



# THE INTELLECTUAL SCIENCES

BARZILLAI QUAIFE



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# The Intellectual Sciences


Barzillai Quaife

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THE INTELLECTUAL SCIENCES;  
OUTLINE LECTURES.



THE INTELLECTUAL SCIENCES;  
OUTLINE LECTURES  
DELIVERED CHIEFLY AT THE  
AUSTRALIAN COLLEGE, SYDNEY,  
IN THE YEARS 1850, 1851,

BY  
BARZILLAI QUAIFE.

VOL. I.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OR PSYCHOLOGY,  
AND  
METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE;  
ALSO,  
SUPPLEMENTARY LECTURE.

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
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16 2 1915



## PREFACE.

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THE grandest of all terrestrial sciences is indisputably Self-knowledge. No study of external Nature can be compared to it in either intrinsic value or relative importance. It therefore forms a direct theme of thought of the most commanding authority. But, in order to pursue it with success, there are branches of Intellectual Science absolutely indispensable. These ought, therefore, to be numbered among its necessary auxillaries. The four courses of these volumes form a kind of curriculum of thought on this vast field of study. The purpose of their preparation, delivery, and publication has been to *throw open* to students, of limited time and means, as well as to any other persons desirous of high mental culture, the branches of knowledge on which the Lectures treat.

The Lectures pretend to be only what they are, necessary aids, introductory to the study of the great sciences of which they treat, and which are elsewhere treated far too voluminously to be available for commencing students.

It is right that it should be understood why the outline form has been adopted, and in what way, in teaching, it has been practically applied.

The form was adopted from pure necessity. Students would lose themselves if sent to large volumes of dense, complicated, and controversial matter, and both time and labour would be spent with more perplexity than profit.

The author had, therefore, to supply his own text-books on these subjects, for there were none ready to his hand.

The reader may be aware of the immense mass of literature on the subjects of these courses, which has been produced in the old countries during between two and three centuries, and which goes on still increasing. Perhaps it may be thought that nothing more within the same range can be wanted. To meet this objection, should it arise against the present publication, the author deems it sufficient to say, that most of this literature is abstruse, controversial, and unavailable for use in teaching, that of much of it, indeed, the very principles are contradictory; that some of it displays irreverence for important theological truths, and for the divinely-constituted nature of man; and that where these faults do not exist, there is rarely such an attempt at simplification and rudimental elucidation, as the work of teaching imperatively demands. The thing wanted, in matters at once so recondite, so vast, and so much out of fashion, is a method which will make that easy which is, for most persons, all but impossible; and that pleasant and profitable, which is usually felt to be too irksome to be entered on at all.

In class, and even in private instruction on such subjects, the teacher must, as much as possible, appear to his pupils at home in his science, independent of the chaotic mass of books, the very mention of which would do nothing but confound them. He must stand as a master, giving his own thoughts, whencesoever he may have derived them.

The feeling of all this led to the outline form of Lectures in the author's case, and compelled him as a lecturer to speak his own mind rather than that of others however celebrated

or worthy. It was the only thing he could do in his position ; and surely he was entitled by natural right to do this rather than forego his work altogether. That he might not embarrass his students he has avoided even quotation and reference throughout as much as possible, preferring that they should look at the matters of instruction in their own light, and with the least external aids. In the Logic alone he has quoted to any considerable extent ; there it has been inevitable.

It will be seen that the Outlines are, throughout, drawn up in Lectures, Sections, and Paragraphs, all numbered for easy reference. It is necessary, then, to say that every division has, for the most part, a leading thought which might be enlarged upon to almost any extent. The fillings up, whenever required, were oral, perhaps even conversational. Another teacher using these Outlines might enlarge in the same manner. Even a private student might easily exercise his thoughts for self-discipline on the same principle.

It must be stated, that this outline form, though open to the enlargement just mentioned, has no chasms of thought to create incoherency. The author thinks he has avoided this defect with some success. Paragraph is so connected, by continuous thought, with paragraph, section with section, and even lecture with lecture, that the whole of one of the courses may be read without difficulty as a compact treatise. More than this must be said—the four courses are similarly connected in the writer's purpose, so as to form one consistent whole.

For the purposes of instruction and self-instruction the advantages of this outline form are easily seen. It brings the whole domain of Intellectual Science before the mind.

almost at a glance ; it makes it possible for even the previously uninstructed to learn at least the rudiments of high philosophy ; it opens a field which any may further explore at their pleasure or convenience. Those who, as the author wishes, make this use of the Outlines, will afterwards be able to form their own views instead of adhering to his ; and the present work will, in their case, have successfully accomplished its disciplinary purpose, of which result he will be heartily glad. Even short of this, the hope may be expressed that the work may be available for many whose busy lives would otherwise preclude them from these most profitable and pleasant speculations.

The Lectures on Mental Philosophy and Metaphysics, and imperfectly those on Logic, were delivered to students at the Australian College in the years 1850-51 ; the original plan of four courses has been completed for subsequent use. Time has not altered the author's views of the utility of the work.


The author has been prompted only by goodwill in writing, lecturing, and consenting to publish. He wishes to stimulate thought, as well as aid it, in matters elevated above all that is sordid and debasing. He looks especially to the advantage of the young generation. He only adds now his earnest wish that his work were more nearly perfect than it is ; but severe bodily infirmity and age must be taken into account.

Lenham Cottage, Woollahra,

29th December, 1872.

NOTICE.—Contrary to the first arrangement, the Second Volume is now made to begin with Moral Philosophy instead of Logic. It has been deemed better.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY  
OR  
PSYCHOLOGY.



# PROGRAMME OF VOL. I.

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# OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, OR PSYCHOLOGY.

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## TWO INTRODUCTORY LECTURES.

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### LECTURE I.

#### PREFATORY NOTES.

##### I.

1. MAN is the chief being on the earth, this member of the vast universe of material spheres. For his use and behoof are all the earth's provisions and arrangements. Every other creature on the earth is not merely inferior, but subservient to him.

2. Obviously then, of all objects on the earth interesting to study, or having relation to that globe, man stands in the first place, and has the first claim. All other things have their gradations of interest, but subordinately to him, and chiefly because of their relation to him.

3. Man, in a sense different from any other creature, is a being of composite nature ; that is, his nature consists of two parts, conjoined, but separable, yet both essential to his temporary, and yet again to his final completeness. These two parts present themselves with scarcely disputable distinctness. The first is his perfect animal system, with its corporeal structure, and all its functions, appetites, and instincts. He is a complete animal in every sense in which the horse or the dog is so. The second is his mind, which ranks him with spiritual beings of the invisible, and makes him superior to all other and mere animals, being that by

which he claims to rule and use them, and to outlive them when his own animal system dies like theirs.

4. It is plain, at once, that this second part of man's nature is the superior, and that for which the other is given. If the inferior, therefore, ought, like all other created things, to be studied, and the more because of the reciprocal adaptations and adjustments between it and them, the superior demands to be studied both for its own nature, and for its relations to all things else. Its demand too is the more imperative on account of this very superiority.

## II.

1. The second or mental part of man's composite nature must be understood to have a distinct nature of its own, which is capable of a separate life, and actually inherits such a life, when the first or animal part dies.

2. This second or mental part, capable of surviving the animal nature, requires, for completeness, to be studied in connection with the animal nature, through which it chiefly acts in regard to the material creation around. Accordingly, some philosophers have almost exclusively thus dealt with Psychology. We say not that this has been wrong for the purposes they have had in view; but we have a different, we may even say, a higher purpose. In the fulfilment of this purpose we are under the necessity of substantifying, so to speak, the mental part, for we are to make its nature, functions, conditions, and destinies, as it is capable of living apart from the body, or in a spiritualized body, our study. We shall therefore only so refer to bodily organizations, or animal instincts and emotions, as may be necessary for perspicuity in our distinct and higher pursuit.

3. The brain is the material instrument of thought, and the chief depositary of feeling, in the present union of mind and body. The whole nervous system is an extended organism of the same kind. The animal appetites materially affect the mind. The animal instincts do likewise. Some

mention of these functions therefore, in the discussion of phenomena, is inevitable. But as these are not the mind, but only the instruments, and material furniture, which the mind is compelled, by the law of its present residence in the body, to use, we shall keep in view its proper nature, and glance at them only as we must.

4. For the purpose, therefore, of these Outlines we must abstract the mind from the body, and study its proper nature and functions apart, though we may gather up the means of that study partly from the body itself.

5. It is in the mind, not in the body, that both the intellectual and the moral nature are to be looked for. And this distinction is absolute and exclusive. The mind must, therefore, have its own physiology, to be studied by a mental anatomist, as truly as the body has for the medical physiologist. It is strange that this should be overlooked as it commonly is, too much, indeed, by some philosophers, but by nearly all educators. The divine, and the educator, as physicians for mind, have as much need to study mental physiology, as medical students have to study the bodily. Neither therefore ought the former study to be omitted any more than the latter, nor ought the two to be mixed to the detriment of the former.

### III.

1. There is a threefold division of man's nature substituted for the above twofold division by some, both philosophers and theologians ; and this introduces us to the terms or designations by which man's superior part is indicated. The text supposed to authorise this threefold division is the expression of St. Paul (I. Thess. v. 23), " I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." There are other passages where like phraseology is employed, and, as these writers suppose, with the like meaning. It is necessary, in these prefatory remarks, to dispose of the discrepancy here indicated, in order

that our nomenclature throughout the Outlines may not be such as to lead to misconception.

2. First, then, we apprehend that the sacred writers, for obvious reasons of utility, employed popular and current rather than technical language ; and there is no reason to think, that the current phrases were often employed with philosophical precision or distinctness. The whole of the Apostle's meaning in the above threefold collection of terms may, therefore, be condensed into the meaning of the one term ὅλως, "thoroughly"—"that you may be kept *thoroughly* (that is, in your whole nature) blameless."

3. If it be thought that this does not satisfy the meaning of the passage, it next comes to be urged against the resting of the threefold division on the ground of the phraseology used in it, that great variety and confusion are observable in terms employed by ancient writers, both scriptural and classical, to designate all things not corporeal in the person of a human being. Such terms are, in Greek, νόος, ψυχὴ, Συμὸς, πνεῦμα ; in Latin, *mens*, *spiritus*, *animus*, *anima* ; in Hebrew, *nephesh*, *ruach*. All these words are derivatives from things, affections, or actions, purely material in original meaning, such as *breathe*, *blow*, and the like. There is, therefore, in them nothing etymological to determine anything to our purpose, and we are driven to take refuge in mere usage—that is, the *usus loquendi* of speakers and writers.

4. The Greek ψυχὴ, and the Hebrew *nephesh*, undoubtedly have the primary meaning of *breath*, and consequently of *animation* ;\* and this meaning is extensively retained in the Old and New Testaments. Nearly the same remark is true of *ruach* and πνεῦμα. The Latin *animus*, *anima*, and *spiritus* are not wanting in like usage.

5. Out of this original use of the terms comes one directly allied, yet a little further advanced. The *animal life* is no

\* The passages of the New Testament are many in which *psyche* means "life."

longer regarded as mere *animation*, it is regarded as a part of the substantive nature or *personality* of the living human animal, almost as if it were distinct from the body, and yet retaining the notion of animated corporeity, or connection with the body itself. This is what modern writers would call, with a still further slight advance of meaning, "*the animal soul*." Now this, and the previous meanings, are applicable to all animals of every grade, from man downwards, on this globe. This we conceive to be the "soul,"  $\psi\chi\eta$ , as distinct from both "body" and "spirit" in St. Paul's passage above cited. The thing is strictly animal, comprising all the animal instincts and appetites, the very life of the body in fact, and having no power of existence apart from the body. It therefore dies with the body, and goes not off into the region of invisible existence. Still it can be made holy, as the body can be made holy, by government from the superior part of man's nature. Hence the prayer of the Apostle is perfectly consistent without the supposition of three parts in man's composite nature.

6. There remain, then, other applications for the terms to that part of man's nature which is separable and undying—the same terms with far higher meanings.

7. Both the Hebrew terms above-mentioned are sometimes used for that part of man's nature in which the moral and intellectual powers reside, whether with a reference to distinct and separable existence, or not. That is, they lose their merely animal import. The same thing must be said of all the Greek and Latin terms. The Greek  $\psi\chi\eta$  is undoubtedly used, by both sacred and classical writers, for mind in contradistinction to body. So is the Homeric term  $\Theta\mu\circ\zeta$ . In Scripture the undying part is many times indicated by  $\psi\chi\eta$ . Hence  $\psi\chi\eta$  with philosophers means "mind," and the derivative compound "psychology," "the science of mind." The word  $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\nu}\mu\alpha$  has a personality in some passages sufficiently remarkable.  $\text{N}\circ\zeta$  often indicates

the intellectual part of man's superior nature, Θυμὸς the emotional, ψυχὴ the moral, and πνεῦμα the whole personality of the mind, in distinction from the body, whether animated or not.

8. In English *usage* we must remark, that "soul" means the immortal spirit of man in its integrity, with all its powers hereafter to be discussed, and yet in its individuality. It is never now used in any other sense. "Mind" is generic, often indeed used with a peculiarly intellectual aspect, but not exclusively so. It is represented rather by ψυχὴ than by any other word. We use the word "mind" for the aggregate rational and moral being of the universe; in this sense "soul" would be unusual. In Scripture, not "mind," but "spirit," is the word for the undying part of man, otherwise called "soul." God is called a "spirit," never "mind," in the Bible; and this may originate the use of the term "spirit" for the immortal part of man.

9. In classical Latin the "soul," or immortal part, is *animus*; later usage gives *anima* for the same. *Mens* represents the mind in an intellectual rather than a moral point of view. But in the use of the terms there is much mingling and interchange of meaning.

10. Whatever confusion there may be in all this, one thing is clear, that the writers never supposed that, in regard to the higher part of man, "mind," "soul," "spirit," meant different substances or components of his nature. Either term would have done to express the whole fact. Still, in our Outlines, we have preferred the word "mind" to the others for prevalent use, since it has a somewhat broader and more intellectual aspect, and is therefore best suited to our purpose. Let it, however, be clearly understood, that we mean by it all that man's immortal spirit means, commonly termed THE SOUL.

## LECTURE II.

### INTRODUCTION TO THE WHOLE SUBJECT OF PSYCHOLOGY.

#### I.

1. There are two, and as far as is conceivable, only two substances in the universe—MIND and MATTER.

2. The existence of Mind can be more easily proved than that of Matter, for matter is capable of an unknown series of analyses, and of infinite division,\* and we cannot tell whether these processes would conduct us. There is no absolute proof that we should not, in the ultimate part of our process, lose the matter we were analysing or dividing. Its ultimate simplicity, with our actual faculties, we could never find.

3. But of mind, in its substance, we can neither find nor conceive analysis or division. The very notion is incongruous. Therefore its essence must be simple; and, being simple, ultimate, and we have its real existence before us.

4. And matter can present itself only through the senses. In the mind then must be the real seat of knowledge. The ideas which represent matter are in the mind—the ideas of mind are not in matter. Mind, then, must be confessed to exist whether matter do or not; while there can be no appreciation of matter without the agency of mind, and consequently no independent evidence of its existence.

5. Moreover, if the mind were to doubt its own existence, that very doubt would prove its existence; for that which has no real existence cannot doubt, because it cannot think.

\* The atomic theory is a mere hypothesis, convenient for its purposes, but neither chemically nor mathematically true. Matter is capable of infinite division. This can be demonstrated. There is, therefore, no such thing apparent as a theoretical atom. In chemistry, ultimate simplicity is unknown. No chemist knows when the last analysis possible to art is reached, if, indeed, it can have any terminus at all.

Doubt is a mode of thought, and thought demonstrates the Being of something which thinks. It is plain that matter does not think, and therefore by thought prove its existence.

6. Thus, then, while we readily admit, on other grounds, the existence of matter, we feel that the existence of mind is more readily demonstrable than that of matter. It is indubitably certain that mind exists, whether matter does or not.

### II.

1. Mind, as above said, is a simple substance ; Matter, as far as we can trace it, is not so.

2. There can, therefore, be no proper analogy in the analysis of matter and of mind ; for in the former it is the *substance* which is analysed, while in the latter it can only be the *properties*.

3. The simplicity of mind is determined by its inherent incapability of analysis.

### III.

1. CONSCIOUSNESS is the vitality of mind, and the great inherent, or rather essential, law of its existence and nature.

2. Mind cannot exist without consciousness, for it is in its very nature to be conscious. There are degrees of mental existence, indefinitely, if not infinitely numerous, from the very lowest trace of animal life to the highest intellectual. In all these there is mind, and consequently consciousness ; but the lowest degrees of mind and consciousness are inappreciable by us, just as there are races of sentient beings so small as to be beyond the utmost refinement of our sight to discern.

3. God is *the* Mind, at once infinite and absolute ; His nature, therefore, is an infinite and absolute Consciousness, which pervades every thing, includes every thing, and therefore knows every thing. The infinite is unlimited, the absolute is unconditioned. God is both.

4. The consciousness which belongs to a creature is both finite and conditioned, and is therefore only commensurate with the finiteness and conditionality of his mind. His consciousness is always exactly commensurate with his mental power, for it is the very life of his mind. If mind were to cease to be conscious, it would cease to be.

5. *Intellect* and *Reason* are only other terms for consciousness, representing it, perhaps, in particular lights, but still meaning in substance the same thing. *Understanding* is another term of the same purport.\* We shall use all these terms as we want them, yet always so as to avoid making them represent separate faculties. The Intellect, then, is vastly more comprehensive than any single or subordinate faculty, as it includes and pervades the whole. It must, therefore, be regarded as identical rather than coincident with Consciousness. It is impossible to separate the notion of Intellect from that of Consciousness, either in God, or in a creature.

6. Consciousness, Reason, or Intellect, is then not a power, faculty, or property of mind to be thought of apart from it, but mind itself, its very vitality and reality.

#### IV.

1. MIND is distinguished by properties or conditions designated "functions," "powers," "faculties," or "susceptibilities," these terms being often interchangeable and practically synonymous. The term "susceptibility," however, has a passive rather than an active import.

2. These properties or conditions do not disturb the simplicity of Mind in its essence, but are mere adaptations to the ends of its creation.

3. These "functions," "powers," "faculties," or "suscep-

\* Intellect is from *Intelligo*, which means "to gather up within," that is, so as to understand and "reason about" things presented to the mind. I cannot hold with Kant's distinctions. Once for all, I think the simplest division of the mental powers is the one to be preferred, and the following Outlines have been drawn up on that principle. The philosophers err on this point.

tibilities," have infinitely numerous modes and degrees of development and operation in the region of mental existence. Such development is twofold—first, that of variety in the same species ; second, that of species.

4. Thus there are individual developments of the powers of mind, distinguishing one man from another ; and specific developments, distinguishing the whole human from the angelic species above, and from all sentient species below.

5. The properties with which the human mind is gifted are of such forms of adaptation as are suited to the necessities of a being destined to be immortal, and to be morally happy or miserable in his immortality. It is this characteristic which distinguishes the mind of the human species from that of the next lower species in the scale of mental existence. It is this, also, which gives to man his peculiar moral rank as an accountable being.

6. Mind, abstractly viewed, is not necessarily and inherently immortal—no mind can be so but the Absolute. Therefore individual minds, whether human or otherwise, are immortal, or not, only by dependence on the will of the Absolute. By that will it is that the minds of the lower species may cease to exist ; and by the same cause the human mind may never cease to exist. The Omnipotent fiat has determined both these conditions, and specially the latter. And in reference to this sovereign destination of the human mind to immortality, it is provided with powers more exalted and specific than those of any inferior grades of creatures.

7. But Mind, of any rank, cannot die as the body dies, by corruption or decay, because it is not, like the body, divisible, or capable of chemical decomposition. Being simple, it has no parts to separate ; not being material, the laws of material change do not affect it. It can, therefore, cease to be only by the withdrawal of the sustaining Power, that is, the will of the Creator.

## V.

1. It is to the properties of mind, designated by either of the terms "functions," "powers," "faculties," or "susceptibilities," our attention must now be directed.

2. The science which relates to this branch of study is a branch of Intellectual Science in general; but being the most accessible, it is taken, in the order of study, before any other branch of the general science which includes it. It is commonly ranged under the science of Metaphysics, and named as if it belonged to that department. For reasons to be hereafter given, we do not adopt this view.\*

3. This branch then has been designated "Mental Philosophy," "Mental Physiology," and "Psychology." We have adopted the first and third of these in our title. There is, however, no valid objection to the second, seeing that the mind must have its physiology as well as the body. Still we shall not use the term "Physiology" in relation to the mind but where we cannot avoid it.

4. It discloses, as its names all import, the Natural History and Physiology of the Human Mind considered substantively as an active and living being, and that in every respect in which it can be viewed. But it includes nothing extrinsic to the mind, its essence, properties, and functional operations. Even of these it treats neither morally nor metaphysically, but only historically or physiologically.

5. It does not include the study of the organism of the brain, or of any other portion of the material structure. The ostensible science of Phrenology is therefore left undisturbed by any question about the truth or falsehood of that theory. It shuns materialism in every form. It keeps to the notion that Mind is Spirit, not Matter, nor any product of the laws of Matter.

\* See Outlines of Metaphysics. Hamilton and Mansel both call the study of the mind "Metaphysics." Brown calls the science "the Physiology of Mind," to which Sir W. H., after Sir James Macintosh, objects.

## VI.

1. The Human Mind then, physiologically, that is, according to the science of Psychology, exhibits its properties, designated as above (1.), under three great and co-ordinate divisions—the intellectual, the moral, and the emotional.

2. The *Intellectual* Department of the mental constitution includes every function which is concerned in the generating of thoughts, ideas, notions, conceptions, reasonings, and knowledge. It is, for study, exclusive of the Power of Volition and the Susceptibility of Emotion, although these are combined with it in all the mind's actual operations.

3. The *Moral* Department has its centre and its character in the Power of Volition, out of which spring all responsible purpose and action.

4. The *Emotional* Department operates as the connecting medium between the Power of Thought, or the Intellectual Department, and the Power of Volition, or the Moral Department, and supplies the capability of mental pleasure and pain, thus furnishing motive. It is the immediate follower of the Power of Thought, and the immediate antecedent of the Power of Volition which it stimulates to act. From its very nature it becomes the seat and reservoir of all the affections and dispositions, habits and propensities, of the heart.

5. The GENERIC division thus of the mental powers is into three departments, the Intellectual, the Moral, and the Emotional:—THE POWER OF THOUGHT, THE POWER OF VOLITION, THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION.

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## PART I.

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### THE POWER OF THOUGHT.

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#### LECTURE I.

##### OBJECTS OF THOUGHT ; EXTRINSIC ; INTRINSIC ; SUBCLASSES OF EXTRINSIC ; SENSES, SENSATION, PERCEPTION.

###### I.

1. THE POWER OF THOUGHT is the power of generating ideas, notions, conceptions, and arguments, and so of gaining knowledge. The primary elements of knowledge are always ideas.\* The term "Reason" is coincident in signification, and must be so understood wherever it is used of a finite mind in these Outlines; for the Reason of a man comprises the whole of his intellectual constitution.

2. This Power exercises itself on two distinct classes of objects—the one wholly EXTRINSIC to the mind reasoning, the other wholly INTRINSIC.

3. The objects *extrinsic* to a given mind are all things to which the mind has access only through the senses, and all matters of abstract contemplation, and all other minds besides that of the observer, and all the exercises of mind *per se*, apart from self-knowledge and experience.

4. The objects *intrinsic* to a given mind are its operations within itself, as matters of direct self-knowledge and self-examination.

\* A word rejected by some philosophers on account of the original error of its use.  
See notes to Lec. II., Sec. I., 4.

5. The adaptation of the Power of Thought to this second class of objects, the *intrinsic*, is that which peculiarly distinguishes the mind of man from that of creatures of lower grades, and constitutes the intellectual or rational basis of man's moral nature. This will hereafter (Lec. vi. i. 2), be denominated, "Introversion of Thought."

## II.

1. THE EXTRINSIC OBJECTS OF THOUGHT are subdivided into—those which are accessible only through the senses—and those which are attainable by a purely intellectual process. Both these divisions, which we denominate "subclasses," are materials of knowledge, but the primary means of approaching them are not the same. "The Power of Thought," of which we are now treating, includes mental adaptations to reach them both. We deal first with subclass I.

2. The means with which the mind is furnished to gain the knowledge of things accessible only through the senses are, primarily, the functions of sensation and perception.

3. SENSATION is the connecting link between the Senses and the Mind. Sensation is a susceptibility rather than a faculty; it resides wholly in the mind, but bears on the bodily functions. It is the power which the mind possesses of receiving impressions through the senses, and also of receiving impulses from those first impressions of material objects.

4. The senses are wholly in the animated body; sensation is wholly in the mind. A sensation may be a state of mind produced by an outward impulsion. In this case sensations are as numerous as our moments or points of contact with the material world. But sensation, considered as a function, is one, and only one. There is but one susceptibility for all the actual sensations which may be produced.

5. This susceptibility, physiologically, is incapable of analysis, and must therefore be regarded as absolutely simple.

The sensations produced may, singly, be simple or complex as they are results of the contact of one or more of the senses with things exterior, or with one thing or more at the same time.

6. When therefore we speak of sensations in the plural, or of any sensation as produced by two or more senses, or by the contact of two or more material objects, we do not refer to the *function or susceptibility*, which always exists whether there be impressions made upon it or not; but to the incidental and variable state or states of mind to which it gives rise. But when we use the term "sensation" in the singular number, and without an article, we mean the *function, the susceptibility, of sensation*.

7. Physiologically, then, sensation is a primitive function of the mind, constituting a power by itself, and is entirely simple. Its design is to connect the mind with the senses, and, through them, with all material existence.

### III.

1. **PERCEPTION** is the other function, constituting a faculty, by which material things are apprehended.

2. The same distinction holds between perception as a function, and any actual perception as either an act or a product of that function, as exists in regard to sensation and its impressions (see previous section). Any actual perception is the state of mind immediately following any particular sensation. There can be no actual perception without some preceding sensation.

3. Sensation may exist without resulting in perception, in consequence of the interruption of the process. In this case there is nothing which can properly be denominated thought. There is not even a rudimental idea. The state of mind reaches not an intellectual elevation, and may be considered exclusively animal. Perception is necessary to any actual idea or notion of a material substance exciting a sensation.

4. Perception functionally considered, that is, the *Power*

## 16 PERCEPTION A COMPOUND OF SENSATION AND REASON.

of Perception, is not primitive and simple. It can be analysed. Sensation precedes it, and forms part of it. *As a function*, sensation is essential to it; and of every particular act of perception, a corresponding particular sensation is a constituent. That is, the sensation, first existing by itself, is continued during perception, which is partly composed of it.

5. The other constituent of perception as a function, *is that particular direction of consciousness which determines rationally*. In other words, it is Reason in exercise.

6. Any particular act of perception is an intelligent notice of some object\* of a corporal sense. It is more than a sensation, and yet must include one. Any intelligent notice must involve an act of Reason. The sensation is a state of mind purely passive, but perception is active.

7. What is therefore regarded as the *faculty* of perception can be no other thing than Sensation combined with Reason in action. Any *act* of perception must be similarly estimated. In the *readiness* of this conjunction, the first adaptation of the Power of Thought to material objects of knowledge can alone consist.†

### IV.

1. All beings, intelligent in whatever degree of consciousness (Introd. Lec. II. iii. 2), and endowed with corporeity, must, as a condition of their connection with the material world, possess some modification or other of sensation, and a corresponding modification of perception. Whether their senses be refined and delicate, or gross and obtuse, or whether they have five senses, or five hundred, or only one or two, the exercise and necessity of sensation and perception must be the same, to bring them into acquaintance with material realities.

\* If that object present itself as complex, the apparent complexity will produce a combination of acts of perception. But sometimes, perhaps the more frequently, the object will appear, and the act will be, simple.

† Compare what Sir W. Hamilton and Mansel say on this subject. Note January 3, 1872.

2. These principles must, therefore, be included in the Power of Thought in the case of all beings possessing animated and sensitive corporeity, for they all possess both sensation and consciousness.

3. This remark specially applies to man in his present state, and to his nature as the object of our researches.

V.

1. Sensation and Perception have thus been distinguished as functions and processes, the former being the basis of the latter. Any process of sensation having resulted in a perception, the remaining portion of the latter pertains wholly to the Intellectual Power in its issues, just as much as if the senses had never been employed at all.

2. We have, therefore, to consider the susceptibility of sensation as the *inlet* to all knowledge of *material* things, to an entire hemisphere of knowledge.

3. And we have to admire the beautiful simplicity of this arrangement, producing such a munificence of stupendous and transcendent results.

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LECTURE II.

SUGGESTION. CONCEPTION.

I.

1. The second subclass of Extrinsic objects of thought comprises those with which the senses have no concern, and which, therefore, are accessible only by processes purely intellectual.

2. This division includes abstractions of every sort except those represented by the names of sensible properties. Virtues and vices, defects and redundancies, qualities and principles mental and moral, the thoughts and reasonings of other minds, the whole sphere of notions and conclusions

in science, Metaphysics in all its branches, Mathematics, Morals, Religion, Political Economy, Laws—belong to this department of knowledge.

3. We call these objects of thought extrinsic, not in relation to the body, but in relation to the mind. They are not a part of the mental constitution, or of its operations subjectively, that is, in the Mind that observes them. They are wholly objective to the observing mind, and are equally capable of being the objects of the operation of any other mind or minds. To any given mind they are, therefore, extrinsic.

4. The primary elements of knowledge are commonly termed “ideas,” and are entirely of rudimentary form, more so than even notions. They are objects of thought, as truly as what is more mature, and are therefore only intellectually apprehended. The term “idea” is useful rudimentally, and for that reason we retain it whenever we want it, though in a sense very different from its original.\* It has now a meaning wholly intellectual, and nobody understands it otherwise. Retaining the term, therefore, we say that ideas may be generated wholly without the aid of the senses, wholly without the processes of sensation and perception; and then they belong to this second subclass.

5. The terms “idea” and “notion” are equally applicable when sensation and perception have brought in the elements from without. Whenever a perception is complete the immediate result is an “idea,” the next, more mature, is a “notion.” Here sensation is concerned in generating thought. Still, ideas and notions are wholly intellectual however generated.

6. Hence the abstract terms used as names of sensible

\* The word *idea* was used by philosophers for a mental image, as if thoughts presented themselves in a kind of bodily shape. One of its meanings was “image,” hence the abuse. But this is no reason for a disuse of the word under a correcter appreciation. Hamilton substitutes “notion” for it. We use both, for we think we see a difference in their degrees of advancement. The reader may accept our view or not according to his own judgment or preference. We shall often use the words indiscriminately where nothing depends on the distinction.

qualities, such as "soundness," "redness," "sweetness," are representatives of ideas, as well as the other abstract terms (2).

## II.

1. The functions of the mind act within certain fixed limits, and according to certain invariable modes called "laws." The law is as much a property of the mind as the function is. It has all the nature of a function, and yet something more. The physiological property of the mind, which takes the lead as a law in any intellectual process involving a connection of ideas, is THE LAW OF SUGGESTION, ordinarily, but, as we think, less accurately, called "Association."

2. This law is a susceptibility as well as a mode. The term "susceptibility" more correctly applies to it, as it does to sensation, than the term "power," on account of its passive nature. It involves no necessary activity. *Suggestion* holds the like place in a purely mental process, as Sensation does in a process which produces perceptions.

3. Suggestion, like sensation, has the twofold character of an inherent and unchanging law or function, and an actual mental process. Considered as a susceptibility it is always inherent; otherwise it is the accidental link between two ideas or notions. In Psychology, suggestion generally means the law, function, or susceptibility; when otherwise, the meaning will always be plain.

4. The mind is endowed with this singular property, that one idea, notion, or thought, shall always bring some other in its train. It is this peculiarity which is denominated "Suggestion."

5. Any particular process of suggestion must always begin with an idea, notion, or thought. It does not necessarily involve either direct volition or mental sanity in its continuance. Thought will suggest thought, or more properly idea will suggest idea, whether the mind be in a state of

highly excited activity or not. In either case the physiology of the principle is precisely the same, all the difference being foreign to the nature of the law.

6. It matters not what is the origin of the first idea in a process of suggestion. It may result from an act of perception, or it may spring from a cause wholly abstract. Suggestion cannot begin till the first idea be obtained; and as every idea, whatever its source, is wholly intellectual, the process of suggestion is necessarily so.

7. We regard suggestion, as we do sensation, as primitive and simple, since there is no conceivable analysis of it. It is also the first law of the Power of Thought, or functionally, its first constituent. Its place and office, after the first intellectual operation producing an idea, are analogous to those of sensation in producing such an operation. It however belongs to both subclasses, which sensation does not. It is the *inlet* to all knowledge of *immaterial* things—to a second hemisphere of knowledge.

### III.

1. CONCEPTION holds a place in the second subclass, analogous to that of Perception in the first. The word is used, however, in a threefold manner—Conception is a function, or a process, or an object.\*

2. The faculty must be understood to stand out distinctly from either the process or the object, in order that we may know what its nature is, and what is its proper place in the mental economy; and yet we should never have known the faculty without its operations. The discussion of it, therefore, cannot be kept distinct beyond its first analysis.

\* This function, &c., is called by Whately, "Simple Apprehension." Hamilton uses the word "conception" for both the function and the process. For the object, the latter uses the word "Concept." There would be no objection to this if we had the symmetrical word "percept," for the object of perception. It is better to use "conception" objectively than a one-sided term. We shall, therefore, adhere to it.—Jan. 4, 1872. Additional note, April 18. "The sense in which Sir W. Hamilton uses the word *Conception* is explained in a note to Reid's Works, p. 377—namely, the combination of two or more attributes in a unity of representation."—Mansel's "Philosophy of the Conditioned."

3. As then the faculty of perception is compounded of sensation, which begins before it, and is continued in it (Lect. I., Sect. iii., 4, 5), and of intellect; so conception is compounded of suggestion beginning before it and continued in it, and of intellect in activity. The office of perception is to introduce ideas, or notions of things presented to the senses. The ideas or notions so introduced become the property of the intellect, the material with which it works, together with the ideas or notions furnished by the mind to itself without the aid of the senses. It has been shown that ideas are the rudimentary materials of knowledge. Notions are more advanced and less rudimentary. But neither ideas nor notions are complete realizations or perfected thoughts; they are but the materials out of which the *faculty* of conception makes its objective conceptions (or "concepts."—*Ham.*).

4. A complete realization, or thought, in the mind, is not a single idea or notion, but a combination of two or more.\* The term "conception" is used to denote, objectively, such a complete realization or thought. In this case, neither the function, nor the process, is meant by the word.

5. There can be no such complete realization—that is, no perfect objective conception—without suggestion both in function and operation, as there can be no objective perception without sensation. As faculties, the second could not exist without the first, and the first is continued in the very nature of the second. Similarly, the processes are involved in each other, the process of suggestion and the process of conception. Then, in like manner, the ideas or notions which form the material on which suggestion acts, although they are singly taken up, when combined, form the objective conception—that is, the perfected realization just mentioned. As before said, the ideas may be furnished by perception, or generated by a purely mental process without the senses; it

\* In common talk, a single idea, even a very imperfect one, is often inaccurately called a "conception."

matters not whence they come, when in a state of combination, under the law of suggestion, they form an objective conception.\* In fact, every complete combination of ideas or notions of the mind into one, from whatever source derived, is an objective conception, and is the result of a function or a process of suggestion working with intellect. Thus the function of suggestion helps to form that of conception, in which function and power mean the same thing, being decidedly active because the intellect they involve is so. Thus, also, the *power* is conception *functionally*; the *process* is conception, when finished, *operatively*; and the *product* is conception *objectively*.

6. The *defect of analogy* between perception and conception, whether as functions or processes, consists in these points—that perception deals with single ideas and notions, conception does not; that perception is preliminary, conception is completory; that perception is limited to one class of ideas and notions, the sensible, while conception uses both classes—the sensible furnished and made ready for it by perception, and the intellectual produced by operations wholly internal. The *analogy* consists in these points—that conception holds the like position with regard to the mind and its productions that perception does with regard to body and mind conjointly; and that both are compound principles, holding *Reason*, both of them, as their chief constituent, and supplementing this by the appliances of sensation and suggestion respectively.

7. As sensations may be unproductive of objective perceptions, so suggestion may leave the mind without a complete realization, or objective conception. The process may in either case be disturbed or suspended. It is evident, therefore, that suggestion and conception are not to be confounded, though the former is essentially necessary to the latter. Conception is more than suggestion, as perception

\* This subject is further illustrated, so far as objective conceptions are concerned, in Outlines of Logic.

is more than sensation. Another constituent is necessary, and that constituent is intellect, or "that particular direction of consciousness which determines rationally" (Lect. i., Sect. iii., 5). In other words, it is REASON IN EXERCISE.

8. Succinctly, and without further elucidation of the word, any given conception is an intelligent realization, operatively, of some complex object of pure thought. It is certainly more than mere suggestion, which is the connecting-link of idea or notion with idea or notion. Yet it includes suggestion. None but a rational being can form a conception objectively, can experience the process, or possess the power.

9. The function or power, therefore, of Conception in man is not rudimentary ; it is a complete conjunction of Suggestion with Reason ; and in the *readiness* of this conjunction consists the second adaptation of the Power of Thought to the objects of knowledge.

#### IV.

1. Considered as results or products of the law, function, or process in which they originate, suggestions and conceptions may be infinitely numerous, and infinitely varied, according to the mental circumstances which may exist or arise to produce, determine, or modify them. And as the functions are always the same, so every process must be single, must have a commencement and a termination, and must succeed, and give place to, other processes with which it may have no connection.

2. The mental history of every person is made up of such individual processes, with their necessary connections and results.

3. The susceptibility of suggestion is one, and always the same. So is the complex power of conception. And this oneness and sameness is not altered however numerous and varied the results may be objectively, under the very same names.

4. It thus appears that the Power of Conception is a very grand power at the entrance of the intellectual economy, and that its component suggestion is the chief law of that economy. It will soon be seen how far it exerts its influence, and what effects it produces.

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### LECTURE III.

#### How SUGGESTION OPERATES.

##### I.

1. Suggestion, considered as a LAW, is brought into operation by various subordinate laws, giving it peculiar development and specific direction.

2. First, the occasions which primarily act upon it, and give it impulse, are external to itself, whether they be external to the thinking mind or not.

3. Second, when one idea suggests another, it is always in consequence of some kind of relation between them. The relation may be either incidental and non-essential, in which case it may be called circumstantial; or essential and material, in which case it is inevitable.

##### II.

1. A relation incidental, non-essential, or circumstantial, may be one of mere and casual *comparison*, or one of simple or accidental *contiguity*.

2. There is indeed always contiguity in comparison, for two things cannot be compared, unless they be intellectually brought together. The real relation therefore in every degree of comparison is either that of contiguity simply, or partly composed of it. But deliberate comparison is an effort of active mental power, and implies intention. Yet even intention may be momentary, and casually awakened by the accidental finding of two things together. Even in this case,

the power of comparing things thus suddenly and extemporaneously placed before the mind arises purely from the suggestive function at work. When premeditated and determinate comparison takes place, the process has reached a stage involving judgment ; but this must be reserved for a future remark.

3. Yet without implying the action of a process so deliberative, two ideas or notions may be at once presented to the mind, so that instantaneous comparison will be drawn between them. Further, they may appear in resemblance, in difference, or in contrast. It may be still observed that, even thus far, the appearance may be circumstantial and casual, and nothing more ; yet the comparison will be made under the law of suggestion.

4. The relation of simple or incidental contiguity may not involve comparison, but merely, either contemporaneousness or immediate sequence, the mind being in a state wholly passive.

### III.

1. Simple contiguity may appear to the mind in regard to either space or time.

2. When two occurrences have happened at the same spot, or in the same locality, the law of suggestion will cause that the idea of the one be immediately accompanied or followed by that of the other. If this do not take place, it may be attributed either to the natural limitation of human powers, or specially to the defective energy or organization of the brain as the instrument of human thought. It takes place, however, so often as to give the notion of a law ; and this law evidently originates in a peculiar property, function, or susceptibility of the mind, or is identical therewith.

3. The very same thing will take place, and in an equal number of instances, in regard to two occurrences which have happened at or near the same time ; the idea of the one will bring the idea of the other.

4. The subordinate law which produces this effect is called “the relation of contiguity;” contiguity of occurrences in place or time will occasion contiguity of their ideas in the mind. But this contiguity may be purely casual and contingent. There may be no inherent relation between the two occurrences, or between the corresponding ideas.

5. The occurrences related in contiguity may be either extrinsic to the mind, or intrinsic. Two thoughts or feelings may be thus related, as well as two external events.

## IV.

1. Even when comparison is most casual (ii. 2, 3), there is more than simple contiguity—there is an essential relation, there are apprehended properties ; and however simple and extemporaneous the properties may be, it is these properties which are brought into relation. They are the real matters of comparison, even in its primary and rudimentary form.

2. That comparison is primary and rudimentary which is wholly incidental, and has yet exercised no attention. *Comparison* in this first stage depends entirely on circumstances of a contingent nature. This is, therefore, among the lowest of intellectual operations.

3. Nevertheless, the primary, even though thoughtless and mistaken, apprehension of the properties of two things, will produce this stage of comparison. The two things will appear to the mind alike, or different, or in contrast.

4. When two ideas have appeared to the mind alike, they will afterwards suggest each other ; and the principle of this suggestion is the LAW, or RELATION, of RESEMBLANCE.

5. When two ideas have appeared to the mind in direct and strong contrariety, they will also suggest each other ; and the principle is the LAW, or RELATION, of CONTRAST.

6. DIFFERENCE is intermediate between RESEMBLANCE and CONTRAST. Contrast is Difference complete and total.

7. Except in minds of finer texture, mere difference will

rarely operate by suggestion. The law is, in this case, generally latent, but still it operates so often as to reveal its existence.

## V.

1. Co-existence and Succession, are forms of contiguity in space and time. Mentally they imply association, however widely separated the things may be in fact.

2. Two things, though as remote from each other as infinite space can make them, if thought of as co-existing, are associated in the mind by the relations of contiguity, and under the law of suggestion may often return together.

3. Succession has the like reference to time as co-existence has to space. The intervals may be vastly extended; but if one thing have been perceived to have a social relation to another, the law of contiguity will operate.

4. But in these cases there is this difference from the cases of contiguity before mentioned (iv.), that the association of ideas is wholly mental, and independent of sensible observation. There are mere co-existence and succession attached to the ideas thought of. In the former cases there was supposed to be an outward and real contiguity, actually observed and known by experience.

## VI.

1. A RELATION OF ESSENCE between two things or ideas both originates and continues in their very nature, and is therefore material and inevitable (i. 3).

2. Every correlation belongs to this department, whether perfect or not, so that it be genuine. Examples are obvious.

3. The notion of creator essentially attaches itself to that of creature ; that of husband to that of wife ; that of parent to that of child ; that of ruler to that of subject ; that of master to that of servant ; and so on.\*

\* Sir W. Hamilton, and Mansel from him, argue that these are not true instances of the law of suggestion, because, say they, the correlative notions contain each other ; they are certainly wrong in both reason and conclusion. The notions do not

4. The notion of genus is essentially allied to that of species, and *vice versa*; and in its turn the notion of species is essentially connected with that of individual, and *vice versa*. Moreover, the notion of essence inevitably requires that of the individual forms in which it is made apparent as its finite manifestation, itself being metaphysically infinite.\*

5. All this is as true of ideas or notions purely generated in the mind as it is of those borrowed from external nature. Thus, triangle inevitably connects itself with the notion of angle, parallelism with lines, and circle with centre, in the mind of a mathematician even though he were born blind. Even moral and physical attributes suggest each other correlative, both in contrariety and alliance. Thus we have love correlative with practical kindness on the one hand, and with malignity on the other, in processes of abstract thought.

6. In proportion to the native or acquired readiness with which the mind penetrates the essences of things or thoughts thus related, will the law of suggestion operate readily in associating the correlative ideas; and the principle, wholly subordinate to that general law, may in this case be fitly denominated—**THE LAW OF INHERENT or ESSENTIAL RELATIONS.**

7. It is chiefly by virtue of this law that processes of abstract reasoning are carried on.

## VII.

### 1. Sensations and suggestions always exist as pure suscep-

contain each other; they are simply necessary to each other, and tied to each other by an indissoluble law. The husband is not the wife, nor in the wife; the wife is not the husband, nor in the husband. They are distinct in every personal and substantial respect. In no sense, either physical or metaphysical, is the one person in the other. Note, Jan. 9, 1872.

\* Hamilton objects to this also, assigning the same reason. It must be allowed that the reason is much more apparently true in these cases. But the objection even in these latter instances, belongs not to Psychology, but to Logic, whence it has been unfitly brought. We therefore adhere to our original text, and maintain that the law of suggestion does operate in the cases mentioned. Note, Jan. 9, 1872.

Further Note.—It seems to me that any two conceptions or notions whatever which reciprocally imply each other are true correlatives. Sep. 21.

tibilities or functions, whether the mind be in an active or in a passive state ; and therefore, if by activity of mind is meant voluntary self control, or an actually purposed government of thought, these functions do not *per se* contain any active principle.

2. When, however, the processes of sensation and suggestions issue, the former in an actual perception, the latter in a conception, intellectual activity has been put forth ; for these latter conditions of mind include the active force of reason in the principles or functions that produce them.

3. Since, therefore, the composite nature of perception and conception includes an active principle, these, as functions, become active, though their components, sensation and suggestion, operate only passively as mere laws of our mental nature, primary laws of human consciousness always existing.

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## LECTURE IV.

### THREE DEVELOPMENTS OF SUGGESTION—MEMORY, REFLECTION, IMAGINATION.

#### I.

1. ATTENTION is not a power or faculty of the mind, but it is the intellectual nature of the mind stimulated to an active effort by a determination of the will. Attention always depends on volition, and includes its force. It is, therefore, an effort voluntary and highly active.

2. When an idea arises, whether as an object of perception or of conception, it becomes the object of Attention ; and its relation to other ideas is discerned ; and this also becomes the object of Attention. The law of suggestion introduces a succession of such ideas, each of which, together with its relations, becomes, in turn, the object of Attention.

3. In such a train of ideas, the whole power by which

their harmony, diversity, contrariety, relation, or disjunction is discerned, is usually designated "THE UNDERSTANDING." This power is compound, not indeed in essence, but in properties; and it includes all the functions heretofore and hereafter described. It forms one great division or faculty.

4. The *Faculty* of Understanding exists independently of its particular employment; but to every *act* of understanding attention is necessary. Any such act is denominated "judgment"; its product "*a judgment*"; but "*the judgment*" is nearly synonymous with "*the understanding*," with a more specific shade of activity. This shade of greater activity in the judgment is, in fact, the difference between the two notions.

5. A highly refined condition of the active nature of the judgment is what is commonly known by the name of TASTE. This is the power which can distinguish qualities agreeable or preferable, proprieties and elegances, in matters of choice and appropriation. Taste, as a refined judgment, is necessary in all the arts and professions of life, for adornment, and for the higher culture. It is, however, the judgment itself, and not a separate faculty, which, by refinement, becomes what we call "*Taste*."

6. REASON is the power of thought; it is the same as the intellect, the understanding, the judgment, only with another phase. It is the first of the three great powers, with a more comprehensive name. It includes a government of all the processes of intelligence, as it is itself the essence of all intelligence.

7. But *reasoning* is the voluntary and energetic employment of the understanding in acts of judgment upon serial notions drawn up by suggestion, and upon their mutual relations, in a specific train of thought, so as to issue in some proposition which *the judgment* pronounces true or false.

8. Now in every such process, and in every part of such process, suggestion is the primary and simple law which, governing all subordinate ones, and combining everywhere

with the great power of Reason, or acting upon intellect, and strengthened by attention, furnishes all the phenomena of determinate thought.

## II.

1. There are three developments of great importance in the mental economy, subservient to all the operations of the Power of Thought. These are memory, reflection, imagination. We must regard these, in the first place, in their simply passive and primary form, as they exist without any effort of attention or voluntary purpose. They are all developments of the function of suggestion.

2. MEMORY is *suggestion* in regard to past occurrences or ideas. If the series of such occurrences be not represented by an equal series of ideas, or if the series of ideas be broken at any point, there is what is called a defect of memory. Perhaps the development of memory, considered as a faculty, is defective. This means, that suggestion in this direction is wanting in reliable firmness; or, that the law of suggestion here is weak or imperfect. The faculty of memory being free from such defect, and no essential interruption taking place, the whole of every series of past ideas would present itself to the mind on the introduction of the first idea of that series; and in every such instance we should see a complete example of the power of the law of suggestion. Memory is nothing else than the law of suggestion bringing up one past idea after another.

3. Memory, thus defined, is indispensable to all the mental processes, for these include time as an essential element, and time is lost to the mind without memory. In every instance of suggestion time is supposed in the transition of thought. One idea must precede another at however short an interval, for the suggesting idea must anticipate the idea suggested. Now, if the first idea, being thrust into past time, could not be connected with the second as its successor, and so retained, the whole process would want guidance and govern-

ment, and would issue in no intelligible and definite result. Every process of reasoning, therefore, depends on memory ; that is, on the continued suggestion, backwards or forwards, of past ideas up to the earliest or latest in the train, each one by its successor or predecessor, the order of memory for the most part, but not always, reversing that of the original process.

4. This makes it evident that memory has two modes in reasoning, and in both suggestion is equally apparent. In the immediate act of reasoning there is the continued connection of idea with idea, the last being specially borne in mind in connection with the present one. This takes place by the law of suggestion in the form of memory. But correct reasoning cannot be sustained without the power of reversing the whole of the previous process ; and this is done by suggestion leading back to the commencement, or else by reverting at once, by an effort of strong and forced association, from the present idea to the first in the train, and then descending again through every link to the present.

5. The mind may yield itself, with passive resignation, to the uncontrolled influence and conduct of suggestion, in reference to things past, and actually exercise no reasoning power. But this in no respect alters the fact that memory is suggestion, for the law of suggestion does not contain any principle of activity. The mind may, therefore, by this process, be placed simply in the attitude of general and indeterminate thought.

### III.

1. REFLECTION is a direction of thought distinct from memory. Reasoning, however, equally depends upon it. It reaches forwards, and in every direction, in pursuit of the next ideas. It does this because it is a development of suggestion.

2. As in the case of memory, so here, we have primarily to do with the function in its simply elementary form, with-

out any exertion of active mental power. Reflection may be as passive as memory. The reason is, that in every bearing suggestion may be wholly passive, calling forth no effort of the will.

3. In this case, however, it aims at no result—not even that which it may ultimately reach. Perhaps the result may not be clearly, if at all, seen in the distance. The process amounts merely to this—one idea after another is picked up by the mind in its vagrancy, and connected successively with its predecessors till a definite end is reached. All this can take place without the exertion of active mental power. Nevertheless it is reflection, though in its lowest and most rudimentary form. Plainly the law of suggestion sustains it.

4. The proper materials on which this function works, are thoughts and ideas, not sensible things, or things hypothetically conceived to be sensible.

5. The state of mind exhibited under this phase is that which we called *musing*. When reflection is governed by volition it rises above musing, and actively *uses* suggestion for a definite purpose.

#### IV.

1. IMAGINATION is the third development of suggestion, and this, too, may be simply passive and rudimentary.

2. An "image" in the mind is the conception of some object composed of parts or properties known to be real or sensible. When the function of conception is thus employed in bringing together sensible properties, and compounding their ideas into one objective form as if it were an image, the faculty by which this is done bears the name of *imagination*. Memory will be concerned in the process, which nevertheless is distinct from memory. When memory has supplied the ideas from past knowledge, imagination will take them up and combine them into images, or conceptions. These will, therefore, be compounded of those ideas. It is only the ideas of real or sensible parts or properties that can

be thus employed by imagination. This is plainly a development of suggestion, for the idea of one sensible property is suggested by another till a complete image or conception is formed.

3. An image of this kind may be either rationally and logically composed of congruous ideas, or irrationally composed of ideas not congruous. In both cases the ideas must represent realities or facts, things historically real, or capable of being so, and therefore of apprehended possibility, having their types in things historically real. There is no faculty in the human mind to create sensible notions of things never presented. What is called a "creative \* genius" does not create sensible ideas; it first derives them from existing realities, and then combines them as it will. The image so created is only a combination of pre-existing ideas. Every sensible idea represents something in actual existence, which the mind could have never apprehended had it not so existed.

4. When ideas are congruous, they may be combined so as to form an image of some real or historical being, some being that has, or has had, an actual existence, and which may therefore be historically presented to the mind. The more nearly perfect the function by which this is done, the more vividly correct and graphic will the image be. Thus nature will be truly represented to the mind. It is a high degree of intensity in the law in operation here, which is fundamental to the poetic temperament.

5. Congruous ideas may also be combined in merely possible forms; and here appears in clear light and prominence the creative power of poetry. The image brought up may be in no respect unnatural; and yet it may, as a whole, represent nothing which has an actual or historical existence.

6. When the ideas which compose a mental image are con-

\* Identical with "poetic." The Greek word *poieo* signifies "to make." A poetical faculty "makes." A "poet," *poietes*, was so called from his creative power.

gruous, whether the being represented be historical or merely possible, the combination is logical and natural. The law of suggestion is clearly operative in bringing them together.

7. But the ideas which compose an image may be incongruous, illogical, and unnatural in combination, and then the image will be grotesque and caricatured, or monstrous. This is by no means necessary to the poetic temperament, though in minds prone to humour it accompanies it. Still suggestion here is in great force.

8. Now the relations of comparison and simple contiguity, of resemblance, difference, and contrast, are all employed in imagination, which is thus shewn to be a development of the great law or function of suggestion, to which these relations are all subordinate.

9. Two products of the principle illustrated in this section are specially to be observed. The first is, that if the development of imagination is both vigorous in itself, and accompanied by great activity and force of will, it results in a power of INVENTION, whether tending outwardly to mechanical contrivances, or inwardly to poetry (4, 7). The second is, that when highly cultivated and refined, imagination becomes what is called FANCY. Put it briefly thus—Fancy is imagination highly refined.

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## LECTURE V.

### THREE DEVELOPMENTS OF REASON—THE POWERS OF ABSTRACTION, ANALYSIS, AND SYNTHESIS.

#### I.

1. The preceding functions and laws are all included in the "Power of Thought," and are essential to it as elements. Including these and their uses, the "Power of Thought" constitutes one great and all-governing faculty of the human

mind ; and this faculty is the prime moving power of intellect, the determinately active form of consciousness, which is the very vitality of mind.

2. And the full determination of the Power of Thought is Reason, of which suggestion is the first element, beginning with the first idea of a series, whether acquired from sensation or otherwise.

3. Reason has three developments, sustained by the three developments of suggestion described in Lec. iv. They are the powers respectively of ABSTRACTION, ANALYSIS, and SYNTHESIS. Afterwards come the several compounds of these.

4. The whole power of what is called "generalization" is contained in the combination of the three powers described in this lecture. For this see Logic.

## II.

1. *Abstraction*, as a condition of the whole reasoning power, is not what we mean as the first of the above-mentioned three developments of Reason. The term is popularly used to designate the withdrawal of attention from all disturbing thoughts, so that the mental force is, without impediment, applied to a process unmixed with the elements of any other. The term does not improperly express this state of mind, which, however, is neither a distinct function, nor a development of Reason the grand function, but an intensity of the Power of Attention. (Lec. iv., Sec. i.)

2. THE POWER OF ABSTRACTION which is now to be considered, is a development of Reason, the first, and necessarily the lowest, of the three (i. 3). It is rudimentary, but distinct and important. It is the power by which a single property in an object of thought is withdrawn from all others, and made a matter of separate contemplation.

3. This is not a power of complete investigation ; it limits its efforts to one of several associated constituents ; it does not reach the height, length, breadth, and depth of a matter,

but contents itself with isolating one property, touching nothing beyond. Or, if it advance farther, it still deals with each successive property in the same way. It regards ideas and notions only in their singleness and isolation.

4. It is therefore evident, that, while this power is necessary to the other two, it is lower and weaker than they.

### III.

1. THE POWER OF ANALYSIS is the next development of Reason, and is higher by one degree. But it cannot exist without the Power of Abstraction.

2. Two things are requisite in analysis, the apprehension of each part of an object of thought, and the assurance that no part of that object is overlooked. The Power of Abstraction is necessary for the first, and the Power of Analysis is completed by the second. Every property must be revealed that belongs to the essence of an object ; if a single essential property be unnoticed, the analysis is incomplete.\*

3. If the subject of the process be material, that is, accessible to the senses, and approachable primarily only by them, sensation and perception are of course concerned in the first part of the process ; but if it be an affair purely intellectual, the process is exclusively of the same character.

4. To analyse recondite and abstruse, as, for example, metaphysical principles, demands a decidedly higher development of the Power of Thought, or Reason, than to withdraw any single idea or property, and to fix meditation solely upon it. The expansion required is vastly greater, and the energy of mind needs to be correspondingly corroborated and confirmed. The necessary persuasion of certitude demands a greater intensity and extent of apprehension. To single out one property from several is easy ; to apprehend all the properties in a collection of many, singly, and

\* But see note on Logic, Pt. I., Lec. vi., Sec. iii., par. 7

justly, and so as to feel sure that not one has escaped detection and scrutiny, is far more difficult, and imperiously demands a higher development of the Power of Thought.

5. This second and higher development we call the Power of Analysis. It must be observed that it deals solely with experience, and enters not into the region of speculation, of conjecture, or of fancy.

#### IV.

1. THE POWER OF SYNTHESIS is the third and highest development of Reason—it is, in fact, the highest intellectual power of the human mind.

2. As the Power of Abstraction may exist without reaching on to that of analysis, so may they both exist without reaching on to that of synthesis; while to a perfect Power of Synthesis the two former developments are rudimentary and necessary.

3. Synthesis is the placing together, in strict combination as one whole, of all the parts or properties of any matter of thought. The term, however, is used only for the *mental* process or its results; it is never used for the merely physical or rather material composition.

4. To be enabled to pursue analysis to its true and proper end by tracing out thence the hidden laws and relations which it reveals, until by their aid we have reached the universal and all-embracing laws which unite all together, and to apprehend the unity and harmony of the combination so formed, requires the Power of Synthesis.

5. Variety is revealed by analysis. Individuality in the several parts of a whole mass is also revealed by analysis. Variety is the distinction of individuality. Analysis is the disclosure of all the elements, considered in their variety and individuality, of which a thing or conception is composed.

6. To take one of the elements apart from the rest is the office of the Power of Abstraction, which process can be performed without analysis. To take a thing or conception,

and to follow some intellectually furnished clue till we have distinguished all its constituents, is the office of the Power of Analysis. Analysis will not work with what is not presented to the mind as a complete whole, for it *must* find all the parts. Its object, therefore, is necessarily complex. Moreover, analysis will not touch hidden relations not demonstrable as facts, or as matters of rigid experience, excluding hypothetical speculation. It thus falls short of synthesis, which deals with essences, and remote and recondite, though necessary relations, and reaches far beyond rigid experience into the regions of the absolute and infinite, to which all essences and essential relations belong.

7. Every single object in the universe presents itself to the mind as finite, and thus as an individual or development of the genus or species to which its essence unites it. This essence is one and infinite, although the number of individuals into which it is developed is finite. The reason is, that while the number of individuals is not necessary, but accidental, there is no limit to the possibility supplied by the essence, that is, by the genus or species, for the extension of that number. The essence can have no boundary; the number of individuals has an accidental boundary; the individual is necessarily bounded by his very individuality.

8. *Essence* constitutes the principle of unity, or that which makes the genus or species ONE; and the *agreement* of all the individuals, however various in other respects, in possessing this essence, and in exhibiting it, constitutes the HARMONY of that genus or species.

9. Now, every complex object, whether material or ideal, and whether single or generic, is composed either of properties as elementary parts, or of individuals. If the object be a single complex one, its elementary parts will all be disclosed by analysis, and will become the objects of historical knowledge. But a perfect acquaintance with such an object also requires that the harmonious conjunction of the parts should be clearly apprehended. Not only all the parts, but

their union, must be apprehended, in order to know their harmony. Harmony is the perfect combination into one of congruous elements, and the essence of the object of thought so formed is its *unity*.

10. If the object of thought be either species or genus, which for our present purpose are the same, or if it be any other kind of conception, being purely mental, it will still have its unity and its harmony in the conjunction of its constituents.

11. All species and their individuals, as well as all single complex objects, intellectual or material, exist under these laws.

12. As all individuals are included under species, and have no essential isolation, and as all species are similarly included under genera, such ranks ascending by successive grades to the very highest point in creation, so that all genera are covered by higher genera of the common essence of which they partake, so all the relations of things are manifest developments of unity and harmony, and they together form the UNIVERSE WHICH IS ONE. The infinitely possible variety of developments and relations is collected and concentrated in the universal essence which makes the unity and harmony of the universe.

13. All this is realized by the Power of Synthesis. The same power apprehends the unity and harmony of the constituents of every object, whatever its rank in the scale of being; although, the loftier the ascent, the wider the range, the deeper the abstruseness of the matter contemplated, the more intense and the stronger must the Power of Synthesis be to embrace it.

14. It is by the Power of Synthesis we get a perfect notion of the essence of a species, and thus discover the unity and harmony of that species, however great the variety of its individual developments.

15. It is by the Power of Synthesis we trace out the

simple laws which unite and govern creation, and constitute its essence, unity, and harmony.

16. It is by the Power of Synthesis we arrive at the notion of union, *without Pantheism*, of all things in God.

17. And when the mind is so vigorous and clear that it can make logical use, at pleasure, of these synthetical apprehensions, it has reached the highest development of Reason, the Power of Thought.

18. Still the other developments are preserved in that of synthesis, which, without them, could not subsist. It is but their consummation.

V.

1. All knowledge consists, first, in acquired ideas or notions forming conceptions; second, in the due apprehension of their composition and arrangement, both essential and logical.

2. The methods by which ideas are generated have been shown to be, first, by sensation and perception; second, by suggestion and conception. The first process relates to things accessible only through the senses; the second, to matters wholly intellectual.

3. With regard, however, to ideas, there are several questions to be answered. First, are ideas ever innate?—that is, are they born with the mind, and by nature impressed upon it? Here the true reply is, "No;" for in the nature of the case nothing but faculty can belong to the mind essentially. All more than this has to be generated in some way or other. Faculty, including instinct, is born with the mind; idea is produced solely by the working of faculty. This is as true with regard to conceptions as it is with regard to perceptions.

4. Second, must all ideas come from a foreign or external source? The answer is, "No." The doctrine of consciousness leads to the assurance that ideas of mental operations and results can be generated within the mind itself without

foreign action. In a conscious being mental operations and their representative ideas must be inseparable. At least this must be true in beings not lower than the rank of man.

5. Third, what class of ideas requires foreign action to generate them? The answer is, "All that are external to the mind itself;" for no foreign knowledge can be gained otherwise than by information or communication. Ideas invariably represent either facts or possibilities; and the ideas of facts or possibilities external to the mind cannot exist in the mind but by entrance, that is, by information, no matter in what way such information be acquired.

## VI.

1. Ideas are the elements of knowledge, but it is the agreement of ideas first, and then of the conceptions they form, which constitutes knowledge itself. It is not knowledge, because it is not truth, when ideas or conceptions cannot be brought into agreement.

2. Knowledge is the result of a deliberate comparison, first, of ideas or notions; second, of conceptions. This comparison is made by the exercise of Reason under its various developments, as already explained. The whole Power of Thought, including every separate, and all the combined functions, subordinate and chief, primary and simple, compound and complex, passive and active, makes those functions at large subservient to the attainment of knowledge. On the contrary, ignorance is a negation which is possible only to finiteness, in which either imperfection inheres, or infirmity causes defect of energy. Infinity of mind precludes ignorance, and includes perfect knowledge.

3. *Knowledge* implies the deliberate exercise of judgment, and supposes that attention be fixed upon the ideas and conceptions already before the mind, and upon their relations. Comparison and reflection now cease to be incidental, rudimentary, and passive, and become determinate, conclusive,

and active, through the intensity of attention which has been awakened. (Lec. III., Sec. iv., and Lec. IV., Sec. i.—iii.)

4. *Faith* is an exercise of Reason according to the laws we have explained. Faith is the rational acceptance of a proposition as true. A logical faith always implies the knowledge and comparison of evidence, and the acceptance of such evidence as will bear the test of judgment. It also implies a sufficient, though not necessarily perfect, apprehension of the thing believed.

5. Faith, therefore, implies knowledge, the knowledge of evidence. Without this there may be credulity, which is founded in ignorance, or in the feebleness of Reason. There is not, in credulity, any correct apprehension of the thing believed; but more than this, a true apprehension of the logical relation of ideas and conceptions is utterly wanting.

6. It is evident, therefore, that faith must be dealt with as knowledge must; that is, as an exercise of Reason, the Power of Thought.

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## LECTURE VI.

### INTROVERSION OF THOUGHT, SELF-INSPECTION.

#### I.

1. THE SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS to which the Power of Thought or Reason, in man, is adapted, is that which includes all the interior operations of the contemplating mind, self-inspected; and the function by which this self-inspection is effected, is INTROVERSION OF THOUGHT.\* (Pt. I., Lec. I., Sec. i., 5.)

\* The term "consciousness" is used by most psychologists in this sense. We entirely object to this, because all beings capable of pain or pleasure must have consciousness, for there could be neither pain nor pleasure without that. A distinctive name is, therefore, necessary. Consciousness can exist without the power of self-inspection and self-knowledge, but without that power there can be no responsibility. See further on.

2. INTROVERSION OF THOUGHT is a purely intellectual power, and is the basis of the  $\gamma\nu\omega\varsigma\iota\ \sigma\epsilon\alpha\nu\tau\circ\nu$  of the ancient philosophers. It is the primary and grand distinction between the human mind and that of the highest order of brutes; it is given to the former, but not to the latter.

3. Introversion of Thought is common to all the higher orders of finite intelligences, from man upwards. There can be no exception to this, for all such must be responsible.

4. The operations of the Power of Thought, in this direction, are not *physiologically* different from those attributed to it in regard to objects extrinsic to the mind of the thinker; but *morally* the difference is of the highest importance.

5. The mind now becomes the object of its own attention and scrutiny. It fixes its regard upon its own sensations and perceptions, suggestions and conceptions, as results of the susceptibilities, which also it examines. It investigates experimentally its own law of suggestion as operating to produce the images or conceptions of which it is conscious, and as enabling it to recall events, and to compare all its phenomena. It studies its own degrees of development in the high department of pure intellect. It also watches the emotions and volitions as they arise out of its intellectual processes, or themselves give rise to others. It thus comes to know itself both intellectually and morally.

6. But in all this its processes of thought are in strict accordance with the laws by which the knowledge of all extrinsic things is generated.

## II.

1. Introversion of Thought and Consciousness are not the same thing. Consciousness (Introd. Lec. II., Sec. iii.) is the very essence of mind, and its vitality. The very notion of it is essential to the notions of pleasure and pain. Every development of mind, among all orders and ranks of sentient beings, is a development of consciousness. But Introversion

of Thought, though a direct attribute of the higher degrees of consciousness, is not possessed by the lower.

2. It is to be remarked, however, that only a limited consciousness can exercise Introversion of Thought, because it alone can exert thoughts on objects beyond itself. The Infinite Consciousness comprehends all things within itself as objects of knowledge, and cannot contemplate anything as outside of its own infinity. Its thoughts are, therefore, always occupied intrinsically, that is, with things interior, for every thing is interior to it. There can be no introversion except in the case of the consciousness which is finite, and which can, therefore, have exterior objects of knowledge.

3. Hence God, as the Infinite Consciousness, can find no place for the exercise of introversion, for He is all thought, all knowledge, pervading all things, including all things within Himself, rendering them transparent with His own light, ever active, but not by succession, or interchange, or intermission. A proper act of self-inspection, as opposed to an outward inspection, as it would imply limitation of knowledge, would be impossible to Infinite Consciousness.

4. But finite consciousness admits of self-inspection, because in regard to it there is a difference and a boundary between what is outward and what is inward; and because it does not pervade all things, and include them essentially within itself.

### III.

1. SELF is the object of Introversion of Thought. Now PERSONAL IDENTITY is the perpetuation of self. Personal identity is, therefore, the object of introverted thought. Personal identity is essential to unbroken responsibility.

2. The power of contemplating one's self, and one's identity, and whatever mental properties are one's own in relation to that identity, and one's responsibility as it arises out of the existence of one's own inalienable virtues and vices, is

the high development of finite consciousness, running on to a futurity which is to be interminable.

3. It is mind only that exhibits notions of *self* and *sameness*, because mind only is in substance unchangeable in an individual being. Essence is, indeed, unchangeable, but this is not individual. Every mind is individual ; and a mind, as mind, is unchangeable, because it is simple, and independent of decaying elements (Introd. Lec. II). Mind is the only thing capable of any individuality, and yet of remaining in essence unchangeable. Therefore it, and it alone, can be *self*, and possess *identity*.

4. The notion of one's self is the action of high and governing consciousness.

5. The notion of my personal identity is that of *myself*, and of *my being the same myself that I was yesterday*. This notion is the fruit of Introversion of Thought, and it cannot be attained without attention to the phenomena, present and past, of my own mind.

6. Self is an individual realization, not an essence. Personal identity is not the identity of essence, but of an individual substance.

7. Self is one thing ; the notion of self is another. The notion involves the *action* of consciousness, the thing does not. Self may exist without any special regard to the force of consciousness ; the notion of it cannot so exist, for in the notion such force is essentially implied. Self involves the notion of consciousness only as it is identical with mind, the essence of which is consciousness. But mind, and the action of mind, are two very different things.

8. Moreover, the *notion* of *self* is also different from the knowledge of *one's* self. There is the notion of self with mere consciousness ; but the knowledge of this may be wholly extrinsic. On the other hand, the knowledge of *one's* self requires the higher development of introversion.

9. Inferior mind, that of brutes, may, by consciousness, have also the bare notion of self, for property claimed involves

this notion, and brutes do claim property. But brutes have not the *knowledge of themselves*, which can result only from self-inspection, of which they exhibit not even the lowest trace.

## IV.

1. Thus, then, the knowledge of an idea or notion, of a perception or a conception, of the process by which either is produced ; or of the functions out of the exercise of which the whole springs ; or of the special function of suggestion as developed in memory, reflection, imagination ; or of the functions of Reason in the developments of the powers of abstraction, analysis, synthesis ; or of any of the relations or results of these single or combined, considered extrinsically or objectively from the mind of the thinker—is the mere effect of the adaptation of the Power of Thought, or Reason, in the second *sub-class* of the extrinsic objects of thought.

2. But the knowledge of these *as our own* brings them under the SECOND CLASS of objects to which the Power of Thought, or Reason, is adapted (Lec. I., Sec. i., Lec. IV., Sec. i.—iii.)

## V.

1. It must not be imagined, however, that in the higher exercises of mind the two departments can be kept from mingling with each other, and rendering each other mutual and indispensable aid. Albeit theoretically distinct, they always commingle ; and, without the Power of Introversion incessantly at work, no process of reasoning on matters extrinsic could for a moment be sustained.

2. Every process of reasoning depends on memory, and on attention to the ideas it presents, and these are all in the mind of the reasoner (Lec. IV.) This, therefore, requires introversion ; and notions of matters purely extrinsic are themselves intrinsic when reasoned on.

3. The realization of such notions, in every stage towards completion as conceptions, *as our own*, that is, as the results

our own mental operations, and thus as things in which we have a property, and by the logical combination of which the reasoning process also becomes our own, also requires introversion.

4. And the verification of ideas, that is, the regarding of them as realities, and as representing realities, requires the incessant comparison of them with the standards which have been set up in our own minds ; and here again introversion is required.

5. An idea or a notion must be appropriated by our own mind, must become, and be esteemed as our own, in order to be regarded as true. And ideas or notions so once acquired become the stores of our minds to be brought out again whenever wanted by the function of suggestion. The whole process, with all its results, is regarded as our own ; otherwise it would have, for the mind, neither interest nor truth. Now, the regarding of such ideas and processes as our own, is an identification and recognition of self in all mental operations, and is, therefore, the work of introversion.


6. It is thus plain that knowledge cannot be acquired without Introversion of Thought.

7. This adaptation, therefore, of the Power of Thought to combine both classes of objects of thought into a mental appropriation to self, is the distinguishing excellency of the Divine workmanship in the mental economy of man.

8. It is, therefore, of great importance, if we would duly estimate that workmanship, that we should form a correct analysis and synthesis of that economy, and of its adaptation to the acquisition of all knowledge.

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## PART II.

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### THE POWER OF VOLITION.

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#### LECTURE I.

##### THE MORAL NATURE. ACCOUNTABILITY.

###### I.

1. Referring to Lecture II. of the Introduction, Section vi., we find that the Moral Department, under the name of "The Power of Volition," is next to be considered.

2. The end and design of the whole mental constitution is the moral elevation of man. That Department, therefore, of the mental powers which belongs especially to this elevation is the last in natural order, as the Power of Thought is the first, in a proper view of the subject.

3. The Susceptibility of Emotion is the intermediate and uniting department between the Powers, respectively, of Thought and Volition.

4. But for important reasons which, without explanation, the subject will itself suggest in due course, the Moral Department requires to be first examined.

###### II.

1. THE POWER OF VOLITION is the power which makes the mind MORAL ; or, it is the *Moral* Power of the Mind. It is usually termed "the Will." It is simple, and yet it is the great actively governing power of the soul.

2. Two things are observable with regard to it :—First,

it is a permanent faculty, and as such it must be carefully distinguished from any and every one of its own acts, that is, from particular, however numerous, *acts* of volition ;—second, it is not a narrow and restricted principle, but is coincident with the whole mind in any state of activity.

3. It may, therefore, be treated as the mind itself invested with the Power of Activity and Causality.

4. The Power of Volition is the Power of Causality. All causality is ultimately reducible to volition. Volition is the very principle of causality ; nothing is in reality a cause which cannot will ; all other things are only passively impulsive ; that is, they must be acted on before they can move.

### III.

1. The simplicity of this power is seen in the impossibility of finding or conceiving for it constituent elements.

2. It is also shown by its co-ordinate position and rank with the Power of Thought. It *stands* as one of the great faculties. It *occupies* a central and leading place in the whole economy of mind. In nature throughout, the higher the range of governing principles the nearer the approach to simplicity. That in which absolute government centres is absolutely simple. In the moral department of the mind, it is impossible to find any other governing principle than the Will, and there must be simplicity somewhere. The proofs of the simplicity of this power are, therefore, both direct and inferential.

3. Its breadth or universality in the mental economy, diffusing itself through all operations and conditions, yet without division, also indicates its simplicity.

### IV.

1. We have said (ii., 2,) that the Power of Volition is a permanent faculty ; by which is meant that it is always one and the same, equally existent, whether in a state of active

causation or not ; and also, whether the Power of Thought be rightly or wrongly exercised ; and again, whether the mental economy, or rather the brain which is its instrument, be sane or deranged.

2. Moral perversity does not damage the Will as a *faculty*, but consists only in a wrong bias misguiding the exercise of that power.

3. Insanity, as a physical infirmity, does not damage the Will as a *faculty* ; it deranges and misdirects only its functional issues, its actings. Insanity is the result of a damaged texture or organism in the brain as the material instrument of thought. The insanity is really in the brain, not in the mind. All the faculties proper to mind exist in insanity ; it is their exercise, not their nature, which is disturbed or suppressed.

4. Defect in knowledge, understanding, remembrance, in no respect weakens the Power of Volition.

5. It is thus manifest that the Power of Volition belongs to the very essence of mind—that mind cannot exist without it. Every rank of mind, even the lowest, must possess it.

#### V.

1. This Power is also a *universal* faculty (ii., 2). When a faculty does not exist in reality, no action can reasonably pre-suppose it. Nor can a faculty act otherwise than within, or up to, the limit of its extension. But the acts of the Will are found in conjunction with the exercise of the senses ; with perception, conception, reasoning, judgment, memory, reflection, imagination ; with the whole Power of Thought and all its developments, abstraction, analysis, synthesis ; and they are especially concerned in the Introversion of Thought, and all its results. It is evident that, in like manner as all such mental operations are, in a way and measure commensurate with all intellectuality and rationality, true actions of the *whole* Power of Thought, which covers and pervades them all, or, rather, is co-extensive

with all their possibilities, so must the Power of Volition cover and penetrate all mental operations, and, therefore, be a universal faculty.

2. Another view—Consciousness, the very vitality of mind, equivalent to Intellect or Reason (Intro. Lec. II., Sec. iii.), and the Power of Volition, must be commensurate, otherwise they would fail each other when combined action is required.

3. It is of the highest importance to keep a clear, distinct, and vivid conception of this power, as a faculty, in its permanence and universality—that is, its indestructibility, its unchangeableness, and its all-pervading character as a function—prominently in thought.

#### VI.

1. Activity, as opposed to passivity, is the same thing as causality, and is the very nature of the Will. Apart from the Will, if that were possible, the whole mind would slumber in dreamy passivity ; or would be, like matter, unconscious. It would not be mind at all.

2. The mind thinks, because it wills to think ; it remembers because it wills to remember ; it recalls past processes and events by acts of retrospection, which involves attention, and, therefore, volition. Reasoning not prompted and controlled by volition, is not reasoning, but musing, or bare passive reflection (Part I., Lec. IV., Sec. iii). Reasoning is an active process, directed to an end (Same Lect. Sec. I., 6, 7). It, therefore, begins, is sustained, and finished, by volition. Mere passivity could do nothing in all this.

3. Besides, the faculty of volition, the Will, produces results of positive activity in conduct. All conduct results from volition, which is, therefore, evidently the active power of the mind, the Power of Causality.

#### VII.

1. The Power of Volition hence appears to be the very centre and hinge of all the moral arrangements of the

mental economy. Or, more correctly, it is the moral nature of man, considered apart from the intellectual.

2. And it is ONE ; it is not several ; it is not divided ; nor is it diversified.

3. It results from these facts, that to reason about the freedom of the Will, to assert it, or to deny it, is irrelevant and incongruous ; and it cannot be done but in forgetfulness of the physiology of mind. It would be just as right to reason about the freedom or bondage of the Understanding.

4. It is not the Will as a *part* of the mental constitution, or as one faculty of several, which is free ; but it is man, who is free in consequence of possessing it. The Will is necessary to the freedom, not of itself, but of man. It is the very element of freedom ; or, rather, it *is* freedom in essence. But unaccompanied by the Power of Thought it would make man no more than a brute of the lowest rank, which is free just as man would be free if ungoverned by rationality.

5. The Will is man's moral nature, taken in connection with the functional Power of Thought. In itself it is an original, simple, unalterable faculty, co-ordinate with Reason.

6. The Power of Thought does not *by itself* constitute the moral nature, but only its necessary basis. The super-added Power of Volition, so existing as to be coincident and commensurate with the Power of Thought, makes the intellectual nature a moral one.

7. Neither of the intellectual nor of the moral nature apart can either freedom or necessity be predicated, since it is their due combination which makes the mind what it is ; without that combination, the mind would not be the active and responsible thing it is.

### VIII.

1. Morality of nature and accountability are not the same thing—the former may exist without the latter, though not the latter without the former.

2. Insanity arises from a damaged or defective organism of the brain as the material instrument of thought (iv. 3). But both the Will in full activity, and the Power of Thought, co-existing, the latter only damaged or misdirected by bad organism, and not functionally destroyed, the moral nature remains; nor can that nature be extinguished without the utter extinction of the man himself. Thus, insanity of brain and morality of nature can co-exist.

3. But accountability requires another condition—it demands that the brain, the material instrument of thought, be able to perform its work, so that the Will also may be able to superintend and control thought, and to direct or embrace its rational issues. Material or physical defect interrupts the course of accountability, though it leaves the essence of the moral nature uninpaired. The Will itself would be blindly impelled if the Power of Thought were subject to a deranged or defective condition of the material instrument of its operations.

4. Accountability depends on the completeness of the physiological structure in combination with the moral nature; and the physiological structure must include above all the organism of the instrument of the mind, the brain. The proportion of accountability, therefore, retained by a moral being must always be the same as that of the completeness of the physiological structure.

5. The exercise of reason, in a human being with his present corporeal conditions, demands cerebral organism; and that exercise will be wholly suspended if that organism be radically and generally defective. In cases of partial defect, the exercise of reason will be proportionately defective. The conjunction of the exercise of reason with the moral nature, the Power of Volition, is the principle and measure of accountability.

6. It is, then, evident that man's moral nature is so united with the intellectual, that accountability, in his case, results not from either of them alone, but from the proper play of

the latter under the government, and for the purposes, of the former ; and this, albeit the Will, separately and physiologically considered, is the *essence* of the moral nature.

7. Hence idiots, in whom, through cerebral defect, the Power of Thought is wholly wanting ; and infants, in whom it is not yet developed, are wholly non-accountable. Deranged persons are non-accountable in the exact degree to which the cerebral defect prevails. Yet, in all these, volition exists in full vigour. Idiots and deranged persons exhibit the reign of Will in an extraordinary degree of power, as in them it is without intellectual check.

8. The conclusion is, that all persons in whom there is no defect of cerebral organism, and consequently none of reasoning faculty, since volition is never non-existent, are both moral and accountable.

9. And we learn that morality of nature is one thing, but that actual morality is another. The nature of man never ceases to be moral ; but actions cease to be moral when the Power of Thought is too defective, physiologically, to guide them.

10. In fine, the case may be thus summarised—the MORAL NATURE is identical with the moral *function*, and its necessary conditions ; ACTUAL MORALITY, with the moral *quality*, and its conditions.

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## LECTURE II.

### ACTS OF VOLITION ; HABITS ; ACTUAL MORALITY ; ACCOUNTABILITY.

#### I.

1. The last Lecture establishes an important distinction between the morality of nature, or otherwise, the moral nature, and actual morality ; the former being identical with

the moral *function*, and its necessary conditions ; the latter with the moral *quality* and its conditions.

2. There is another important distinction in the very nature of actual morality. The one notion of it is nearly synonymous with the broad notion of accountability, as accountability was explained in the last section of the preceding Lecture ; the other notion of it makes it consist in the specific acts of volition for which man is accountable, and in the mental habit produced by the current of those acts. (See onward.) Both these notions are distinct from that of the mere moral nature.

3. The MORAL NATURE, it must be reiterated, is the *physiological constitution* of a being of the rank, or above the rank, of man ; and it includes every such being, whatever his virtues or vices, or whatever the defect or completeness of his physiological functions. ACTUAL MORALITY results from the free play of those functions, and is superinduced by their physically unfettered use and exercise. Actual morality is accountability, and he who is *actually* a moral is also an accountable being.

4. But Cicero says, "Omnis virtus consistit in actione ;" that is, "action is the consummation of actual morality." If "action" be expanded here to mean the whole activity of conduct and character, the remark is true. Moreover, actions, making up, with abiding feelings or affections, conduct and character, always come out of specific acts of responsible volition and their outgoing developments.

## II.

1. As a universal and permanent faculty (Lec. I., Sec. iv. v), Volition stands in perpetual union with every movement of the mind, and consequently imparts a moral nature to everything out of which such movement springs.

2. As the Will is the faculty of activity, or causality, it destroys the notion of mere passivity in every other principle or power upon which it operates. It gives to every process

of the Power of Thought, after sensation and suggestion—which are, although fundamental conditions of thought, only rudimentary susceptibilities—an active and moral character.

3. The moral nature of man thus becomes co-existent, co-extensive, and even coincident, with the intellectual, and one mental constitution, not to speak *here* of the co-ordinate department of emotion, is formed out of the two principles.

4. The faculty of activity is essentially active, and therefore can never cease from giving forth, in greater or less degrees of strength, active results. These results are *acts* of volition. Such acts must, from the very nature of the Will, however noiselessly and without observation, proceed in an incessant stream. It is not in the nature of the Will to be passive, even for a moment, or to suffer the intellectual power, or its faculties, to be wholly passive. Every sensation, and every suggestion, is instantly seized, and made in some degree active, by the incessant activity of the Will. But in an excited state of the Will, the mind retains less of passivity than when the stream of acts of volition is calm and smooth. The mind is never wholly passive, but is often partially so, and yet not so as to injure the activity of its nature.

5. In an accountable being, that is, one whose cerebral action does not work with insanity, an incessant stream of acts of volition imparts an incessant moral quality to the mind's conditions.

### III.

1. There are, however, specific acts of volition sufficiently distinct and energetic to become objects of particular attention and knowledge; and these result from some special judgment acting emotionally.

2. It is usual to think of such acts of volition as almost the only constituents of the moral condition, the continued stream of volitions being almost unnoticed. Hence the moral condition is generally conceived to be intermittent.

This is a fundamental error. There is no difference of nature between these noticed, and those unnoticed, acts of volition; both spring out of the same moral nature, and are characterised by the same moral actuality.

3. But there is a difference in the development of their respective exciting causes—the noticed acts of volition being generally produced by observable motives originating in processes of judgment; while the unnoticed frequently have their causes far deeper in the moral nature.

4. It is these unnoticed acts of volition, flowing in a perpetual current, often entirely recondite, though sometimes noticeable at first, which co-operating with emotions which they moralize, form the substance and body of MENTAL HABITS. Every mental habit is, in fact, of moral quality because dependent on the operation of the Will. Put it thus, emotion stimulates an act or acts of volition, and volition re-acts in perpetuating emotion, first into feeling, then into mental and moral habit, or disposition, affection, or passion.

5. It must be observed, that every habit must have a commencement, which, in many instances, will be noticeable. A habit must commence in a specific act of volition. It is a law of human nature, that the oftener a thing is done, the greater the rapidity and the imperceptibility with which it is repeated. The habit is complete when the rapidity and facility are so great, that the repetition takes place without a perception of the act or acts of new volition. Deep down in the moral nature do such habits conceal their force.

#### IV.

1. There are two things extrinsic to the physiology of man's nature which must be taken into account in an estimate of his actual morality—these are, a period of Judgment for the examination and reward or punishment of principles and conduct, and a law of preparation for that Judgment.

2. Between these things on the one side, and the mental physiology on the other, there is a reciprocal fitness, agree-

ment, and tendency to unite. It is in this peculiarity we find the excellence and utility of human powers. All that is valuable in man, as an end, is his relation to an eternal morality of divine government; and, therefore, all that is now valuable in him is his moral capacity resulting in moral actuality. This, *within* his constitution, is the sole end of that constitution. But this moral capacity would be utterly trivial, and moral actuality would not exist at all, if there were no extrinsic judgment and law corresponding with them, and adapted to them.

3. The two facts constituting man's accountability are, that he has a *perfect capacity* to be called to account, and that there is a standing decree that he *shall be* called to account. The former fact is physiological, the latter is extrinsic to physiology; but they perfectly harmonize; and if they did not, accountability could not be made out.

4. But it is in the highest degree accessory to this accountability, that there be a recognized and hypothetically authoritative standard furnished to the mind to guide preparation for the account to be rendered. This standard is *only* accessory, for it varies in form and application—its sufficiency is rather a matter of apprehension than of assurance; and, therefore, while the two facts fundamental to accountability are always the same, this standard depends on knowledge. But it is *highly* accessory, for whatever the mind *conceives* to be a true law becomes an obligatory rule until new light shows it to be erroneous.

5. The importance of this accessory fact consists in this, that without a law, real or believed, there could be no rule of judgment, and, consequently, no actual judgment. There cannot be judgment where there is no conduct; and there can be no conduct, in the moral and necessary sense of the term, where there is no law. All judgment for moral purposes is a calling to account for conduct.

6. Thus, then, the facts appear. Man has a *capacity* to be called to account, and this is identical with his mental

economy undisturbed and uninjured by defective organism in the brain, and rendered moral by the universality and permanence of the *Power of Volition*. The Power of Volition issues in a continued course of acts of volition, noticed or unnoticed, but in either case real ; and in these, with the habit of mind they help to form, consists the actual morality, the virtue or vice, of the mind ; it is for these the account must be rendered. There is an external judgment decreed at which the mind *shall be* called to account. The correspondence between this fact and the moral capacity of man renders him accountable. But this result may be interrupted by a derangement of that capacity. Besides, there must be a rule of action, recognized by the mind itself, as an authoritative guide of preparation for the account the mind will have to render. Here is the sum of man's accountability, the central point of which is the POWER OF VOLITION.

## V.

1. Mental Physiology, like all other physiology, deals with the mere facts of a given constitution, taking what is actual, and its actual relations and results, alone into account.
2. It is, therefore, a question of Metaphysical, and at the same time of Biblical Theology, not of Mental Philosophy, how the moral nature of man has become perverted, and what provision has been made, and is effectual, for the correction of the perversion, and the re-adjustment of the moral balance. But it is of the highest importance to understand, that the moral responsibility of man, so long as the previously described conditions of that responsibility are undisturbed, is not in the least degree affected by the existing depravation of the moral nature. That depravation is altogether outside of the science of Psychology.
3. A physiologist studies the human body according to its assumptively perfect construction as created, and in a state of normal health, because this is its true science. He takes no diseased specimen for his standard and model, even though

the very purpose of his study be to heal the diseases which have been superinduced. Disease is the depravation of the bodily functions, and belongs not to them normally. There is a true analogy between disease in the body and sin in the mind. In both cases, physiology assumes the functions to exist, and the science is formed quite irrespectively of their depravation.

4. The great function of Will, the Power of Volition, is, therefore, in Mental Philosophy, to be regarded normally, as a constitution, not in the colouring of depravity, however depraved it may have become. It is what it is in itself, as a constitution, the essence of the moral nature, and the main element of responsibility, equally, whether it have become depraved or not. It must be left to Theology to inquire how God, in eternal justice or mercy, will treat depravity.

5. Man is responsible, on the grounds already exhibited, for what he wills, and for the mental and bodily acts and habits which result from what he wills, so long as he wills under the provision of an intellect unembarrassed by a deranged or defective organism in the brain. It is a physical, not a moral, disease which interrupts or destroys responsibility.

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### LECTURE III.

#### INTROVERSION AND CONSCIENCE.

##### I.

1. It is by Introspection of Thought (Pt. I., Lec. vi., Sec. v.) man discovers his own capacity to be called to account, and the exact correspondence between the two notions of a day of account, and of that capacity. It is also by this power that he can compare the states of his own mind with the rule or law given to prepare him for his account, so to be able to pass judgment upon his own moral condition and its degrees

of deterioration or improvement, the acts of judgment being essential to improvement.

2. Introversion of Thought, then, is essential to accountability ; and those orders of sentient creatures which do not possess it are not accountable. For them there can be no judgment, because there can be no preparation for judgment, and no self-application of law, and no acts of moral judgment passed by them upon themselves.

3. If, then, we consider the intellectual nature apart from the moral nature, the power of mental introversion will be the rational link between them, so as to give the combination a permanently moral character ; or, if we consider the Power of Thought as the basis of the whole moral nature, Mental Introversion will be precisely that portion of the Power of Thought from which the determination of the moral nature specially rises. As, in general, there could be no moral nature without the intellectual, so, in special, the power of introversion is that consummation of the intellectual nature which issues in the moral.

## II.

1. Every intellectual process, except the primary, rudimental, and wholly passive ones, pure sensation and suggestion, is begun and sustained by acts of volition from beginning to end.

2. For instance, every act of conception, of judgment, of abstraction, analysis, or synthesis, employed in deduction or induction, in short, every act of generalization or individualization, requires an effort of attention, protracted as long as the process lasts, or as the act has to be renewed. Now, "Attention (Pt. I., Lec. IV., Sec. i., 1.) is the intellectual power of the mind stimulated to an active effort by a determination of the Will." It thus includes volition, which it makes necessary to every intellectual act or process.

3. Thus, the whole intellectual economy—that is, the Power of Thought, or Reason, in its entire division—is

## INTROVERSION AND CONSCIENCE.

brought into operation by the stimulus of Volition ; and that operation is completely sustained by the same stimulus, however unobserved may be the process ; and thus every act of Reason, and every process of reasoning, become moral.

4. And inasmuch as Introversion of Thought is the consummation of the Power of Thought, and is indispensable to the perfect exercise of Reason (Pt. I., Lec. vi., Sec. v., 3-8), and, consequently, to the acquisition of knowledge, it must be actively employed under the stimulus of volition ; so that no act of self-inspection can take place without an act of the Will. It is, as it were, a power of self-knowledge and self-improvement put at the disposal of the Will.

5. Whether, then, we regard Introversion of Thought as a separate exercise of the Power of Thought, or as the prime movement or agent in the processes of ratiocination, it will appear to be under the government of volition, and placed so for purposes of high improvement. And all the other mental arrangements show themselves in strict subordination to this.

### III.

1. CONSCIENCE is the moral product of Introversion of Thought ; it is not a *faculty*, as is commonly thought, but a *result*.

2. We always regard the needless multiplication of distinct faculties in the mind as a very great, and as a too common source of confusion and obscurity in this most important science. The closer the approach to simplicity in the number of the faculties, the readier their identification with the very nature and substance of the mind itself. For this reason, as there is no need, in the nature of the case, to regard conscience as a faculty by itself, so we deem it a great and even mischievous error thus to treat it. The following notes may elucidate this.

3. In English we have the two words "consciousness" and "conscience" etymologically the same, but in significa-

tion different—the former we have explained as meaning the very nature and vitality of mind, with a proper bearing on intellect: we shall see that the latter has a moral bearing, though intellectual in its essence. Both words, however, represent the one Latin word *conscientia*, which also stands for the meanings of both. The fundamental notion of both the English words is “self-knowledge;” but this self-knowledge is not a perfect thing without the introversion of thought, which belongs to a mental range not lower than man’s. This is the sense generally given to “consciousness” by writers on Mental Philosophy, though this limitation, excluding every lower grade of mind, is not correct. Consciousness belongs to all mind essentially, whether there be introversion or not. “Conscience,” on the other hand, belongs only to beings of that intellectual range or above it ; it is impossible without Introversion.

## IV.

1. Conscience is produced in every man whose powers are perfect, because those powers always imply a moral condition.

2. Conscience is the knowledge of oneself, that is, of one’s inward condition. This appears from the previous section. The English usage employs the word only morally. The self-knowledge which it expresses is only that of the condition of mind which is merely, yet actually, moral ; that is, virtuous or vicious.

3. Conscience involves two things—a judgment intellectually passed upon one’s own state and actions, and an emotion, protracted to a feeling of pleasure or dread in the applications of that judgment to one’s own futurity.

4. The judgment which is included in conscience differs in no respect from that employed in any other matter of comparison ; physiologically its nature is the same ; or, to speak with still greater precision, it is the very same faculty, and the very same kind of operation which is employed.

The whole is comprised in the range of the great faculty, the Power of Thought.

5. But in every case of judgment there must be things to compare. In the matter of conscience the things compared are—a real or supposed moral law on the one side, and one's own feelings, states, or actions, on the other. The judgment which compares these is the same as that which compares two men, two flowers, or two pieces of coin. The moral issue of dread or pleasure peculiar to conscience is traceable, not at all to any distinction in the physiology of judgment as displayed in the two cases, but wholly to the moral nature of the things compared.

6. The variation of a moral rule does not affect the physiology, or psychology, of conscience. The most opposite opinions may be entertained by different persons about what is duty without affecting the nature of conscience. If, indeed, there be no apprehension of duty, there can be no conscience, since conscience is a result of which such an apprehension is one of the essential constituents; but if there be any such apprehension, however erroneous, there will be conscience, and it will always operate in the same way, producing moral pain or pleasure.

v.

1. The sense of accountability, involving some notion of judgment, definite or vague, awaiting in futurity one's conduct here, is necessary to conscience as a result of mental operations; for this will be the notion which affixes to one's mental scrutiny the sense of personal interest, and yields pleasure or dread.

2. Hence the whole Power of Thought and the whole Power of Volition are combined in the production of conscience. But specifically, Introversion of Thought, as a branch of Reason, and as the consummation of its office and work, and also as brought into action by volition, must occupy itself in producing that state of mind which the

word "conscience" expresses. There can be no sense of accountability in any other way.

3. The matters brought into comparison with the moral law in any act of self-judgment by the power of introversion, are one's own dispositions, desires, volitions, and their fruits in outward action. These, if only of the passing moment, require nothing but *consciousness*, that is, the general Power of Thought in *present* action, to bring them up. But if they are matters wholly *past*, the power of *suggestion in memory* is occupied in recalling them. Yet, neither consciousness nor memory is, in those instances, what is meant by conscience.


4. Conscience, then, is an actual judgment passed by us on our own moral state, combined with the painful and pleasing feeling which thence results. The conditions necessary to enable such a judgment to pass, and such a feeling to arise, are, that there be an extrinsic law, an obligation, a future account to be rendered, and a reward or punishment thereon depending ; and then all must be apprehended by the mind.

#### VI.

1. Thus the Power of Volition, which includes the whole *moral* nature and activity of the mind, is co-ordinate with the Power of Thought, or Reason, which includes the whole *intellectual* nature of the mind.

2. The two, however, are so combined as to be incessantly re-acting on each other ; and they are, therefore, between themselves, mutually causal, although the preponderant and exteriorly operating causality is in volition.

3. The moral *nature* of man is placed in his physiology ; but his moral *state*, his *actual* morality, is summed up in his *acts* of volition, and in his habit of mind thence resulting. The whole of these acts together, with the habits engendered thereby, make up the aggregate of his virtue or vice, and of the qualities for which he is accountable ; all which things are the subject matter of the verdict of conscience, as they will also be of the great judgment of the future, being the collective agreement or disagreement of the man with the moral law.



## PART III.

### THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION.\*

#### LECTURE I.

THE SUSCEPTIBILITY—ONE. FEELING COMMENCED BY EMOTION ; DISPOSITION. PLACE AMONG THE POWERS.

##### I.

1. WE must quote here from Introd. Lec. II., Sec. vi., 4. “The Emotional Department operates as the connecting medium between the Power of Thought, or the Intellectual Department, and the Power of Volition, or the Moral Department, and supplies the capability of mental pleasure and pain, thus furnishing motive. It is the immediate follower of the Power of Thought, and the immediate antecedent of the Power of Volition, which it stimulates to act. From its very nature it becomes the seat and reservoir of all the affections and dispositions, habits and propensities, of the mind.” The position, therefore, the office, and the grandeur of this department make it necessarily co-ordinate with the other two.

\* It is right to guard the student here, once for all, against the danger of mistaking feelings merely animal in nature and effects for emotions purely psychological. The animal system exhibits sometimes exhilaration, sometimes depression, sometimes an utter want of sensibility ; and from the close union of body and mind the animal is frequently found to throw such influences upon the soul, as to make the latter appear to be the seat of them. Under such circumstances, the emotions may easily seem more animal than spiritual, or to be so mixed with the animal sensibility as to lose the distinctness of their own mental character. But it must still be remembered, that emotions belong only to the mind, however they may seem to be modified, or even depressed, by other causes than mental.

2. It is clear that without this impulsive department the influence of personal motive, whether moral or intellectual, would be utterly wanting, the intellect would be dry, barren, and useless, and the Will left to caprice, subject to no law. Hence its importance.

3. It is also clear that feeling is in nature perfectly distinct from both understanding and will, and cannot be confounded with either. Considered, therefore, as a department, it stands alone with definite outlines, though co-operating with the other departments as a co-ordinate.

## II.

1. The Capacity of Feeling and the Susceptibility of Emotion are, in reality, the same thing. Emotion originates in the capacity of feeling. Were there no capacity of feeling, emotion would be impossible. The *external* cause that produces an emotion acts by impulse upon the capacity of feeling. Nor, in fact, is it otherwise in regard to an *intellectual* cause—it operates on the same capacity.

2. Yet there is this difference between an emotion and a feeling—the former is necessarily transient, while the latter can be protracted, and even perpetual. Also, it must be remarked, first, that the commencement of a feeling is necessarily an emotion; second, that a feeling perpetuated to a habit constitutes, considered singly, a disposition or affection—considered with all the other contemporary feelings also perpetuated, a contribution to *the whole* disposition or moral character of the mind. But to the morality of this habit or disposition the Will is essential.\* (See Moral Emotions, further on.)

3. Hence, in these Outlines, we take THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION, in its co-ordinate rank with the other Powers, *generically*, that is, as comprehending all that belongs to the affections and feelings of the mind not entirely instinctive and sensational. Instincts and sensations may, indeed, give

\* See Pt. II., Lec. II., Sec. iii., 4.

*rise* to emotion, but are not in themselves the mental susceptibility, which in nature is quite independent of them. It is to the mind proper, in its own nature, as distinct from all that constitutes the merely animal nature or animated material corporeity, that the SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION, with all its properties and intrinsic conditions, belongs. Its place in science is purely psychological, and it would be capable of the same estimate if the soul were disembodied.

4. INSTINCT is a principle inherent in life, and without it the ends of the life to which living beings are respectively destined could not be fulfilled. Its rudimental actings are wholly independent of both intellect and volition, though it may be restrained or regulated by both. Every sensitive or rational nature must have instincts as the prime conditions of its functional life. These may, by neglect, become strong enough to form PASSIONS overriding intellect\* ; but then the moral nature is perverted. But there is no perversion of the moral nature in the mere play of an instinct, for instinct is a property of nature itself, and intended for its preservation and first moving. Finally, some instincts are purely animal, and will die with the animal system ; some have a complex relation to the composite nature of man ; and some are purely and absolutely mental. The last are our proper subject here, and the others only as they impinge on it.

5. We come now to a more explicit exposition of this great department and its operations. Some repetitions, however, are necessary, on occasion, for perspicuity.

### III.

#### 1. There is manifestly, in the human mind, a Susceptibility

\* It is the *animal* instincts chiefly which, by excess, become passions in the grosser sense ; but mental instincts can become passions too. For instance, ambition is a passion as soon as the mind is acted on violently by it ; and yet ambition springs from an original instinct of the mind necessary to the healthy play of mental properties. It may be further said, that any excessive emotion involving desire is a momentary passion ; and when feeling succeeds to the emotion, and becomes permanent, desire remaining excessive, we have a passion in the fullest sense reigning in the soul. Now such feelings are in every stage sustained by volition, and are, therefore, moral, though the original instinct, or instinctive emotion, was not so.

of Emotion, or a power of feeling and being moved, physiologically distinct from the Power of Thought and Volition, and yet connected with them, so as to be essential to the nature of man, and specifically to his mental economy.

2. Some philosophers appear to regard this, *together with the Will*, as one of only two great divisions of the powers of the mind, the intellectual and the moral. That this is an error our further notes will suffice to prove. We shall see that some emotions are not inherently more moral than the intellect. It may well be asserted that this arrangement is neither logically nor psychologically correct. It destroys the unity and concentration of the moral nature in volition, and deprives that power of more than half its proper, if not its only character. It destroys the simplicity of the moral nature by a distribution which is utterly destitute of symmetry.

3. As the POWERS OF THOUGHT and VOLITION, amidst the infinitely diversified phenomena they exhibit, are respectively grand functions and single powers, so also must the CAPACITY OF FEELING, that is, *of feeling and being moved*, which cannot, as we have seen, be identified or confounded with them, be grand and single. Otherwise the human mind would want order and symmetrical proportions.

4. There is, then, ONE POWER, FUNCTION, FACULTY, OR SUSCEPTIBILITY, of equal rank with the former two—it is the SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION; and it is what we mean by the *Capacity of Feeling*. Without emotion there would be no feeling—hence we use it for the name of the Department.

5. But inasmuch as this function is in its nature passive, not active, the term “susceptibility” is fitter to designate it than the term “power.” It may be analogously compared with the simple susceptibilities of the intellectual system. For example, as the susceptibility of sensation is but one, although acted on by all the senses, and exhibiting the impress of their infinitely varied objects, so the Susceptibility of Emotion is but one, whatever may be the thoughts or

things which act upon it, and whatever may be the variety of its own phases.

6. The Susceptibility of Emotion is, therefore, distinguished from emotions as the function of sensation is distinguished from actual sensations. The susceptibility always exists—emotions may wholly cease. The susceptibility is one and simple—emotions are of infinite number, and many of them complex. The susceptibility is essential to the nature of the mind—the mind remains the same when the particular emotions pass away. The susceptibility is uncaused, except by the planting hand of the Creator—emotions owe their existence to proper occasions acting on the susceptibility.

7. There must be a susceptibility to give rise to emotions ; but there is only one susceptibility for all emotions. Neither does necessity demand more, nor analogy warrant the supposition of more. **THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION, *the Capacity of Feeling*, is therefore ONE.**

#### IV.

1. The place of this Susceptibility in the economy of human faculties is between the Power of Thought and the Power of Volition. This has been already said in Sec. i, 1, of this Lecture.

2. It is clear that it cannot precede the former, which begins by sensation. If emotion, beginning in the *capacity of feeling*, and indeed beginning *feeling itself*, preceded sensation, it would not be in the mind, but in the merely animal system—it would not be psychological.

3. It is equally clear that it cannot come after volition as a result. The last thing *in the mind* is an act of the Will, for this leads immediately to bodily action. There is no room here, then, for the function or the play of emotion.

4. It cannot be identified with Reason, for it does not, when simple, contain the nature of thought. Its essence is *feeling*, not *thought*, from the very moment of its evolution

from the mere capacity. Its developments indicate the same essence.

5. It cannot be identified with volition, for in many of its developments volition is entirely quiescent.

6. The just inference, then, is, that it is placed between the faculties, but has an office distinct from either. It could not hold its necessary alliance with them both without *interposition*. Then its place between them leads to the conclusion that it is intended to unite them, and to be the means of communication from the one to the other. But it could not fulfil its office if it were not co-ordinate with them.

V.

1. But the tendency of this Susceptibility is always onward to volition, while the tendency of Reason is onward to emotion, and through this to volition.

2. This onward tendency of Emotion to Volition gives its alliance therewith a greater appearance of certainty than its alliance with Reason exhibits. Its alliance with Volition often becomes so strong that many philosophers have been confirmed thereby in the theory of only two great powers, the intellectual and the moral.

3. In an idiot, and in an infant, the three great Powers of Thought, Emotion, and Volition are in embryonic form, the first being wholly undeveloped, the second imperfectly developed, the third considerably active, but the impulsion of sensibility acting on the Will being purely animal. In a deranged person, a maniac, volition is highly active, emotion powerful, and thought active, but disturbed and unmanageable. But these cases of imperfect or irregular development do not interfere with these psychological investigations.

VI.

1. The generic and comprehensive nature of the Susceptibility of Emotion, thus far described, is not only not a hindrance

to the study of its developments and outgoings, but it is the better understood by the study of them in detail.

2. Under the infinitely varied phases which the mind presents to the combined generic and detailed investigation of this department, we view in it all that interests and gratifies, all that is grand, lovely, and fitted to draw affection. But this combination of the generic and the detailed, that is, of the great Susceptibility and all its issues, is essential to the maintenance of the interest we feel. In any other way than as traced up to the one Susceptibility, and centring in it, specific emotions are viewed as without law, subject to random influences, or uncaused variations, without order or harmony.

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## LECTURE II.

### SPECIAL EMOTIONS ALL COME OUT OF ONE SUSCEPTIBILITY.—

#### CLASSIFICATIONS.

##### I.

1. The Susceptibility of Emotion, being one, and always the same, a great power of the mind, co-ordinate with Thought and Will, is a reservoir in which are kept all movements of feeling for the occasions which require them.

2. The emotions which proceed from this Susceptibility will be states of mind corresponding in nature to the occasions which excite them, and likewise as numerous as those occasions may be.

3. The mind is thus capable of actual emotions indefinite in number and variety, seeing that no limit can be put to the occasions which call them forth. And this capacity of emotions, indefinite in number and variety, is extended by a capability in the emotions themselves of modification, change, interchange, and combination, so that no two emotions will ever be exactly alike.

4. Every thought, perfect or imperfect, every perception and conception, may thus be followed by an emotion suitable to itself in character and intensity. And every two impulses, contemporaneously made by two such thoughts, may produce a compound emotion. And every idea added by suggestion to a train of thought, in any form of the process, may give a new modification to the emotion—and so on *ad infinitum*; for as there can be no limit assigned to the operations of thought, so there can be none to their emotional results.

5. No emotion can be spontaneous or self-originated; every emotion must have a cause extrinsic to itself. The very term "emotion"—Latin, *e, moveo*—indicates external causality. An emotion is a *feeling* (see this explained in last Lecture Sec. ii. par. 1, 2), resulting from an extrinsic impulse upon the *capacity* of feeling, equivalent to the Susceptibility of Emotion. Feelings not so caused are either instinctively animal, or in some way peculiarly constitutional—they are, at any rate, not emotions in the psychological sense of the word. True emotions can thus be as numerous and various as the causes which excite them, and these are in number and variety boundless.

## II.

1. But emotions, although infinite in number and variety, are nevertheless to be classed according to their nature and causes respectively, so as to facilitate psychological inquiry and examination, and give precision to our apprehension of them. The proper mode, however, of classifying emotions pertains to their essence, not to their relations or their intensity.

2. An emotion may be in essence, either SIMPLE, or COMPOUND, or COMPLEX, the last two terms not being synonymous. *Simple* will be opposed to each of them in turn.

3. A *simple* emotion is one which is free from all inter-

mixtures of every sort, so as to contain nothing which is not rudimentally and primarily its very nature and unity.

4. A *compound* emotion is a combination into one of two or more simple ones, so as to unite the natures of both in a state of mutual qualification and dependence.

5. A *complex* emotion admits into its composition other principles not emotional, some notion or conception, present or recollected, some train of reflection, or some act of judgment or of volition. Whenever this is the case the emotion is not pure, that is, it is not completely of an emotional nature, but is complicated with matters foreign to it. In the analysis of such a state of mind it is necessary to distinguish all that is not truly emotional. A large portion of the difficulty which impedes a correct apprehension of the phenomena of mind lies in this very region.

### III.

1. An artificial classification has been made out of the distinctions indicated in the last section, or in neglect of them. Philosophers have called emotions "those without intrinsic moral quality," and "those possessing moral quality."

2. This classification is not sufficiently exact for scientific proof. Neither a simple nor a compound emotion involves any notion of intrinsic morality ; and whatever moral constituent there may be in a complex emotion is not itself emotional. The emotion is in every case the purely natural result of the mental economy, not involving the exercise of the Will, whenever that economy is acted on by extraneous causes.

3. Complex emotions are, doubtless, moral to the extent in which they include a moral element, but the morality which marks them is wholly superadded to their emotional nature, and not essential to it. Both Reason and Will can be at work in a complex emotion, and its complete character results from such an admixture.

## IV.

1. A *simple emotion\** must always be limited to time present. If protracted, it is protracted only by repetition at every successive moment, which is present in its turn, and imparts to the notion of present time the emotion it carries with it. It may even be said that the protracting of a simple emotion is only the repetition of emotional action through successive moments, each repetition being distinctly the effect of a new impulse from the exciting cause. Hence the classification, which some philosophers have made, into emotions involving time, and those not involving time, is not sound. Every emotion, proper is momentary. Repetition does not alter this. If the *feeling* in emotion be protracted, it is no longer emotion but feeling; and yet though the *emotion* is transient, the *feeling* may last through all time. But even this is not to be confounded with an emotion protracted by repetition. All this it is most important to understand and remember. (See Lec. I, Sec. ii. 2.)

2. All simple emotions are not alike susceptible of repetition so as to appear protracted. This difference arises from that of their respective impulses. The cause which gives impulse to an emotion may involve time, and even morality, and yet the emotion itself may include neither the one nor the other.

3. Time is always involved in reflection; whenever, therefore, any emotion results from reflection, we have an example of time in the cause without its being of necessity implied in the effect. The same remark holds in every instance of emotion as the effect of meditation, remembrance, or ratiocination. Even if thought turns upon things future, the time occupied in that thought precedes the emotion which things future may be adapted to awaken.

\* It is proper to state that simple emotions are really instinctive, and for that reason they have no primary morality in them. They are, however, instinctive in a purely psychological, not in an animal manner. The animal instincts may sometimes combine with them and modify them, but they are not to be confounded. The mind must have instincts of its own.

4. As every active process of the Power of Thought requires an exercise of volition to sustain it, there will be morality in every such process, and yet there may be none in the emotion which it produces.

## v.

1. But although a simple or compound emotion can have in itself, no proper morality, since every emotion is directed to effectuate some determination of the Will, it must have a *tendency*, physiologically, to morality. The holiness or rectitude of a simple or compound emotion can be nothing more than a tendency to produce a holy or right act of volition ; but it must be as much as that—it can be nothing less.

2. The physiological design of the Power of Volition is to lead to action ; and that of the Susceptibility of Emotion is practically to influence the Power of Volition. Now, every actual emotion is an exercise of that practical influence, leading or impelling the Will to some specific form of action. Thus, this Susceptibility, with all its particular issues, is an essential part of the great moral machinery of the mind, without being itself distinctly or separately moral in its nature.

3. It is the property of Reason in sane exercise (Pt. II., Lec. I., Sec. viii., 7) to cause rational emotions ; that is, to awaken the emotions corresponding with the nature of the objects which Reason itself contemplates. If there be no emotion when the objects are such as naturally to demand it, or if the emotion be in extravagant incongruity with them, or in uncontrollable excess, there is mental derangement in some form or degree or other.

4. Every act of Reason in sane exercise tends through emotion to volition, and thus to morality. The nature of Reason, therefore, is just as moral as that of Emotion, both consisting in mere tendency ; and thus the parallel between Reason and Emotion is marked and observable. It must, however, be observed that the backward exercise of Volition

is more direct on Reason than on Emotion; the particular issues of Reason being attributable to Volition acting in *direct* impulse, while on Emotion the action of the Will is *indirect* through Reason.

## VI.

1. When the Susceptibility of Emotion, or what is the same thing, the Capacity of Feeling, has produced an actual emotion, and that emotion has resulted in a permanent feeling, we have the element of a disposition or affection, which will be moral whenever the Will is at all concerned in causing the feeling to be perpetuated. It is thus that the abiding dispositions or habits of the mind have always more or less of morality in them. (Pt. II., Lec. II., Sec. iii., 4.)

2. When such a disposition has been formed, it is not much more in its nature than an intensification and a corroboration of the feeling itself, habit being the corroborating power.

3. Such a habit as this strengthens and quickens the Susceptibility of Emotion itself in that particular direction to which a given emotion leads. In other words, the general susceptibility will be more readily excited under the power of such a habit than in any case where no special disposition or habit of feeling has been formed. A disposition subjects the mind to a special liability to emotion more or less strong and vivid, according to the strength of the feeling which that disposition implies. Thus an emotion is the first step towards a disposition, and then the disposition intensifies the liability to the sort of emotion in which it originates. The multiplication of mental habits so formed, with all the special liabilities they evolve, makes up the whole latent character of a man.

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## LECTURE III.

### SIMPLE EMOTIONS. WONDER, SYMPATHY, EMOTION OF BEAUTY, AND THE REST.

#### I.

1. The emotions, as phenomena, are often classed according to their outward and special characters, rather than according to their dependence on the great faculty of which they are all alike the products. But this is scarcely consistent with the unity and simplicity of the nature of their source. It is at most a mere exposition of their particular nature and developments as they appear to the observer, without regard to the nature of the mind of which they are mere expressions. It is indispensable that, in considering actual emotions, whether in classes or specifically, we do not forget that they are all products of one faculty, which is as simple as the mind to which it belongs. Remembering this caution, it is then necessary to proceed to a detailed examination.

2. The class of simple emotions, which, as we have seen, have no inherent moral character, is exhibited sufficiently under the phenomena of a few feelings and their opposites, diverse phenomena of the ONE susceptibility. As samples, such feelings are Wonder and Sympathy, and the psychologically instinctive feelings which follow a perception of Beauty, Sublimity, and Harmony. Their opposites are Emotional Languor, Sympathetic Repulsion, and the feelings provoked by Deformity, Ludicrousness, and Discord. These feelings, although extremely different in phase and result, are products of but one susceptibility, and come forth under the same law.

3. Every one of these emotions must be preceded by a perception, or a conception, of an object or objects in which the qualities reside which are the occasions of the emotion, and the mental phase will always correspond respectively with those qualities. Till the Power of Thought has been thus far brought into exercise no sane emotion can be produced.

4. Thus, WONDER is an emotion which originates in a perception or conception of *something new or strange*. Novelty and strangeness are necessary to it. When an object characterized by these qualities is presented to the mind, the emotion of wonder is instantly excited, and that without reflection or volition, without time or morality. The feeling—an emotion is, be it remembered, a feeling commenced—is absolutely momentary. Continued wonder is excited by a continued series of new views of the object, and in this case the emotion is not one, but many. The instant the object ceases to exhibit new phases adapted to strike, wonder ceases and is succeeded by some other state of mind. If wonder be more than momentary, it is by the extension of novelty and singularity, and this can be only by the revelation of new properties every moment, or by the development of the same properties under new modes. Wonder can never be produced when the object is perfectly familiar.

5. When wonder ceases to occupy the mind, and an intellectual state does not take its place, then follows satiety, next tedium, and then a sense of distressing *languor*, the very opposite of the animation of wonder. This, also, is of an emotional character in its commencement, but may become a protracted feeling. The mind, if it can, instantly retreats from it to some object of attention; and if this cannot be done, the feeling may be extended as long as the object is contemplated which excites distaste. Perhaps even the emotion itself may be extended by repetition. This state of mind cannot co-exist with wonder, because it is its opposite.

6. This mental languor is totally different in nature from the animal languor which is the result of a bodily cause, for the latter is not a psychological affection at all.

## II.

1. SYMPATHY is an emotion excited by the presence of an object *possessing some identity of nature*—that object pre-

senting itself in an aspect of sufficient distinctness and interest.

2. Like wonder, sympathy, as an emotion, must be regarded as momentary, its protraction being only a repetition of momentary emotional actings. It has, therefore, no necessary reference to time, and is entirely simple. But it does not, like wonder, require novelty and strangeness to excite it, and, therefore, it may continue to be excited by the same object under like phases.

3. As it requires identity of nature, the exercise of sympathy nearest perfection will always be between two beings in every respect alike, as two angels, or two human beings, simply because they possess throughout a common nature. In body and soul two human beings are perfectly homogeneous. In spiritual nature, two angelic beings are similarly correspondent. The manifold sensibilities of the one are a counterpart to those of the other. Therefore, man can sympathise with his fellow-man, and angel with his fellow-angel, in every form of interest, whether of suffering or of pleasure, to which they are respectively subject.

4. With beings of other orders the sympathy of man can only be partial ; with an angelic spirit man can sympathise only to the extent in which his spiritual nature corresponds with the angelic ; with an animal below him he can sympathise only by means of his possession of the animal nature and sensibilities.

5. It is evident, then, that sympathy is an emotion ; that it answers to the nature of the presentation which has excited it at first, and then in turn becomes the direct object of the energetic impulsion of that presentation ; and that it springs out of the grand Susceptibility which is the common fountain of all emotions. It requires no other source than this great faculty. All that is peculiar and special in it comes from its external relations.

6. We may conceive that the exercise of sympathy is purely mental, and that in some way it belongs to the very nature

of mind as one of its instincta. We can, by analogy alone, and that inadequately, compare the Infinite Mind with the finite in regard to the nature and form of any one of its workings. Hence it is difficult to speak or think of the mind of God otherwise than according to its purposed revelations of itself—indeed, rather than difficult, it is impossible. Still by imperfect analogy, but far better by revelation, we learn to think that the very essence and clear pattern of every created excellence was in the mind of God from eternal antecedence. He can, therefore, though in a manner utterly mysterious to us, feel a sympathetic relation with all that is sentient or intelligent, because there can be no sentiency or intelligence of which He is not the Author and Source. Nothing good exists which has not its infinite correspondence in the Infinite Mind. Nothing, therefore, can be precluded from the sympathetic actings of that Mind. Now, if this is so, sympathy must belong to the very nature of mind.

7. But something more than this general sympathy with sentiency and intelligence on the part of God was called for on behalf of man when he fell; for that sad event severed the moral union of man with God, and produced an active repulsiveness between them. To repair the breach, and make sympathy again at once possible, special, and effective, God became invested with perfect humanity in the person of Christ; in order to feel and exercise all the sympathies essential to man, so as to restore all sympathetic relations between man and God, God took *manhood into union with the Godhead*.

8. Sympathy includes both the sorrows and the joys of its object within its range. The exercise, however, always involves sufficient pleasure to raise *the attraction of regard*. But it does not contain, in its simple essence, any moral principle, for it is not at first called into play, nor afterwards necessarily sustained, by acts of volition.

9. The opposite to this is sympathetic repulsion. When the pain of sympathy predominates, and there is a perception

of no qualities but such as excite disgust, the subject of those qualities still being our like, an intensely repulsive emotion is generated; and because it is repulsive it is the contrary of sympathy which always attracts; yet it is sympathetic in its nature, for it involves natural homogeneity as its prime condition, and operates through the *violation* of the same affection which sympathy on the other hand *gratifies*.

## III.

1. BEAUTY, DEFORMITY, SUBLIMITY, LUDICROUSNESS, HARMONY, DISCORD, or DISSONANCE, call forth simple emotions, each with its respective but exact correspondence.

2. It has been maintained by some writers, that these qualities of objects have no real existence extrinsic to the mind itself, that they are subjectivo-objects, not objectivo-objects. We deem this an error, and must reject it. They are, as objects, wholly extrinsic to the mind.

3. Whether these objects (1) be simple or composite does not affect the present inquiry. The mind under emotion does not attempt to analyse the exciting occasions of its feelings. The perception of them produces like effects whether they are simple or not. The mind takes the impression of them by mere sensation, without scrutiny. That impression may be simple, and the emotion likewise. As soon as a rational process is instituted to examine the nature of either of these objects, the *emotion* ceases, and the mind is absorbed in its intellectual occupation.

4. The movement caused in the mind by the presence of beauty is the EMOTION OF BEAUTY; and so of the rest. We cannot understand how the emotions could be real if the objects were not so, and did not present themselves in real, extrinsic, and distinct positions before the mind. The whole error of Idealism would follow the admission of it in these special instances. We, therefore, maintain that beauty, and the emotion excited by it, are entirely distinct, though related

things, and that the former is extrinsic, while the latter is intrinsic, to the mind.

5. The opposite of *beauty* is *deformity*; that of *sublimity* is *ludicrousness*; and that of *harmony* is *dissonance* or *discord*.

6. In the emotions excited by these objects neither time nor morality is necessarily involved, for they include no reasoning process, and are only the effects of sudden perception.

#### IV.

1. The simple emotions, especially when lengthened into feelings, are the elements of all the natural or physical pleasures and distresses of the mind. They are real instincts in their involuntary character and vast effects; yet they are purely mental.

2. The simple emotions are the correspondent re-actings of the mind in regard to objects fitted to awaken pleasure or distress. They are the sunlight and the shade of man's mental economy, whenever conscience is not concerned. *That* introduces a far different element of joy or sorrow.

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### LECTURE IV.

#### EMOTIONS, COMPOUND, COMPLEX—THREE SORTS OF COMPLEX EMOTIONS.

##### \* I.

1. Two or more SIMPLE EMOTIONS may be combined, and then they will form a COMPOUND ONE (Lec. II., Sec. ii., 2, 4), when the objects, the perception of which excites the feelings, are more than one at the same time.

2. In order, however, to make such a compound emotion, the simple ones must be congruous in nature so as to be capable of union. But, subject to this law, compound

emotions may be as numerous as there can be combinations and modifications of emotions in the whole range of the faculty.

3. Thus, the emotion of beauty is not congruous with that of languor, or with those of discord, ludicrousness, or sympathetic repulsion; but it is congruous with those of wonder, harmony, sublimity, and sympathy. Any of the congruous emotions can be combined in any numbers ; and it is thus that the almost infinitely varied feelings of the human mind are produced.

4. But inasmuch as all compound emotions are nothing else than combinations of simple ones, they involve no inherent moral quality, their existence being instinctive in the presence of their objects, without any direct volition.

## II.

1. COMPLEX EMOTIONS are those which are complicated with some other principle not emotional. (Lec. II., Sec. ii., 2, 5.)

2. There are of these three sorts—those in which the emotional principle prevails, those in which some intellectual principle predominates, and those in which the preponderating principle is volition.

3. Among those of the FIRST sort are *Gladness* and *Regret* in their various modifications, the *Desire of Happiness* when there is no specific object contemplated, and its opposite *Aversion to Pain*; together with *Liking* and *Disliking*, in vague generality.

4. *Gladness* is an emotion preceded by a perception or conception of something personally agreeable. Its non-emotional constituents are, *a judgment upon its object* continued in the emotion and *desire*, in which is included volition. Gladness always includes desire and judgment, or at least apprehension. It is, therefore, complex, for these are non-emotional principles. But in gladness the emotion very decidedly predominates.

5. *Regret* is precisely the opposite of gladness. The desire included in it takes the form of *disappointment*, a feeling occasioned by the occurrence or loss of something dreaded or desired.

6. These emotions are moral because they contain desire, which also includes volition. Dread implies the desire of escaping the pain threatened by something in prospect.

7. The modifications of gladness and regret are—those which are distinguished by degrees of intensity—those which are marked by habit and duration—those which take to themselves an additional intellectual or moral element.

8. Among the first of these modifications will be found *joy* in all its enhancements up to *ecstacy*—*sorrow* in all its aggravations down to unmitigated *horror*. This is the modification of intensity.

9. The modification of habit or duration will include *cheerfulness* and *melancholy*. These must not be confounded with the cheerfulness and melancholy which are not properly psychological, but are either innate in the animal system, or arise out of causes accidental to that conformation, and, therefore, contain nothing with which the Power, either of Thought or Volition, can grapple. The feelings now under consideration, on the contrary, are purely mental affections. Now these affections are clearly reducible to gladness and regret, which always imply intellect and volition, from which they are distinguished simply by habit and duration.

10. The third modification is found when, in addition to its proper nature, gladness or regret receives the peculiarity of some other element. For example—when the mathematician was overjoyed at the result of an elaboration of thought, and cried, in rapture, *Εὕρηκα*. his joy was marked by intellectuality. When the reflection which gives birth to gladness or regret turns upon recollections of moral conduct, and the emotion is consequently distinguished by self-approval or self-condemnation, the moral superaddition is manifest.

11. The indiscriminate or indeterminate *desire of happiness*

~~ness~~ and *aversion to pain*, are, so far, inclusive of volition, as that the Power of Volition is their very basis. Their exercise is chiefly emotional; and they are, in their turn, the bases of gladness and regret, and thus may be regarded as fundamental forms of those emotions.

12. *Liking* and *disliking* imply some apprehension or perception, if not a matured act of judgment. Volition may be rudimentary, or more advanced, and the degree of moral quality in these feelings will be advanced accordingly. But the strength of these principles is decidedly emotional.

13. It is evident that in all these cases the very same mental functions are at work to produce the most opposite feelings. Gladness and regret, cheerfulness and melancholy, ecstasy and horror, have alike their roots in the great powers of the mind, their different characters being solely developments of those powers to fit extrinsic occasions.

## II.

1. The second sort of complex emotions is that in which some intellectual principle predominates.

2. To this sort belong *Admiration*, and its *opposite* which has obtained no place in psychological nomenclature.

3. Admiration does not directly, though it does indirectly, involve a moral element. It involves an intellectual one, and that of considerable activity. Its emotional constituent is wonder. Admiration, if sustained, always finds some new quality, or some new display of quality perceived before, in its object. If the element of novelty were withdrawn from the object, the element of wonder would also be withdrawn from the feeling with which it is regarded, and thus admiration would cease.

4. The other constituent of Admiration is *Approbation*, and this requires an act of judgment, to sustain which a determination of the Will is necessary. When wonder ceases, admiration becomes mere approbation, and there is

no emotion. In admiration the intellectual part decidedly predominates.

5. The *opposite* of admiration, without a name, is composed of wonder and disapprobation.

6. *Expectation*, scarcely emotional, has an intellectual character. Properly, it is merely intellectual. When there is an emotional contingent, it depends wholly upon the interest apprehended in the expected event.

7. Expectation is based solely upon intellectual data, the knowledge or apprehension of which supplies its material. It may be equivalent to faith, or it may be the result of calculation. It is the state of mind generated by existing facts appearing to lead to an issue yet future.

8. Expectation is unaltered by the nature of its object. The event expected may be good, evil, or indifferent. In the last case expectation produces no emotion. Hence it must be right to say that expectation is not emotional, and that the emotions which arise at the expectation of something good or evil really belong to some other division.

9. But *Expectation* is introduced here for the sake of *Trust* and *Resignation*, which are emotions of the tranquil order, and spring out of confidence in a favourable object—confidence being the intensest degree of expectation.

10. And it is also introduced here for the sake of *Disappointment*, an emotion which has had expectation as its antecedent, and is, in fact, a high form of regret at the non-fulfilment of that which had been expected. Where there is no expectation, there can be no disappointment. *Dismay*, and even *Despair* are the aggravated forms of disappointment. The last is its horrible consummation.

#### IV.

1. The THIRD sort of complex emotions is that in which the preponderating constituent is volition, and which is, therefore, highly moral.

2. *Desire* here presents itself for examination. It has

been indiscriminately mentioned under preceding heads. It must here be cleared of misapprehension.

3. Observe, then, that desire is sometimes a merely animal instinct, or at most an active movement resulting entirely from animal conditions. Of course, even this sort of desire is in the mind; but it depends so entirely upon animal physiology, and results so directly and entirely from corporeal organization and necessity, that it has only a sidelong connection with the science of Psychology. Such desire is that of food, of sex, of shelter, of clothing, of exercise, of rest, and the like. Yet even such desire may, by excess, invade the mind, and assume the place of a psychological principle. A moral defilement will be the consequence. The excessive feeling will be a passion.

4. Guarding against the error of confounding the desire just described with that which is truly mental, it may be observed, that the latter *always regards a specific object which presents calculable motive*, and thus appeals to Reason. This desire always implies an act of the Will, and is thus more or less moral as volition is called up in it. Desire seems to be the impulsive and incipient part of a given act of volition. There is emotion in it which is lost in the act of volition, as the latter becomes complete. It is impossible to separate a purely mental desire from the Will, so as to show that the former can take place without the intervention of the latter. There is a specific volition in every specific desire, apart from that which impels to outward action towards the desired object. Desire itself *includes* volition as a constituent, and then *leads to further* volition. This is equally the case whether the desire be to avoid or to gain an object.

5. Bare inclination must not be confounded with desire for desire is choice after an act of judgment, while bare inclination does not imply deliberate choice at all.

6. Whatever be the nature or quality of the object, the nature of the feeling under discussion is not variable. The *virtue* or *vice* of desire may be enhanced by the quality of

the object, yet, *physiologically*, desire is always one and the same thing. The enhancement of the virtue or vice of desire, however, belongs rather to Moral than to Mental Philosophy. We are here examining merely the physiological nature of desire as a mental state ; yet, even of this the moral quality forms a part.

7. Desire is the principle by which all emotions are connected with acts of volition. It, therefore, partakes of both natures, so as to adapt itself to the office of conductor.

8. This principle is accordingly found to be a constituent of several complex emotions.

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## LECTURE V.

### THIRD SORT OF COMPLEX EMOTIONS CONTINUED, WITH EXEMPLIFICATIONS.

#### I.

1. *Love* is admiration made consummate by desire. There can be no specific love if either of these elements be wanting. Without admiration there can be desire, but not love ; for we cannot love that of which we in no respect approve. Without desire the feeling is nothing more than admiration, and mere admiration is not love.

2. It is desire, then, that constitutes love a highly moral affection, and this through its component volition.

3. *Passions* are not to be confounded with love, whether they be animal or mental in prevalent quality. If the former, they are but appetites in excess ; if the latter, they are but excessive emotions or feelings of the instinctive form. An appetite is the mere craving of an animated corporeal organism or function. A passion is at best an excessive feeling often produced by the intensity of an appetite. Neither appetite nor passion contains anything intellectual, nor does it, *necessarily*, contain anything moral. There is

no act of judgment in it, consequently no approbation, and hence no admiration. The desire it contains never rises higher than instinct, often not mental, but animal. Still this instinctively animal desire is often intensely impulsive, and *invades* the mind, producing emotion there not to be confounded with the desire contained in love. Even thus far the thing may go without any act of volition. But it rarely rests at this limit. The desire becomes much more than instinctive, and the passion, by allowance, becomes a highly moral feeling. It may, occasionally, consist with love by the accession of admiration ; but it is usually too impetuous for this connection. The predominance of passion becomes the triumph of sensuality, for which man is accountable because he has mental power to control it.

4. *Gratitude* is love, the fruit of reflection on favours received from its object. The conduct of that object is the matter of admiration ; and the sense of personal interest is added to this feeling to give it a particular character, and to make it more intense. We love the person whom we admire; and we love him with a warmer and more characteristic feeling when we have received kindness from him.

5. *Affection* is the domestic form of love. It includes sympathy. In its particular applications it is partly instinctive—the instinct, however, regulated and directed by Reason.

6. *Friendship* is love, without instinct, with more or less of sympathy. The distinguishing characteristic of it is, that the admiration and desire it contains are reciprocated.

7. *Benevolence* is the virtue of an unself-directed habit of kindly volition. It is indefinite in its range until reduced to the form of love by specification at the sight of objects. With sympathy it becomes a feeling of strong kindness. If the object be in misery, the emotion, and then the feeling, is *Pity* or *Compassion*; if guilty of wrong, it becomes *Mercy*.

8. Love to God is first gratitude ; beyond which it ranges immeasurably high in supreme admiration and desire.

## II.

1. The emotions directly opposed to these several forms of love are easily reduced to their constituents, whose nature is the product of the same great powers which produce all the rest.

2. *Hatred* is the feeling opposed to admiration, consummated by *Aversion*. Wonder and disapprobation are its first constituents, and the desire of avoidance, especially intensified, is its completion. While, therefore, like love, it contains an intellectual element, its chief character is derived from volition. Hence it is highly moral. Anger is the proper emotion of hatred.

3. Love may become intensely emotional in the direction of good-will to its object, prompting to specific volition of the most self-denying character. So hatred may become intensely emotional in the direction of ill-will, and then it assumes the personal quality of malignity, settled malice, or revenge. These forms are moral in the highest degree because of the volition which predominates in them.

4. *Disgust* is the most intensified degree of aversion.

5. The correctness or incorrectness of judgment in approbation or disapprobation in these various sentiments does not affect their physiology. Approbation, for example, may be erroneous, but it will still unite with wonder to form admiration, and then with desire to form love. Thus, both love and hatred may become unjust, because based on wrong apprehensions; but they will not be the less real, or the less composed of legitimately adjusted elements on that account.

6. But if the qualities which are admired are *moral* qualities, the love thence resulting will possess one moral element more than when the qualities are merely physical. Love may attach itself to merely physical excellencies, and it is still moral because of the constituent of desire which contains volition. But it is far more highly moral, if the things regarded with approbation are, or are deemed to be, moral virtues. But these matters belong to Moral Philosophy.

7. The case is exactly parallel with regard to the opposite feeling of hatred.

### III.

1. Desire is a prime constituent of *Hope*. We have seen (Lec. iv. Sec. iii., 6-9), that expectation is an intellectual principle. Now, united with desire, it forms hope. Hope is, therefore, a highly moral feeling, in every stage from emotion to habit.

2. The morality of this principle, however, is seen in two respects—the moral nature of its objects, and its own composition.

3. There are three modifications in the composition of hope—when expectation is greater than desire—when desire is greater than expectation—when both constituents are equal.

4. When expectation predominates, the emotion and the moral quality of hope are feeble.

5. When desire exceeds expectation, the nature of hope is still preserved because expectation is there ; but the emotional and moral qualities surpass the intellectual. The proper nature of hope becomes feeble, and anxiety takes place.

6. When both constituents are equal, and likewise intense, that state of mind is realised which Holy Scripture calls “The full assurance of hope.”

7. Hope is most rational when its element of desire takes its rise from an act of judgment in favour of its object ; but such an act of judgment is not an indispensable constituent of its nature.

8. *Despair* is the direct opposite to hope, but has three degrees of opposition. The first degree is, when there is simply, but absolutely, no expectation to accompany desire. The second is, when there is full confidence that the desire will never be gratified. The third is, when the object desired is apprehended to be so absolutely necessary to hap-

piness, that no feeling can co-exist with the want of it mitigating the force and fulness of desperation. In the last degree, despair will fill the mind with horror, and utterly preclude the possibility of solace and relief. The emotion first awakened will settle into a feeling of anguish complete and overwhelming.

## IV.

1. *Fear* may be, like desire, purely instinctive. (Lec. IV., Sec. iv., 3.) It may, indeed, be considered as one of the developments of the instinctive form of desire. It is the instinct of all animals for self-preservation. It is the elementary of the desire of avoiding pain. Thus far, it is not a psychological emotion, but a merely animal one, and then it has no moral quality.

2. Fear, which is the proper matter of our present investigation, is truly psychological. It then appears as an emotion or a feeling properly mental. It may, indeed, be awakened by the animal instinct, but whether it be so or not, its antecedent is reflection, momentary or otherwise. It thus admits one degree of morality. When the desire of avoiding pain becomes definite, another degree of morality is admitted. The *objects* of fear may occasion a third.

3. Fear may have grown into a permanent feeling, but at its commencement it is an emotion, perhaps even a violent one. Fear, as a specific emotion, will be called forth by the sudden apprehension of a specific peril.

4. Fear, especially grown into a habit, gives intensity to despair when its object is seen to comprise all misery.

5. Terror and dread are modifications of fear.

## V.

1. *Veneration* or *Reverence*, considered emotionally, includes three chief principles—the simple emotion of sublimity, and the complex one of love and fear. Excluding love, the emotion will be mere, but overwhelming, dread, which the

feeling of sublimity would but render more intense. Excluding the feeling of sublimity, presumptuous familiarity would ensue, only to be checked by fear superseding love. The three principles united make up the just feeling of veneration. A moral being alone can be the object of veneration, because this carried out to its completion is adoration, or worship, which implies love and confidence in the moral qualities of its object.

2. Veneration, misdirected, is *superstition* if fear predominate—*idolatry* if love predominate. An intellectual element corrects misdirected veneration in both forms.

3. Superstition commences as an emotion; so does idolatry. Idolatry is the external homage paid to idols, or the adoration of finite beings; and, in this case, superstition is its prompter.

4. But the New Testament speaks of idolatry chiefly as a mental homage to what is a matter of cupidity—"Covetousness, which is idolatry." The case is thus—Covetousness is either an unlawful desire, or the desire of an unlawful object from a mistaken admiration. It is, therefore, a perverted form of love. It is to be understood, then, that when wrong love, or the love of a wrong object, is so strong as to preclude veneration for God, it appropriates to itself that veneration, contains that homage which is the proper nature of worship, and is what the New Testament calls "Idolatry." A right object may be loved to an unlawful degree, and this is as truly idolatry as if the object were illegitimate. But in the latter case the moral fault is two-fold, while in the former it is single.

5. Idolatry thus appears to have three stages. First, it is an emotion; second, it becomes, by the constant repetition of the mental act, a perpetuated feeling, often violent; third, it settles into a habit of intense but unobserved force. Then, the idolatrous character is complete and all-ruling.

6. Here again we impinge on Moral Philosophy.

## LECTURE VI.

### COMPLEX EMOTIONS CONTINUED, WITH EXEMPLIFICATIONS— CONCLUSION.

#### I.

1. *Humility*, in its commencement, is a complex emotion. Like all others of this sort, it can become a habitual feeling. It is highly moral, as volition predominates in it.

2. There is in it, however, a strong intellectual element; comparison is always implied in it, and this is an act of judgment.

3. Humility does not belong to a being of unbounded nature. That which is absolute is non-conditioned by any of the limitations and qualifications of the dependent. The nature of humility is finite and relative, and in its proper development involves comparison with some infinitely exalted standard or example. But lower examples, if superior, may be brought into the comparison.

4. In humility, *self* is always one member of the comparison. On the other side is essential and infinite superiority. When lower examples of superiority are taken, they may be numerous and various; they may be even *falsely* supposed to be superior. There is no difference on this account in the *nature* of humility, though the moral result will be debasing when an ill example is taken instead of a good one. Hence, for the production of the genuine virtue, without deteriorating admixtures, the essential and absolute superiority is the only safe standard with which to compare oneself. This exists only in God and His perfect law.

5. A standing comparison of self with superiority is the basis of the perpetuated virtue of humility, and the origin of its emotional commencement. Every specific act of such comparison gives birth to a new emotion of humility in every being not chargeable with sin. If the being be sinful the comparison reveals a deeper inferiority, and unites the emo-

tions of *shame* and *humility* in one emotion called *Humiliation*. This, too, can be perpetuated into a feeling and a habit, when the emotional character will cease except by repetition.

6. In every form and modification of humility, a highly moral element is the chief characteristic. This is admiration, with desire of conformity ; that is, love. Without love there can be no humility ; for without love self rules, and the feeling is not humility, but wounded self-esteem, or mortification, an emotion and feeling containing predominantly the very essence of *pride*, the direct opposite of humility.

7. Yet even humility will have its boast, its theme of exultation ; and that boast, that theme, will be the object with which it compares itself, and which it loves and delights to own. The mind, in a healthy state, must glory in something. If it have no object beyond itself whose attractions quench selfish thoughts, it will seek its theme of boasting wholly in itself, and will be proud. Humility is impossible under such circumstances. The boast of humility is external.

8. The *will* to glory in an essentially superior object extrinsic to oneself, as it makes humility, so it renders that emotion, and its perpetuated feeling, a highly moral one. Nothing, in fact, can be more moral than true self-abasement in the presence of an object of infinite and incomparable worth. The Will is highly concerned in every such act.

## II.

1. *Pride* has already been said to be the opposite of humility. Its only worship is given to self ; its object of supreme love is self. It forgets or ignores all superiority. It deliberately thinks, outwardly, only of what it sees or fancies to be inferior ; it compares itself only with that. It loves nothing above itself.

2. There is in pride, as in its opposite, humility, the intellectual element of comparison—the objects compared in this case being always imagined to be inferior.

3. There is the moral element of love, but it is exclusive self-love ; and, the habit once formed, this predominates in every disposition of the heart. Like humility, therefore, pride belongs to the third class of complex emotions.

4. When a comparison of superior objects with self becomes inevitable, the first emotion is *envy*, followed soon by *chagrin* or *mortification*. These are all emotional developments of pride.

5. Pride has its boast in self, or in that which gratifies self, or brings glory to self, whether personal beauty, or mental endowments, or moral virtues, or wealth, or fame, or friends, or family, or circumstances. These things are only the accessories—self is the object which gives them their estimated worth.

6. Thus humility and pride spring from the same psychological principles, involve similar processes, and issue in analogous results.

### III.

1. *Shame* is the emotion arising from a personal conviction of something regarded as disgraceful, or from a consciousness of the possibility of being so convicted.

2. In the former case the emotion acts in punitive, in the latter in preventive form.

3. In the punitive form pride is its constant accompaniment, if not a constituent of it. It will be a predominant principle in eternal punition, and will have no corrective or mitigating element. In the preventive form, however, shame is capable of being purely virtuous, and of becoming, as it is in fact, the great preserver of decency and propriety in the intercourse of human society.

4. In the merely preventive form, shame appears to be a simple emotion; but in the punitive form it is certainly composed of various elements, of which the simple emotion is the primary to which it owes its distinction. But the intellectual elements of comparison and introversion are

essential to it, while a desire of impossible excuses will make it intensely moral.

5. Shame is the result of peculiar occasions acting on the general susceptibility, and, though strictly emotional under impulse, is capable of becoming habitual. It can, however, be called up by a strong act of volition. The punitive form chiefly requires to be placed in the class of complex emotions. Its character, still, is highly emotional, even qualified as it is by other elements. The intellectual operation which precedes it is extremely rapid, and very imperceptibly glides into its nature.

#### IV.

1. It is needless, perhaps, to carry these specific illustrations of the mode of operation proper to his great function into further detail.

2. It, however, requires to be repeated, in fine, that the emotional susceptibility is not, when considered by itself, the seat and centre of the moral power of the mind, whatever morality may be diffused throughout its functional actings. The Power of Volition, the Will, is alone that seat and centre, and so becomes the source of the whole of the mind's morality.

3. And yet it requires, on the other hand, to be understood as an evident truth, that since all the complex emotions, by the intermingling of volition, have more or less of moral quality in them, and that, too, not by accident, but by the design and contrivance of the mind's Creator; and since *there* all permanent feelings, the substance of character, reside; the emotional department is the proper, and, indeed, the only place for the formation of character, especially moral character, in the perpetuation of the habits and feelings resulting from these processes. Thus, the department becomes, as it were, the repository and storehouse of all those results of volition which combine with feeling; and there they rest, forming a consolidated character, in permanency.

4. It must be noted, too, that THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF EMOTION is a good name for the whole department, because, without emotion to begin with, the department could not exist at all. All mental feeling commences with emotion. Feeling confirmed and perpetuated forms disposition, which, through habit, whether noticed or not, becomes deep, strong, and all-governing.

5. Nor must it be forgotten (Lec. I., Sec. ii., 2) that, from its very nature, emotion is always momentary, though it may seem to end at once, or not, according to its character. If it do not seem to end, it loses its emotional character by being lengthened into a more or less protracted feeling. When the emotional character is not lost, and yet there is continuance, it is by the repetition of emotional actings from new impulse at each successive moment.

6. A strong caution is requisite to distinguish between animal and psychological INSTINCTS, as causes of emotions. The animal instincts are implanted merely to preserve the animal life, and to secure the due action of the animal functions. They can, however, be governed and used by Reason. When not so governed and used, they run off into irregular and unrestrained indulgence, and then they will surely invade, perhaps lord it over, the region of psychology. Thus, they may produce in the mind itself very vicious emotions which it cannot help making its own.

7. The mental instincts are innate tendencies and impulses towards knowledge, love, justice, converse, honour, moral elevation, piety, immortality, and all nobility of soul. They belong purely to the mind. But, grand and good as they are in their proper nature, by misdirection they become perverted and debased. And they are, too, often overwhelmed by the force of the instincts which are merely animal.

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# TWO LECTURES IN CONCLUSION ON PSYCHOLOGY.

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## LECTURE I.

### SYNTHETIC REVIEW.

#### I.

1. THE course we have pursued on Psychology in the previous Outlines has been chiefly analytical. The mind being taken as a simple and indivisible substance, we have searched for its properties ; and, in doing so, we have analysed them into powers, functions, faculties, or susceptibilities. Considering it as a moral being, with immortal expectations, we have ascertained where its true morality, and its consequent accountability lies. Only by analysis could we have reached this result.

2. But after the analysis of the mental powers, the oneness and simplicity of mind might, perhaps, be questioned ; or it might, at least, escape the notice it demands, without the check supplied by a synthetic review of the whole matter. That synthesis we now, therefore, propose to show. Each of the three great powers may be first reconstructed, and thus the oneness of the whole mind may be gathered from the collation of those powers.

#### II.

1. To treat first of the Power of Thought—it is inconceivable there should be varieties of Reason—it must be one

and the same thing in nature wherever it exists. There may, indeed, be degrees, but there can be no diversities, in the nature of reasoning power.\*

2. By Reason in a given mind we clearly mean the reasoning power, or faculty, or function, of that mind. We can never mean or understand that it is something else than this, or that it is this in one mind, and something else in another. When this faculty is in exercise it acts by invariable laws both in one mind and in all other minds that possess it ; and all thoughts, things, and facts, are manipulated by it with absolute uniformity and infallible certainty, so far as essential mode is concerned. Now, we have called this faculty of Reason by other names,—Consciousness, Intellect, Understanding, Judgment,—using each term according to exigency ; and yet we have not implied an essential variety. We *feel* that the names only represent the *same* thing in different aspects.

3. Taking this identity in the nature of Reason as our starting-point, we turn to Introversion of Thought. Every one can inspect his own mind ; and if he do this he will discover, beyond dispute, that this power is a function and an exercise of Reason—the very Reason that is everywhere and always identical. It is, in fact, that special degree of the power of reasoning by which man, as a species, is raised above the brutes as a responsible being, and as a prince in the realm of intellect. By it he criticises, so to speak, all materials of thought, harmonises, connects, separates, combines, and makes them all his own, or rejects them.

4. Then the powers of abstraction, analysis, and synthesis, resting on the preliminary faculty of comparing, and detecting agreements, differences, and contrasts, declare themselves at once as subordinate, though indispensable, functions of the same Reason ; nor is it conceivable that they should be viewed in any other light, or that Reason should exist without them.

\* Even Kant's distinctions in Reason do not contradict this ; nor is it possible to contradict it.

They cannot, by any process of thought of which we are conscious, be separated in nature from Reason.

5. The principle of suggestion, passive as it is, is manifestly a property of Reason itself, and not an accidental appendage. That it is inherent and essential is plain, from the fact that the reasoning power of any created mind would not exist at all if it were absent. It is the only law by which ideas are capable of being connected. Only the Infinite Mind, which knows all things by the eternal intuition of an absolute consciousness, can dispense with this passive, but powerful, function. It is, therefore, essential to the reasoning power of every created mind. It hardly need be said that, if suggestion is thus essential to the nature of Reason in a creature, its developments, memory, reflection, imagination, cannot be otherwise, for they are its proper and necessary actings.

6. We reach back to Conception as a compound of Suggestion and Reason, and to Perception as a similar compound of Sensation and Reason; Reason being in exercise in both cases. Like suggestion, sensation is a passive, yet powerful, function of mind. It is, however, simply the inlet by which the mind opens to receive the impressions of outward things. It, therefore, cannot be severed from whatever the mind is; it must be a property belonging to the Reason to which it is so necessary. Rudimentary as it is, the mind cannot do without it in its external relations.

7. In all these gatherings up we carry with us the notion of Consciousness as that without which mind would be a nullity, and Reason, or Intellect, a word without a meaning. Introversion is consciousness with its eyes turned inwards by a forced act of self-cognizance. Reason is, therefore, conscious; or rather, is consciousness itself.

8. Here, then, we have arrived at the conclusion that the Power of Thought, as a department, is not divided by the detailed functions, but is simply made up of them as essential properties, and adapted by them to the whole

domain of intelligence, while one consciousness possesses and exercises them all.

### III.

1. The Power of Volition is of less difficult study. All the acts of Will are acts of one power, not of many, nor of a complex one.

2. All outward actions are plainly products of acts of Will. We are conscious that however many our actions are, their immediate and invariable antecedents are acts of Will. We have, in reality, a perpetual intuition that the actions not connected with acts of volition are irresponsible, and carry neither virtue nor vice. They are outside of moral law and obligation. Then, *acts of volition* must be regarded as the acts of a power. Where no power is, nothing is an act in the true sense of the word.

3. We have always the consciousness that the act of to-day is performed by the same power as the act of yesterday. There is the sense of self and identity—the same self acting in all instances. There is, consequently, the consciousness that however many be the acts of volition, the very same Will is responsible for them all alike. It is impossible to create, or invent, or even imagine, complexity, diversity, or change, in the inward cause of all one's actions.

4. It is thus not so much a matter of argument as of intuition, that our moral nature consists, in chief, in this indivisibility in the source of all responsibility in action. Unless our personal identity could be withdrawn from our cognizance, the *sense of sameness* in our Will, and the sense that *there is* to be found our moral nature, must remain unaffected by any phenomena whatever.

5. Hence, all our experience of the acts of our Will leads us to acknowledge that Will as one great and simple department of the mind.

### IV.

1. Nor is there more difficulty in the study of the emo-

tional department. If we could take every one of the countless feelings, or shades of feeling, or combinations of feeling, which affect us with pleasure or distress, and trace it upwards, we should reach but one Susceptibility of Emotion as the source of them all.

2. Nor can it be doubted that this source is mental, not animal. Even the animal instincts, when they produce emotions, act upon the mind in doing so.

3. Thus, joyous hope and utter despair are totally opposite feelings; they have the same root in the one desire of happiness ; and that is traced back to admiration ; and that again to wonder ; and this is a simple emotion of mind, while the elements, which are their complements, are all purely mental. And that form of love which leads to marriage is a mental affection, though combined with an animal instinct for the purposes of the present life of man. All that is emotional and feeling in it is purely mental.

4. The result of all this is, that we are led up by all specific emotions of every class to one capacity of feeling, one Susceptibility of Emotion, as a great department of the properties of mind. We have a consciousness that all our feelings have their centre there ; nor is it conceivable that, with one mind in man, and not more, it should be otherwise. The varieties of sensitive phenomena which mind exhibits are all produced by conditions wholly extrinsic to that centre, acting, nevertheless, so upon it as to show that it alone can be the ultimate source of them all.

v.

1. Thus, by an induction of subordinate *functions*, we reach the oneness of the Power of Thought ; by an induction of the *acts* of Will we reach the oneness of the Power of Volition ; and, by an induction of mental *feelings*, we reach the oneness of the Susceptibility of Emotion ; and these are the three great departments which comprise the whole of the properties of mind.

2. Mental philosophy is a philosophy of facts, principles, and laws, as truly as natural philosophy is. Now, the subordinate functions of the Power of Thought, and the laws by which they act, are facts patent to every mental observer, that is, to almost every one more or less clearly. No one can question that he reasons, or can reason, upon everything outward and inward. All the phenomena of intellect are matters of consciousness. It is just similar with all the phenomena of volition and emotion. They are all known facts existing under known laws. Then, taking these up by induction, we are inevitably led to the great powers to which they respectively belong, and so on to the mind of the properties of which these are the generic departments.

3. The theories which deny the reality of mind, or resolve its operations into mere results of material organizations, are so stupidly or madly absurd as not to be worthy of serious disproof. Everything bespeaks mind, whatever may be said for matter (Intro. Lec. II., Sec. i.).

4. Nor is it possible to confound Reason with Feeling, or with Volition; or Volition with Feeling. They are *felt* to be distinct departments of the one mind, though working together, and mingling with each other.

5. The manner in which they co-exist, and co-operate, shows determinately, that the three powers are a constituted and harmonious arrangement to accomplish the high purposes for which every mind, in its unity, was created. They never thwart, they always supplement each other.

## VI.

1. The whole matter may be finished in the following summary.

2. The human mind exhibits a vast variety of obvious phenomena, which are to be traced up to the functional principles which produce them. When we have collected them, we find that they are fitly resolved into the three

Powers or Functions of Thought, Volition, and Emotion, all of which manifestly exist, and that at once distinctly, and in co-operation. They are so diverse that they cannot be confounded, and so necessary to each other that they cannot be separated.

3. On further examination we find that these divisions are not organs, but properties or functions, and that they are inherent in a simple substance called "mind."

4. Thus we come to the result, that the human mind, in all its phases, is a simple substance,—one, insoluble, indivisible, incapable of decomposition or decay, in each individual. In each individual, also, it is finite.

5. Each individual human mind has, in its various functions, its proper modes of adaptation to all the possibilities of physical, intellectual, and moral existence. It thus stands in relation to the Universe and to God.

6. In this relation each individual mind is a moral agent, capable of moral obligations and enjoyments, and destined to reap the fruits of this capacity in an immortal duration, whether of pleasure or of sorrow.

7. "The Human Mind" is the name of a species, of which the genus is "Mind." All individual minds of mankind belong to it. The essence of the mind of humanity is the substance of this species, of which substance the individuals are the determinate developments.

8. The genus "Mind," which includes every possible variety and rank of mind in the entire universe, stands before us in the loftiest rank of being.

9. Whether we consider the human mind as species, or as individually developed, we think of it as absolutely different from corporeal organization.

10. But, for the present, all phenomena and processes of the human mind are conditioned by corporeal organization, that of brain, which, in the present state, is the *instrument*, and the only one, of knowledge and thought.

## LECTURE II.

### THE REALITY OF MATTER ; THE CONNEXION OF PSYCHOLOGY WITH THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

#### I.

1. MATERIALISM and Idealism are directly opposite theories. The former denies the existence of mind, the latter the reality of matter. The Materialist asserts that the phenomena of Thought, Feeling, and Volition are the mere results of organic action in the brain. The Idealist maintains that all the phenomena which seem to indicate the existence of matter anywhere are mental ideas, and nothing more.\*

2. Of course we hold that both theories are wrong, notwithstanding the greatness of the names by which they have been honoured. But we have no need to set arguments against Materialism in extended array. "The existence of mind can be more easily proved than that of matter." "If the mind were to doubt its own existence, that very doubt would prove its existence; for that which has no real existence cannot doubt, because it cannot think. Doubt is a mode of thought, and thought demonstrates that being of something that thinks." "Matter does not think, and, therefore, by thought, prove its existence." (Intro. Lec. II., Sec. i., 2, 5, 6.)

3. Materialism is thus entirely at fault. On the other hand, the fault of Idealism is, not that it is wrong in its notion of mind, but that it without due proof rejects matter. Against this error, and to prevent misapprehension of our

\* Dr. Reid has given a statement of the views of the Peripatetics, of Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, Bishop Berkeley, Hume, Arnauld, and Leibnitz, on ideas. Their views are variously modified till they reach the perfect idealism of Berkeley, and beyond that, the negation of Hume, who says that "what is called body is only a bundle of sensations, and that what is called mind is only a bundle of thoughts, passions, and emotions, without any subject." All this folly arose out of the false notion of perception derived from the old philosophers, and their successors the schoolmen.

meaning in the second Lecture of the Introduction, Section i., the following course of thought, as to the mode of proving the real existence of matter, is appended to the preceding Outlines of Psychology.

## II.

1. According to our theory, then, the existence of mind requires no proof, for that which thinks, *is*, and it is mind which thinks.

2. But the existence of matter cannot be proved by its own thought, for it has none. Even the matter of the human body does not think, and thus prove its reality. The brain is indeed, as an instrument, employed in thought; but it would not be so were the mind withdrawn, as it is in death. Animal life ceases with the withdrawal of mind, and nothing remains but dead matter rapidly decomposing.

3. Sensation is in the mind, but the senses are in the animated body. The mind really, not in the mediate way of the older philosophers, but through its function of sensation, perceives outward objects. The mind is led outwards by sensation through the senses to whatever material objects may present themselves.

4. Thus, then, the senses are animated bodily functions used by the mind for the realization of whatever is outward and material, and it is thus only the mind accepts, after having tested, the proofs of the real existence of matter; and further, this it can do only as it can rely upon the truth of those functions, and of the reports they bring in.

5. Hence the reliability of these functions of the animated body is the first matter of inquiry.

## III.

1. It may be taken, *prima facie*, as more than probable, that He who has undeniably created the mind of man a real being, and has with equal certainty endowed that mind with a consciousness of feelings just such as would exist if the senses were real functions in a real body, and were the real

recipients of impressions from actual existences extrinsic to them, has made both the senses and the exterior forms of matter as real as the mind which entertains the thought of them. The mind is real; its feelings are real feelings; it is more likely than otherwise, that the feelings are produced by real senses in real bodies, and occasioned by real forms of extrinsic matter. And in proportion as the strength of this probability increases, the value of the contrary hypothesis must decrease.

2. Our consciousness that we receive the impressions from without is so strong as to amount to an intuition which admits of no reasoning against it. We feel at once, that the source of our special sensations is external; and so thorough is the persuasion, that no reasoning upon recondite principles of philosophy can lead us to act, or habitually think, otherwise than as we must act and think, if all things without us were as real as our own minds.

3. The presumption, then, is, that the Creator has made the material objects of our perceptions as real as the perception itself, which, beyond doubt, is a real faculty of mind.

#### IV.

1. It matters not to our inquiry how many senses we have. If there be but one, and its report be true, the proof it brings of the reality of extrinsic bodies is as sure as if there were ever so many. But it is assumed that there are several senses, each of which brings up its report. Then, our question is, does each of our senses tell us true?

2. Man is represented as having five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, feeling. It has, indeed, been disputed whether these be not reducible to three, taste and smell being regarded as modifications of feeling, otherwise called “touch.” It is the province of physiology to determine that point—it little concerns our present subject. There are at least the *appearances* and the *uses*, as we are conscious, of the whole number of five senses. Nor is the reality of exterior objects affected by any distinction of the kind.

3. Now, we may, or, rather, must ultimately, be content to accept and rely on the testimony we are conscious that our senses give us of the reality of matter and of the external world. No investigation instituted by the idealist philosopher can possibly be better than the testimony created for us by the Creator Himself. Still, as a merely scientific inquiry, we may follow the train of a few thoughts.

4. There is then, relying simply on what may be called a scientific search for proofs, great difficulty in arriving at reality in external objects. For example—they say that the eye is a camera, and that upon a canvas, the retina, at its hinder part, is a picture, which purports to be a copy from a scene without. Further, they say, the notice of the picture is communicated by a nerve to the brain, and by the brain to the mind. The process may be inscrutable, but this does not matter. Now, in this process the mind comes not at all into contact with the external scene. There is a complicated instrumentality, or better, a succession of instrumentalities, between the mind and the scene. A damaged state of any one of these instrumentalities perverts the information which the mind should receive. If there be a false picture on the retina, the information will be false; if there be no picture at all, the mind will have no communion with the supposed scene without. What then is there absolutely to prove that the scene is not a creation within the eye? Or what is there, indeed, to demonstrate that the whole impression, instrumentality and all, is not purely mental, setting aside what our consciousness persuades us?

5. Similar difficulties beset the information we gain from every one of our senses. Where then lies our certainty of their truth in the testimony they give us? It consists almost entirely in the conviction we have, that the Creator would not make us habitually conscious of what is not true.

6. And yet there is the collateral confirmation of this conviction, which we get from the uniformity and universality

of human experience in such matters. Not only do we receive like impressions whenever we bring ourselves to the test, but other persons' experience exactly tallies with our own—a proof that there is a law in operation which can be no other than a law of truth. Whatever seeming irregularities we meet with are easily seen to result from anomalous, defective, or diseased organization.

## V.

1. Besides the five senses usually reckoned, there is what has been called the "muscular sense," or the sense of motion. It has been thought that this furnishes directer proof of the reality of matter than either of the five, or the whole of them together. This, however, is by no means unquestionable. If the act of the mind be all in the testimony of the eye or ear, why may it not be in that of motion and the resistance it meets? If idealism be true it must provide against all arguments of this sort.

2. Pressure is, indeed, a stubborn thing to confirm the existence of matter already assumed on other grounds. All the senses contribute such a confirmation, though perhaps not quite so satisfactorily. For the purpose of this confirmation let us admit the muscular sense, and see how it works.

3. Resistance is felt by the sense of motion. Resistance realizes the fact of existence in space, which in our present state necessitates the notion of matter, for matter and space are a kind of correlatives. That is, if we can think of space as existing before matter was placed in it, yet our actual and customary notion of space is, that it is the location of matter; and that of matter, that it belongs to space. Moreover, the very notion of movement involves that of space to move in, and of matter that moves. But idealism destroys the reality of space in making everything mental. Thus, idealism is contradicted by the muscular sense, or the sense of motion.

4. By the aid of the same principle we get the notion of

shape in matter, which is no other thing than the extension of the resisting body in two or more directions.

5. And that this muscular sense is the first to give us the knowledge, both of shape and distance, is proved by facts. A youth was kept from infancy in a dark dungeon until seventeen years of age. When afterwards brought out into the society of men, as he looked through a window, all things far and near seemed to him like splashes of colouring upon the glass which he could touch with his hand. Just so the infant feels for a distant object as if it were near, and only by experience of motion and touch discovers his mistake.

6. With the foundation, then, of this muscular power already laid, our other senses become the faithful handmaids of our knowledge of material things ; and we find, as we go on, that their reports agree with that basis, and we thus learn to trust them. Surely it is intended by the Creator that we should do so.

7. The whole material universe is thus laid open to us in all its forms, forces, beauties, and glories, and we realise it as a true existence. All the experience of mankind proves that we are safe in doing so.

#### VI.

1. The theory now assumed to be true is well tested by the consequences which would result from the truth of the opposite one.

2. The direct effect would be, that every man would be absolutely isolated—shut up in the camera of his own mind; with pictures, indeed, on the walls, but with no realities without. Only by our own senses have we any access to others. To a person thus conditioned every other person is a non-reality, for mind can have no other access to mind in this world than by the bodily organs. Thus, every one would be virtually annihilated to every other. Whatever disembodied or pure spirits may be able to do in converse, could no embodied man do. All social virtues and pleasures would be mere dreams under such a condition of being.

3. Another effect would be, that the glorious universe would be gone. The earth clothed in beauty and utility would be gone. The wondrous sun and moon, and all the starry systems, would be gone. The Creator's wide dominion would be gone. The Bible would be gone. Redemption would be gone.

4. A system of philosophy which involves such consequences cannot be true. This negative proof is irrefragable, that the material universe, in all its parts, is a reality, and not a merely mental idea, or bundle of ideas.

## VII.

1. We accept, then, the whole system of material nature, as we have been accustomed to do, and man clothed with a material but animated body, as its fitting inhabitant. No counter theory can be admitted without a desolating damage we cannot but deprecate.

2. Man's material organization connects him with the outer world in the same manner as those of brutes do, only in more refined and exquisite modes than theirs.

3. There is in man, especially when young, just as in other animals, an impulsiveness of spontaneous action which seems scarcely to depend on volition. It is in the animated body, and is governed far rather by material than by psychological laws. Whatever the merely animal life may be, that is the seat of this impulsive spontaneity. It can be restrained, but not caused, by the mind.

4. The appetites, necessary for the uses of life, are feelings of the animated body, and are not psychological; and yet they, too, may be regulated, and held in check, by the superior power of the mind.

5. Nor less are the instincts, properly so called, properties of animated bodies, in no respect owing their existence to psychological principles. All animals have them in forms suitable to the necessities of their modes of life. Man has them as an animal; but in his case they can be controlled

and directed by Reason. They have their high uses in the physical economy. In the other animals they are the supreme, and never suspended laws of action ; but man is ruled by them only where intellectual and moral laws cannot apply, or only so long as these latter are in abeyance. They are never to be confounded with moral principles, or even with emotions, although they may supply an impulse to the emotional susceptibility.

6. Let the mind be the ruling and immortal part of man's nature, and furnished with the adaptations to fulfil his destiny which have been expounded in our previous course ; then let his organism be real, and really adapted to its external relations ; lastly, let this show his psychological relation to matter, exhibiting the equal reality of body and soul in him as the creation of God—and we surely have an object worthy of our profoundest study. Man is both mentally and bodily constituted to hold converse with both worlds—the outward and the inward, the upper and the lower—and to gain his discipline for immortality from both.

Written for teaching, first, as a mere sketch, 1864 ; re-written more fully, 1872.  
B. QUAIFE, Lenham Cottage, Woollahra, May 16, 1872.





# METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE.



# OUTLINES OF METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE.\*

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## LECTURE I.

### EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION.

#### I.

1. Two terms require to be explained and disposed of, or allotted to their right places in nomenclature, in the first place—"Ontology" and "Metaphysics."

2. "Ontology" is derived either *directly* from the Greek participle  $\omega\nu$ , genitive  $\sigma\nu\tauο\varsigma$ , "being," or *indirectly* from the same through the adverb  $\sigma\nu\tauω\varsigma$ , "truly," "certainly."

3. It is singular that this shade of difference—and it is not much more than a shade—has rendered the word nearly useless in nomenclature by reason of the confusion which it has generated. Owing to this, many philosophers have rejected the term altogether. Still some leading men employ it, and this renders an elucidation of it necessary.

4. The two main definitions, to which others are subordinate, are—"The Science of Being," and "The Science of Realities;" evidently drawn from the distinction of the Greek words in par. 2. Of these, the former seems to have been that adopted before Kant, the latter that of writers since. In regard to the former there seems to have been much obscurity.

\* The Lectures of this course are far from being of uniform length. This is partly owing to the nature of the subjects. It has not been felt of sufficient importance to induce us to alter their original forma. When used, they were delivered in parts at the demand of the moment. So we let them stand.

Some confined it to the limits of  $\tau\circ\ \delta\nu$ , the phrase used for "being," in the strict sense of actuality though abstract. This was justified by etymology. Others made it include, not only "being," but the nature, essence, reality, necessity, of things in general, so as to make quantity, quality, likeness, substance, cause, effect, space, time, simple, compound, parts of the notion. This was plainly going quite beyond etymology, except on the excessive supposition that these are to be regarded as necessary parts of actual "being." All this seems to be discarded now, and the prevalent opinion inclines to the second definition, with its etymology (par. 2)—"the Science of Realities."

5. Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel both retain the word, with these respective significations—Sir W. H. calls the science, "Inferential Psychology"; Mr. M., "The Philosophy of the Realities of Consciousness." For reasons, which our readers will be sure to perceive, we feel it necessary to dispense with these not very intelligible definitions. M'Cosh, also, has his own way of determining what field Ontology is to occupy, and it is not easy to make his method coincide with those of the other writers. Amidst this confusion, how can Ontology be called a science? It must be because of this indeterminateness, that Isaac Taylor dispenses with the word altogether, under every notion of its meaning.

6. As there is now such conflicting usage in regard to the word "Ontology," we have arrived at the conclusion that it is better generally to disuse it. We shall, therefore, for the most part do so in re-writing these lectures (1872).

## II.

1. The term "Metaphysics" is retained by most writers on these subjects, but with a great variety of use. We take two or three chief examples.

2. M'Cosh gives the following definition:—"Metaphysics is the science which inquires into the original or intuitive convictions of the mind, with a view of generalizing and

expressing them, and, also, of determining what are the objects revealed by them."

3. Isaac Taylor considers Metaphysics, in contraposition with Physics, as the science of Abstractions.

4. Sir William Hamilton includes in the *whole* range of Metaphysics, phenomena of mind, its laws, inferences or results therefrom. Plainly, therefore, Psychology is broader, in his view, than either the physiology of mind on the one hand, or the abstractions which stand over against it on the other. In a word, it includes both. At the same time, he considers the third division, which he calls Ontology, as Metaphysics proper.

5. Mansel's treatise on Metaphysics covers the whole range of mental science, and must, therefore, be understood to include Psychology in the meaning of the word.

### III.

1. Thus, we have stated the not very harmonious views of philosophers. We regard Isaac Taylor's view of Metaphysics as the simplest, and therefore as the least liable to confusion. It is, also, the most easily used. We will follow our own thoughts upon the whole science, adopting his general distinction.

2. The term "Metaphysics," is composed of the two Greek words *μετά*, "after," or "beyond," and *φυσικός*, "natural," or "belonging to nature." The phrase *τὰ μετά τὰ φυσικὰ*, literally, "the things beyond the physics," was applied by schoolmen to those books of Aristotle which followed his treatises on Natural History, and other purely physical branches. The modern meaning of *μετά*, "beyond," has ruled, however, in the meaning of "Metaphysics," "beyond natural things."

3. In this meaning we recognise the Greek term *φύσις*, "nature," a term which must apply to every actually existing thing. Every such thing must have a nature. This is true of body and mind alike. Thus, a given mind, as an actual

and created substance, has its  $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ , or "nature," and its  $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\alpha$ , or "natural properties," just in the same sense as any given material substance has. It is a real, living, active thing, individually developed, just as much as a tree, or an animal. And a similar analogy holds between mind in the aggregate and the whole material universe.

4. The term "Physics," then, ought—and we make it in these Outlines—to comprise all that belongs to mind or matter substantially, physiologically, and individually developed, whether considered in the gross, or in singleness of parts; and the science which includes all this and no more, is, in the strict sense, physical science; while that which applies only to a particular branch of it, it is proper to designate the "physiology" of that branch. Thus, the science which describes all the parts and functions of the human body is "the Physiology of the Human Body." Just in the same way it cannot, by the reason of the case, be improper to call the science which treats of the nature and properties of mind, and their functional actings, "the Physiology of the Mind," for so it is in reality, though commonly deemed otherwise. We have, however, used the designations "Mental Philosophy," and "Psychology," because equally proper, and more common—for the science of mind taken as a substance (see Psych. Intro. Lec. II. Sec. v., 3). Psychology comes from the two Greek words  $\psi\chi\eta$  and  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\varsigma$ .

#### IV.

1. The science of Metaphysics, then, properly, and in its strict nature, treats of matters *beyond* physiology whether of matter or of mind; that is, beyond actual nature in substantial, developed, and individual forms, and even in the aggregate; also, beyond phenomena. Its range is that of Abstractions.

2. When we speak of the human mind, or of its three Powers of Thought, Volition, and Emotion, or of their laws

of action or development, the whole matter is *within* the range of Physics in the extent to which that word ought to be applied. But there is, manifestly, a range of science entirely beyond the highest range of the physiological, or physical, development and action of mind; and this is, not without some reasonable cause, distinguished by the post-classical and rather barbarous name of "Metaphysics."

3. But there is a kind of border-land, so to speak, between Physics and Metaphysics, the boundaries of which are not easily discovered; and on this undefined ground the two departments of thought seem to mingle with shadowy indistinctness. All individuals have essences in common with their species, and even with their genera, and these stretch their possibilities into the region of infinity. Now, this region of infinity belongs to pure Metaphysics, being abstract in the highest degree; while the individual developments, being actualities, belong to pure Physics. All between constitutes the border-land in question. Do genera and species\* belong to the region of Metaphysics? or to that of Physics? or to the border-land of shadowy indistinctness between? In other words, are they, or the essences that compose them, realities, or actualities, of physical nature? Or are they abstractions? Our thought is, that they partake of the nature of both, in such a manner that it is liable to dispute to which side they belong. In like manner, in regard to many other conceptions, either side may have the preference according to the aspect in which a matter is seen.

4. The notions of genera and species are formed by the process of thought called "generalization," that is, by comparing resemblances, and classifying them accordingly. Thus,

\* Among the schoolmen and their disciples were formed two divisions called Nominalists and Realists, so named, because the former held that general terms were words only, representing nothing but conceits; while the latter held that they expressed physical realities. The sects are extinct. Sir W. H. says that now the distinction is between Nominalists and Conceptualists; Hamilton was a Nominalist—see his Logic. Brown was a Conceptualist. We state our own views. Note, May, 1872.

individual characteristics apart, what remains in one individual can be compared with what remains in another, and if their remainders are alike the two are taken as one ; and, by expansion, a great number of individuals being in like manner compared and found to agree, the class is formed which is termed "species." A number of species being compared, and the specific differences being disregarded, what remains alike in all the species goes to form the class called "genus." The notion of any given genus or species is termed a "general notion," and the term used to express it is called a "general term." Thus each of these—a man, a horse, a lion, a tree, a house, is individual if pointing out a single and determinate example ; but if such terms are used as designations of classes, the individual characteristics being disregarded, they become general terms, and express general notions. Now the question in the last paragraph is, whether these general notions belong to Physics or to Metaphysics ; that is, whether the general terms express physical facts, and actualities, or metaphysical abstractions.

5. A similar difficulty besets what are called "abstract terms" and "abstract notions." It must here be said, that "abstract" and "general," as applied to terms, have not only not the same meaning, but very different ones. A *general* term is the name of a class ; an *abstract* term is the name of a single quality taken abstractly. There is, indeed, abstractness even in the notion expressed by a general term, but the notion has a physical side ; but, on the other hand, the notion expressed by an abstract term is, in one division, wholly abstract. Thus the case is—an abstract term may be the name of a physical quality, the knowledge of which comes through perception ; or of a purely intellectual quality which comes through conception. In the latter case the abstractness is absolute, for it belongs both to the notion and to the process of thought ; in the former case it is confined to the process of thought, the notion being that of a physical quality approached by the senses.

6. In the case then of an abstract name of a physical property, as for example, *roundness, hardness, sweetness, redness*, the thing contemplated is only on one side metaphysical ; while the abstract name of a virtue or vice, or of anything wholly removed from sensation and perception, is metaphysical to all intents and purposes. The former we place in the border-land between Physics and Metaphysics, the latter entirely in the region of Metaphysics.

7. Not much otherwise, indeed, with regard to general notions—if the things classified be wholly intellectual abstractions, the general notion will be wholly metaphysical, as well as the process which leads to it ; but, if the classification be of things physical, matters of sensible apprehension, facts, actualities, there is a physical side to the general notion as well as a metaphysical one, and the border-land is their place.

8. One thing more must be said with regard to the latter division of general notions, that is, those of genera and species in the physical range ; we do not think it can be fairly made out,\* that these notions represent only mental conceits, and not realities in nature. We regard the classifications as being the Divine order or plan in creation, and, consequently, as much physical facts as the very creatures so classified. Where God has not impressed characteristics, assuredly man cannot find them. No conception of man is possible, in the physical departments of this economy any more than in the spiritual, which God has not conceived, and purposed, and worked out before him. Whilst, therefore, there is a metaphysical abstractness in every field of generalization, the things generalized, and the notions resulting, may belong to physics. Here is, then, a sufficient indication of the border-land for the location of such notions.†

\* See Lecture ix. of this course, where this matter is examined a little more at length.

† For example—the horse-nature, which makes the species, is as real as the individual horse ; and it must be so by Divine intention. So the man-nature, the oak tree-nature, and even the spirit-nature. And that nature is physical and actual.

## IV.

1. The knowledge of all physical properties and laws, both material and mental, is acquired either through the direct intervention of the senses, by the Power of Introspection, or by the intellectual processes of deduction and induction. In this last department a short process of deduction comes first, a single truth being presented to the mind with certainty of appreciation, whence are drawn out successive truths over a well-proved field. This first truth of indisputable conviction is *the fact of my own mental existence*. This sure fact is the real δόξ ποῦ στῶ, the *primum datum*, the starting-point in the enquiry after other certainties; then, by induction, we generalize the facts so reached. All the knowledge gained in these ways is that of experience, and is phenomenal. Yet, throughout, the agent employed is the first great power of the mind, the Power of Thought.

2. Physical science is thus, strictly, the province of experience, while metaphysical science treats of all objects of thought with which experience is wholly unacquainted. Yet experience carries us into the border-land in regard to the physical aspects of genera and species, and to the physical qualities having abstract names. The rest is wholly metaphysical. The metaphysician presses on from the point where the experimental philosopher leaves him, to the higher conceptions which no experiment can be brought to verify—which can, indeed, be verified only by the laws of pure, but strictly necessary, thought. Yet the phenomena of experience will serve as the scales of the ladder by which he may ascend to a universal and absolutely necessary synthesis of being. It is in that high region metaphysics find their consummation.

## V.

1. The *Essence* of a thing is its nature when all its individual peculiarities are removed; and, as everything must have a nature or essence, the subject of essences is exceed-

ingly large. For philosophical discussions the term "essence" is fitter than the term "nature," because less ambiguous and more scientific. Hence, we use it, only explaining it by "nature" when we must. Essence is that in which individuals agree, and is, therefore, that which makes species. But again, over and above their specific differences, species have an essence in common, and this makes genus.

2. Now, in every instance essence is of boundless capacity; that is, it is infinite in regard to the grades below it; it is, therefore, metaphysical, for infinity is, in every sense, a metaphysical notion, never reaching to a conception, and never measured by experience—infinity cannot be conceived. But, again, essence is made up of physical properties whenever its subject is physical; it has, therefore, as have the genus and species which it makes up, a physical aspect also, and thus it belongs to the border-land between the two sciences.

3. Thus, Metaphysics is the science of essences in the synthetical forms of genus and species. It includes the essence of mind, as well as all other essences. That is, it regards mind in its universality, and in those laws which sustain and pervade that universality, passing by its individual developments, which it leaves to Psychology. On the upper edge, so to speak, of this region of essences, which it embraces as far as it can do so without including Physics, commences the science of Metaphysics.

## VI.

1. To Metaphysics, as the science of abstractions, belong the *notions* of reality, actuality, contingency, certainty, possibility, impossibility, probability, improbability, quantity, quality, space, duration, likeness, unlikeness, and the like.\*

2. All science is metaphysical, inasmuch as it is made up of abstract truths. Even physical science, as science, is metaphysical, since, though gathered by induction from material or psychological facts or phenomena, it is not made

\* See Section x.; and also the Supplementary Lecture in this volume.

of them, but of thoughts and principles, of deductions and inductions.

3. Hence Logic, though generally taken as a principal study by itself, is, as a science, whether higher or lower, pre-eminently metaphysical. So is the Science, or Philosophy, of Grammar, or Language. Here, too, belong Moral Philosophy, Theology (except as to its historical facts), Law and Legislation, Jurisprudence, Politics, Political Economy.

4. All practical truths, arts, and professions, are founded on science ; that is, on abstract or metaphysical truths.

5. Of practical truths, some evidently belong to the arts and professions. Now every art and profession, not vitiated by quackery, must result from a sound and consistent theory—that is, it must have a science behind it ; and every such theory is composed of abstract or metaphysical truths, which are together the sole preservative of practice from wild and dangerous appliances and spurious conclusions.

6. Other practical truths belong to virtuous conduct, and these are based upon abstract truths of a moral nature. It is a grave error to make Moral Philosophy merely practical.

7. The abstract truths which give rise to arts and material professions, stand out to the mind from a comparison of purely physical laws ; or also from pure mathematics if they involve form, motion, measure, and number. On the other hand, the abstract truths which give rise to moral practice, themselves result from the essence, the original laws, and the relations, of mind.

8. Thus, we see the immediate and inseparable connection which subsists between all the concerns of human life, mental and outward, and the great science of Metaphysics. Its lofty ascent, and immeasurable breadth and depth, will be inferred from subsequent expositions.

#### VII.

1. From the preceding notes the exact position which this science holds, and its relations to all science, may be readily deduced.

2. First—it takes up essence with all its relations and results, and treats of it comprehensively, with as much distinctness and certainty, as if it were capable of analysis or experiment.

3. Second—it places contingencies, possibilities, impossibilities, probabilities, and improbabilities in their true comparison with realities.

4. Third—it draws out the abstract truths which form the essence of science, and the recondite principles of every art; and it synthetically unites them into a harmonious whole.

5. Fourth—it reasons from the *laws* of every reasoning process, to the laws and nature of universal Reason and Truth.

6. Fifth—it takes up the *results* of any reasoning process, and, leaving that process entirely behind, it reaches forward into the region of the infinite, absolute, and eternal.

### VIII.

1. Every science must have some first principles too simple, and we might say, intuitive, to be demonstrated, or to call for demonstration, or to admit of doubt, which must, therefore, be assumed as the basis of all reasoning, and as fundamental conditions of thought.

2. Such principles are the Axioms and Postulates of Euclid. Without them Geometry could not advance a step.

3. The science of Metaphysics has, likewise, its first principles, to prove which no reasoning is possible or required. The denial, or even the doubt, of them, destroys the whole ground of ratiocination about the science.

4. The right term for these first principles in Metaphysics is "Intuitions."\* How many of these there are in reality it is

\* Aristotle's ten Categories are well known, and now generally rejected. Sir W. Hamilton shows that they belong to Metaphysics, not to Logic, as far as they are true. He, however, points out that there are not properly ten, but two, generic forms. Any way they are useless. In as far as Kant's Categories are *a priori* cognitions, they are intuitions, and might have been so called. Aristotle's Categories were not intuitions, but generic forms of thought. The schoolmen made much of them. We abandon our original use of them. Note, May, 1872.

not easy, perhaps not even possible, to say. Some minds appear to have more intuitions than others ; to some almost nothing seems intuitive. It is, perhaps, in most cases, not till the mind has received some measure of training and bracing, that it can perceive even its own intuitions, and yet they may be intuitions nevertheless. They are first principles of thought which culture only can make apparent, and bring out to perfect use. Culture improves, quickens, strengthens faculty, to apprehend truth ; it does not affect the truth itself. Thus, cultivated minds may have more, readier, and clearer intuitions than uncultivated ones.

5. Without attempting completeness, or aiming to exhaust this subject, we must, in next lecture, elucidate some chief intuitions as the basis of further inquiries. We shall confine ourselves strictly to what we want.

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## LECTURE II.

### INTUITIVE NOTIONS.\*

1. *The knowledge of the fact of one's own mental existence* is entirely intuitive. We have said (Lec. I., Sec. iv., 1.) that this is the real *primum datum*, the starting-point of inquiry after other certainties. The knowledge that I have a mind, includes the knowledge that this mind has powers and feelings. The whole of this knowledge is intuitive. Even the knowledge that I have a body is intuitive and refutes all arguments against my being a possessor of material and organized corporeity.

2. Aristotle's category of Being follows immediately upon this. Then, there is Being abstract, or *per se* ; and Being relative, with all its conditions. Nine of Aristotle's categories make up the latter. Both Being abstract, and Being with its conditions, are, as notions, intuitive. It is with the former we have first to do.

\* On Intuitions read M'Cosh.

3. Being abstract stands first in the groundwork of every argument ; it is assumed in every train of thought. To every thing and every thought it is essential. Neither idealism nor materialism would be true without it. Without it there would be neither Substance nor Reason. There would not be even God. But, though so necessary, it belongs to pure Metaphysics.

4. Physical Being is either absolute and eternal, or developed and temporal. The absolute and eternal form which Physical Being presents is, to human thought, its completion ; the developed and temporal, its commencement. It is the developed and temporal form of Physical Being which suggests the metaphysical and abstract notion, which, therefore, although wholly beyond the physical range, rises from a physical source.

5. Thus, our first notion of Being is connected with some finite and actual form. A given thing *is*—that is, *has Being*. There is then such thing as Being, of which the notion exists in the mind. It is quite possible that it may exist beyond that particular form in which we have perceived it. There is, then, the notion of Being quite irrespective of that first form. That notion, connected with nothing actual, circumscribed by no conceived limits, is the abstract notion of our metaphysical Being.

6. The finite form of Being with which this notion commences, is **MYSELF**. *I am*—there is individual Being. That *I am* requires no proof—it is the *intuitive* testimony of my own consciousness, strengthened and extended by the after exercise of Introversion (Psych. Pt. I, Lec. vi). I cannot doubt my own mental being, whatever I may doubt besides ; for doubt itself is a mode of thought, and that which thinks, *is*.

7. The *ego*, which I am thus sure has Being, presents itself to me in a finite, developed, and temporal form, within the range of Physics. But, beyond this, I have the intuitive perception of Being, without taking myself necessarily into

account as its subject. I have a primary cognition that Being *beyond* myself must exist as well as *in* myself. I go beyond and forget myself; and though I should have landed nowhere on the shores of actual and developed creations, I have the fundamental notion of Being which may exist and fill a universe. Whether it do so exist is a matter of physical research, not of intuition.

8. Led by the first object to look outwards, I perceive Being developed in countless forms around, above, and below me. But inasmuch as what I see is not mind, and the first notion of my own Being is mental, I deduce that *mind* also may exist above, around, and below me, and that there may be spheres for it without limit. Thus, my notion of Being becomes metaphysically commensurate with the farthest reach of my own thought.

### II.

1. We return from Being abstract, to Being developed and actual, and this we instantly feel to be relative and conditioned. Here, too, so instantaneous is the conviction, that it requires no *process* of thought—it is sudden and powerful, like a lightning-flash. It is, in fact, intuitive, though its development into details involves processes of inquiry. Now all the categories of Aristotle, in as far as they are distinct, except the first, are so many detailed conditions of Being relative. But it is better to follow some clue of our own, in trying to find some conditions intuitively perceived, cognitions that are primitive as soon as abstract Being is parted with. Here, we disregard Aristotle and his disciples as authorities.

2. It is an intuition that everything actual and real must have a NATURE or ESSENCE, and that if two or more things actual have some common essence or nature, they are thereby classified, leaving out of view their individual peculiarities as accidental, not essential. Being must possess essence by an inevitable law. The tendency of the mind to classify is

primitive and original, and the law of classification will be of like, not unlike properties.

3. Whatever *is* must possess a nature, and that twofold, *its own*, and *that of the species* to which it belongs. The first it claims as an individual; the second is claimed for it by its higher relations. In both cases the nature is the essence respectively of that to which it belongs—in the one it is that of the individual development, in the other that of the species. This is the physical view of the subject; metaphysically, it is purely abstract. The first notion of essence is intuitive. It springs up at the first attempt to investigate.

### III.

1. INDIVIDUALITY is an intuitive notion co-ordinate with Essence. It is inseparable from thought.

2. The notion with which I begin to trace Being is inevitably the notion of an individual object, which cannot, by subdivision, be reduced to a lower grade. Hence, the notion of individuality is coincident with my first conception of anything actual. Then, if I look outwards, I see all around me the principle carried out into individual forms; and I see, also, that it could not be otherwise if there were to be a creation at all. Thus my intuition is illustrated, confirmed, and extended.

3. The notion of species is correlative with that of individuals, or otherwise, *contains them under* it, to use Sir W. Hamilton's expression; we would rather say, *covers them*, so that the covering and being covered be deemed correlative. The one thought, therefore, is necessary to the other. Then, if there be individuals, there must be individuality—it is a metaphysical necessity. Reasoning is impossible otherwise, and all men, by a law of their nature, must reason.

4. As Metaphysics rises out of first principles, it begins with the apprehension of distinct and finite forms; it cannot begin with the absolute, which is inconceivable. These forms present to thought the notion of individuality as a meta-

physical abstraction. Finiteness appears to the metaphysical reasoner to be a sure character of individuality.

## IV.

1. SELF, or IDENTITY, is another co-ordinate with Essence, and equally intuitive. It is not the product of reasoning, but the simple and primary testimony of consciousness. Of reasoning, it is an elementary condition. The difference of meaning between the two words is simply that of duration. *Identity* is SELF protracted or perpetuated. Personal Identity is only said of a rational and accountable being.

2. We say that the notions of Self, and Self protracted, forming that of Identity, are essential to that of Being, and are, therefore, respectively and conjointly, co-ordinate with those of Essence and Individuality.

3. We begin with *myself*, which is a clear intuition. Myself suggests, in the abstract form, self and identity. These are fundamental conditions both of existence, and of thought about it. The difference, however, between *self* and *myself* is obvious—*myself* belongs to Physics, *self* to Metaphysics; yet so that the former notion is the parent of the latter. *Myself* is also the development—*self*, the great principle developed. We first find the development, and then the principle which it evolves. Every actual being contains self and identity. The loss of either would annihilate that being, for change would make it another, not the same.

4. This principle is fundamental to reasoning. All reasoning takes the identity of its objects as its *datum*. If objects of thought ceased to be themselves, that is, the same, ideas would be irrelevant; conceptions, if they could be formed, could never be connected—they could not be even formed.

## V.

1. It is impossible to think of the Finite without raising the thought of its correlative, the Infinite; or, of what is the subject of conditions, without raising the thought of the

unconditioned, the Absolute. Thus far, then, the INFINITE and the ABSOLUTE are intuitions.

2. The two terms "Absolute" and "Infinite" are so far from being synonymous, that they are partially contradictory. The former term always precludes the notions of division, succession, and development; the latter does not necessarily so; and whenever it does not it is contradictory to the former. Or thus—the Absolute is always infinite, the Infinite is not necessarily absolute.

3. Each term has three applications—To Being, Space, and Duration. Absoluteness in Being can be predicated only of God; in whatever way Infiniteness is not contradictory to Absoluteness, God can also be said to be infinite. We can speak of both absolute space and duration, and infinite space and duration; and, as we shall presently show, we do not mean the same things. Number can be infinite, but not absolute—absoluteness precludes the divisibility implied by number. Although number may be infinite, yet any particular number is finite. Infinite number is, therefore, an endless succession of finite numbers. It is plain, then, that "Absolute" and "Infinite" are not convertible, though both are intuitions.

4. Absolute Duration and Infinite Duration are not the same. ETERNITY is absoluteness of duration. Infinite Duration implies susceptibility of division by periods; Absolute Duration does not. The fundamental relations of Eternity and Time are those of absoluteness and infinity in duration. It is an error to speak of time as necessarily finite, or as limited to the duration of any particular world. Time is eternity conditioned for finite thought, by being divided into an infinite number of finite periods. Time, applied in a finite manner, is the life duration of creatures. Finite beings can measure their life duration only by periods; and duration with periods is time, not eternity, though it be everlasting.

5. In like manner, we can speak of *absolute space* and

*infinite space.* Place has a relation to absolute space, analogous to that which time has to eternity. Infinity of place is the location of the universe, divided into an infinite number of parts, which fill, or are to fill, immensity. Place, applied in a finite manner, is the location of individual creatures. Every finite being must have a defined existence in time and space.

6. Though absoluteness and infinity are intuitively suggested to the mind by finiteness and conditionality, and thus we are enabled to conceive of their *reality*, they are not in themselves conceivable by any finite intellect. The intuition is, *that* they are, not, *what* they are.

#### VI.

1. An absolute Being, only, can occupy Eternity and Absolute Space, and this is God in His absolute nature.

2. God is a PERSON, but this character belongs rather to His revelation of Himself in Time—Time infinite—than to His absolute existence in Eternity. His Personality can be revealed ; His Absoluteness can never be revealed, since there is no being but Himself capable of understanding the revelation.

3. In beings at once finite and rational, personality includes individuality and identity ; but God has a personality which is infinite, and which is, therefore, above individuality, though not above identity.

4. Finiteness is opposed to both absoluteness and infinity, but it will have different forms of opposition in conformity to the distinction between those two abstractions.

#### VII.

1. Objects meet the eye, or other sense, by means of what are called “phenomena” (from the Greek work *φαινόμενα*, “things appearing”) “appearances.” These are apprehended “qualities,” “properties,” or “attributes,” terms which may for our purpose be taken to mean the same thing. We know nothing of these qualities beyond the last effort of scientific

exploration. It is the doctrine of Metaphysics that phenomena must have a **SUBSTANCE\*** to inhere in ; and this is an intuition so strong as to resist all attempts to displace it, the blundering scepticism of such men as Hume† notwithstanding. Every **QUALITY** (from *qualis*), or property, or attribute, is a quality, or property, or attribute, of something, which "something" is known by the name of "substance." Thus, the intuitive notions of Substance and Quality are necessary to each other, and they are co-extensive with Being and Essence. Substance is, of Being the *substans*, of Essence the *continens*, of Identity the *continuans*.

2. **QUANTITY**, as well as *quality*, is a fundamental and primary condition of finite Being. Every development must have in it the—"How much?", as well as the—"Of what kind?". This is obvious at first sight—it is only the absolute which can be beyond measure.

3. Quantity embraces the whole range of mathematical science in both number and measure ; and thus, again, it is essential to all physical developments, and so to all possible Being, except the Absolute. It is not excluded from moral science. Even thought and feeling can have magnitude or diminution.

#### VIII.

1. **UNITY** is an intuitive notion. The notion of unity is the immediate result of the contemplation of any single being. No compositeness can supersede it. It is the whole composition which is one. This unity is essential to distinct, as well as to combined existence. In beings of a certain rank it coincides with individuality and personality.

2. The universe is one. Its Author is one. His Government is one. But the unity of the Divine Being is simple, while that of the universe is composite.

\* "Substance" is derivable from two different Latin words, *subsisto* and *substo*, giving different *senses*, the one absolute, the other relative. The latter is meant above.

† See Dr. Reid, *Essay II.*, chap. xii.

3. There must be a unity of the universe, though it is composed of an indefinite number of parts. The *individuality* of these parts resists Pantheism; but their *unity*, as a universe, prevents chaotic severance. If there were not unity in Being, the universe would be shattered into fragments, without relation or law. If there were not unity in the Reason of things, the absoluteness of that principle would not exist, and every work of God would proceed at random. If individuality destroyed unity, annihilation would result, for Being, both possible and actual, would, by conflict, be reduced to negation.

4. Yet unity must not destroy individuality, for this would supersede all development and creative action, and establish the doctrine of either Atheism or Pantheism.

5. The combination of unity and individuality gives HARMONY, without which the parts of the universe would be but a chaos of loose elements. Harmony is seen in all the *physical* constitutions of the universe, in all the *intellectual* principles which govern it, and in all the results of both. The moral disturbances which sin has introduced will ultimately be seen to have contributed to establish this great principle. The stability and consistency of Reason Absolute cannot be deranged, but will be illustrated, by mortal transgression.

## IX.

1. The notion of REALITY, or ACTUALITY, is an intuition. It is co-incident with our very first mental effort, nor can it be suppressed by any cause during our whole life.

2. By Reality or Actuality that which has a truly physical Being, whether material or spiritual, is here meant, not an abstraction, not a possible or hypothetical thing. We speak of a man, of an angel, of a world, of a tree, of an animal, of a rock, of a sea, as beings possessing reality, that is, as having each an actual substance to which we can rationally attribute properties. Of the nature or essences of these beings we likewise speak as realities, because they actually exist.

3. We do not speak of goodness, wickedness, infinity, finiteness, of thought or volition, of action or passion, as actual beings, but only as attributes or manifestations. Their existence is nothing till some actual being makes them its own. Real being has causality either original or mechanical. The words "real" and "actual" must here be understood in a strictly physical sense.

4. Every other kind of existence than this is purely metaphysical. To reasoning men the metaphysical would be nothing without the prior supposition of the physical, since it is wholly to the physical that the reality of substance belongs. But the physical being admitted, every metaphysical principle assumes a consequent reality of its own, and in its own character.

5. Now we have placed this intuition of REALITY last in our selected series of Intuitive Notions, because, as it were, it "signs, seals, and delivers," thus stamping and authenticating all the rest. If there were no *Reality*, or what is equivalent, if we could not realize, being, essence, individuality, self, identity, absoluteness, infinity, quality, quantity, unity, harmony, would all disappear, and nothing but negation would remain to our apprehension. Hence the Intuition of Reality in regard to all existing things is given to meet us at our very entrance on the world of thought, and to tell us that we ourselves are real in both soul and body, that God is real, that his universe is real, that all its laws, intellectual, material, and moral, are real, and that all the ordained issues of things will be found to be solemn, grand, affecting realities. With such reality in our first themes, we then confidently proceed on our course of metaphysical inquiry.

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## LECTURE III.

### SUBSTANCE; MODE; SPIRIT; MATTER.

#### I.

1. SUBSTANCE, as the fundamental condition of actual or real, that is, of Physical Being, belongs to everything which exists, whether in material or spiritual, in individual or generic, in infinite or finite modes, so that its existence be physical and positive.

2. Positive Being is the presence of substance containing reality. That which *has*, is. Absolute Being alone is wholly positive ; that is, IT ALONE has no negation in physical existence. All finite Being has negative conditions—that is, in some respects it *has not*, and therefore IS NOT. Every creature has both a positive and a negative side.

3. A negative condition is the privation or negation, either of substance or of mode. Between individuals, the negation consists in whatever they have not in common ; their positive, therefore, consists in the essence which unites them in the same species, and in the substance to which that essence belongs. Man, in possessing a nature subject to all the conditions of moral responsibility, has a positive which the brute has not ; that is, the brute is negative to man in that respect. Yet both alike possess the positive of the animal nature. To *some* extent, mind is common and positive between them.

4. It is apparent that the completely positive is commensurate with the Absoluely Infinite ; that every relatively infinite is positive in its own degree ; and that every finite is positive only within the limits of its substance.

#### II.

1. Substance can be taken both absolutely and relatively. Absolutely taken, it is utterly inconceivable and unapproachable by us. Thus, we can treat it only as a purely metaphysical abstraction. Taken relatively, it is revealed or made

cognitive to us by attributes, properties, qualities, as that in which they must inhere. But in this case we have no more *immediate* knowledge of substance than in the former. This is true, whether we are contemplating material or immaterial objects; only that the material calls for and employs the senses, the immaterial does not. Still, substance is wholly a conception, and our belief in it is intuitive; that is, it is a primitive belief. The presentation of properties instantly brings with it a conviction of the reality of the substance to which they belong.

2. All the properties, by whatever name designated, of any substance, are **MODES** of that substance to our apprehension, and otherwise than thus we could have no knowledge of its actuality. These may be permanent, or changeable, or evanescent, but this makes no difference to the philosophy of the case.

### III.

1. Substance may be material or spiritual, infinite or finite, personal or common, generic, specific, or individual.

2. My consciousness tells me that I am a real and physical being; and I need no other testimony, for consciousness is itself a witness of the fact, over and above what it tells me in an assertive manner. *Myself* is the notion that it conveys—myself that thinks—myself that possesses the property and power of thinking—myself that, consequently, possesses the principle or power of causality—and, therefore, myself that is a real being, whose substance possesses properties of indubitable reality.

3. It matters not to this *primary* view whether my body, with its organization, be a physical and material reality, or only a mental image. *Myself* depends not on that hypothetical distinction. It is my consciousness that makes myself, not the truth or reality of the objects of my perception. My consciousness then accepts as true what all my nature represents as organization; my mental organism

regards my body as at least a virtual being ; a fact sufficient for all the purposes of satisfactory demonstration. I am so constituted as to be conscious that I have a body, whether I have one or not, and in this constitution it is that my *humanity* consists as a reality. It is, therefore, the mind's estimate alone with which we have to do, and we are unable to take that testimony as false.

4. This apprehension of *myself* in the first place may be neither clear from confusion as to the distinction between spirit and matter, not very elevated in its range ; but it will, nevertheless, be sufficient for the following suggestions :—*Myself* is a being to which belongs *self* or *identity*—*my own self, my own identity*. In Being, the thing which sustains the notion of identity is *substance*. Without substance there is nothing *to be*, or *to be the same*. Thought, feeling, volition, are the phenomena of faculties which make up a mental organism, and they are ever changing. In those phenomena, *myself* as a substance, and *identity* as the expression of self in general, do not consist. Faculty implies a possessor—the identity is in the possessor.

5. Such a reflection suggests *self* apart from *myself*, and then substance in general, to which alone *self* can belong. But it is soon perceived that, while the *myself* is an individual substance, the contemplation of which takes a physical direction, the *self* is a notion almost, if not entirely, metaphysical—it can be entirely so, since it is abstract, and thus absolute.

#### IV.

1. A very little reflection leads us to perceive that the *myself* contains, in consciousness, all the organism of mind, of body, of both in union, and of *all as mine*,—I am—**SPIRIT** ; I am—**BODY** ; I am—**A MAN** by the union of both.

2. Mind, in *myself*, is indicated by thought, reason, consciousness, with subordinates ; also, by manifold emotion, feeling, disposition ; also, by a power and acts of Will.

Mind, thus developed in *me*, suggests mental substance generic and even in the abstract and absolute. There is mind—that is enough—it can exist out of me as well as in me—it can exist where anything exists in infinite space.

3. If Mind is a real being, which I feel it is, it is substance. My *own* mind is substance—all mind is substance.

4. Body, in my apprehended possession, is indicated to my mind by organs and senses. The former are parts, the latter are properties, of the body. Assuming the truth of this indication, I can walk because I have feet—see, because I have eyes endowed with the power of vision. Now I cannot help accepting it as a fact, that these parts and properties are their own witness. There is Body, then—that, also, is enough; it can exist out of me as well as in me. Similar Body may be co-existent all abroad. And, as my perception adds that the matter of my body is compound, it leads to the belief that its components are out of composition and organization as well as therein, in forms known and unknown. Hence our apprehension that matter as well as spirit is generic, and to be found all abroad.

5. This organism of *myself*, as it appears to me, includes adaptations which suggest relations; and these, in turn, suggest that there are beings corresponding to me, for adaptations and relations always involve corresponding objects, the denial of which would be a clear absurdity. Then I perceive that I my very self, do really possess such adaptations and relations, which at once are a part of myself, and refer to things not myself. I am, therefore, not the only individual being, but there are others around me as numerous and various as my ascertained adaptations and relations. But, wherever there is an individual, there must be an Absolute, of which the individual must be either a creation or a development. Hence we come to think of the absolute substance of the universe, matter and spirit, of which the individuals are the developments, and of the Reason Absolute of which they are the creations. I have here arrived at the SYNTHESIS of

Being, of substance, matter, spirit, and of Reason which rules it.

6. When any number of individuals are perceived to possess attributes in common or alike, the notion arises of a common nature or essence. This common nature or essence is physical and limited, considered merely as it is developed in individuals, and constitutes the substance of the species or genus. But, while the individuals are finite in form and capacity, and also in the actual number of them in existence, the common nature is infinite to contain any amount of individual developments. Beyond the actual developments, however, to which the substance of that common nature is confined, that nature or essence assumes a purely metaphysical or abstract form, and in this sense it is relatively absolute and infinite.

V.

1. MIND, judging from what I know of myself, exists in personal and individual forms, and may exist in an unlimited number of such forms. And all these have the substance called mind. Mind, then, is the substance considered singly, and it is the common substance of all such forms taken collectively. In both instances it is real, actual, positive ; and in it inhere all the attributes proper to such a substance.

2. If an infinite number of minds exist, mind, their common substance, is infinitely positive when taken in a physical sense ; but whether the number be finite or infinite, metaphysically, the common nature of mind is infinitely positive. No common nature can have negation within its own gradation, that is, except as to what is above it, or to some range below it. But physically, the individuals in which that common nature is have negative being, are positive only to the extent of their actual development.

3. Mind, then, as a substance, may be generic, specific, or individual ; all intelligences belonging to the genus ; all

human or angelic beings, respectively, to species ; and each human being, or each angel, being an individual.

## VI.

1. If MATTER is a real and positive thing, it is because it is a substance ; but the primary nature of that substance it is impossible for man to know. All that is ever arrived at is property. In nothing have we assurance that we have reached a simple and ultimate result, after the utmost power and skill we can exert upon the analysis of any material substance. But it presents to us an appearance which we are compelled to treat as a reality.

2. By analysis we pursue matter towards its ultimate forms, but our analysis can never perfectly reveal the true nature of matter to us. When we arrive at certain forms we call them simple, because we have not found the means of going further in our search. But those forms may be far from the actual simplicity of matter. Now, beyond what we have ascertained by analysis, we can only reason, and our reasoning, analogical as it necessarily is, is metaphysical. By this, however, we proceed towards infinitely distant possibilities, and seem to have in view that vanishing point of material substance at which it may be lost in the immaterial.

3. The analysis just mentioned is chemical, and for that reason, physical. There is also a mathematical process—matter can be infinitely divided. This is capable of mathematical proof. We cannot, indeed, perform the process practically, but the thing is mathematically evident, and the understanding can grapple with it. Clearly, then, we have now reached the abstract region of metaphysics. Now, this mental process also leads to the vanishing point of matter at an infinite distance where the material and the immaterial unite.

## VII.

1. Matter is the secondary and subordinate substance of the universe, proceeding from the point of its junction, or

coincidence, if that be the right term, with the immaterial, which is mind, on which it is wholly dependent, and to which it owes its being.

2. Matter contains an inherent, but as it is dependent on mind, not a self-derived or self-sustained positivity. It has negations.

3. The real, that is, the positive existence of matter has been argued thus—*myself* exists with infallible certainty, my consciousness not only bearing testimony, but being itself a proof. But this same consciousness tells me that I have both positivity and negativity—that the *myself* is, although real, yet finite, and cannot be self-derived. Since finiteness implies negations, finiteness in duration implies a negation of duration, a time when the finite was not. In negation there can be no causality, and where there is no causality there can be no effect. I have an absolute intuition that once I was not, and therefore could not be the cause of myself. My being, therefore, conjoined with my consciousness of finiteness, leads to the sure result, that there is an Absolute Being who has caused me, a Being every way capable of being the cause I want, while uncaused Himself. This involves the absolute unrestrictedness of His power. An Absolute and Infinite Being must be incapable of physical failure, or of intellectual faltering, or of intentional deception ; for each of these *conditions* is contradictory to the unconditional, the absolute. Such a Being, then, must work, not only without error, but without necessarily contributing to error ; and such a Being must have constituted all the organism of *myself*, including my senses, of which He has made me the conscious possessor. Thus, my Absolute Maker has compelled me to rely upon the testimony of these senses, to accept with unreasoning assurance the evidence they give of the reality of the matter of my body, and of all other things with which they are familiar. My senses, undoubtedly, tell me that matter is positive ; therefore, were it not so there would be intentional untruth in the work of the Abso-

lute and Infinite. But, as we have seen, this is contrary to the very suppositions of Absoluteness and Infiniteness—therefore, the testimony given by my senses to my consciousness is true, and matter is real and positive.

4. This reasoning, commencing with a physical position, becomes purely metaphysical, but cannot be the less true on that account. Most persons, however, never reason thus. Happily, we are not practically dependent on this reasoning for our conviction of the reality of matter. The argument is useful to philosophical and scientific thought, and to verify the consistency of our common impressions; but even the philosopher begins, like all other persons, with those impressions, which he habitually takes for granted, acting upon them always, whatever his subsequent thoughts may be. And in all cases we deal rather with the forms in which matter stands out before us, than with that ultimate form at the point where it first departs from the immaterial. It is quite an after reflection, altogether superinduced, which leads us to speculate upon the absolute or abstract forms in which matter exists beyond our possible acquaintance.

5. But this remote and inscrutable thing is brought to our apprehension in an infinite variety of developed and tangible forms, and by combinations according to fixed laws and relations. The matter, whose existence is our concern, is not matter in the abstract, which, commencing from the borderland between the physical and metaphysical, stretches into the region of pure metaphysics; but matter, in its developments and combinations, of which my own body, with all its senses, is one. For all common purposes the philosophical inquiry is needless and irrelevant, whether matter remotely be a reality or a non-reality—that is matter to *me* which stands to me in the *relation* of matter, and which I *apprehend* as such. The commencing point of its positivity is nothing to me if it be positive at the point of its contact with me. It may, in its first link of reality, connect itself with the immediate will of God, the Absolute and Infinite, the Great

Immaterial, and be so reducible to that as to be identical therewith. But, between that point and the point where *myself*, by my senses, can apprehend it, there may be an infinite chain of principles, only on the nether end of which hangs the existence of that which I conventionally denominate "matter."

6. Now, this MATTER, from the point where it becomes appreciable to me, is real and positive to me—is not a mere idea. My senses are to me real organizations, and they are properties of matter real itself, and really animated ; and so they constitute the point of the immediate connection of matter with my mind. Whatever the concealed nature of my senses, and of the animation necessary to them, is, they are real—there is something which constitutes them positive. I can distinguish them from sensation, which is a mental affection. They are extrinsic to the outer boundary of mental action and susceptibility, and, therefore, they belong to matter; and, consequently, matter has a real existence. If there are *modes* of matter under any conditions, matter must be a real thing. It begins, to me, at either end of that chain of evidence which is appreciable, and it includes all between those extremities. Within these limits it is real ; beyond the remotest of them we cannot pursue it. The first, or hithermost, link of the chain is in my own senses ; the farthest link appreciable may be in the metallic form of the alkali which is analysed ; all between these is appreciable, and, to me, real and positive ; and this secured, is, in ordinary, sufficient for the whole argument.

7. But it is clearly supposable that we should entertain the abstract and remote, as well as the approachable, notion of material substance, and that we should attribute to it a positivity, not, however, forgetting its inevitable dependence on the immediate will of God. That positivity cannot depend on our experimental knowledge ; yet the bare fact of its existence within the reach of that knowledge, and in a state of adaptation to our apprehension, authorizes our ab-

stract conclusions. And if there be truth beyond our experimental power of discovery—to deny which is to claim the possession of infinite faculties—it must be an object of our legitimate inquiry. If we have the intuitions of Being and Essence suggesting laws to guide us, we cannot greatly err. But the ratiocination, beyond the power of experiment, will be metaphysical.

## VIII.

1. SPIRIT is the primary and governing substance of the whole universe. It is, therefore, indubitably real and positive.

2. By *Spirit* and *Mind* we mean the same thing. The *Soul*,\* in man, is the same as we here mean by the human mind, and, in reality, the same, in nature, as we mean by all mind. We call it *immaterial* in opposition to *material*.

3. Spirit is presented to me by that special exertion of Consciousness called "Introversion of Thought." (Psch. Pt. I., Lec. vi.) It is the property of spirit, to think. Introversion is thought, and is, therefore, the act of a spirit. It also reveals to me myself as a thinker; therefore *I, EVEN MYSELF*, am *Spirit*. Consciousness is the very life of Spirit. It is my conscious nature which moves my animal body, and this is developed and organized matter—it is not this body which moves my mind. Spirit, then, is the chief substance of my Being, and of my Humanity. By the same law it must be the chief substance everywhere.

4. My own spirit is an individual spirit. The law by which this is plain to me leads me, forces me, to the apprehension of all other individual spirits operating on matter in the same way.

5. I am led thus to reflect on the nature of causality, or, more correctly, on its source. It must be Spirit generally, for if it were not so it would be dead matter, which is absurd. Moreover I find it to be so in myself, and in all beings,

\* See Prefatory Lec. I. Psychology.

within my knowledge, constituted as I am. Things without life really cannot be moved or altered by a different law. There must, therefore, be a great operating Spirit everywhere to cause motion and change. I take this absolutely thus—that which is conscious, and therefore active, may cause movement in that which is not so ; but that which is not so can cause nothing. Everywhere I see motion ; therefore everywhere there is Spirit causing it.

6. Hence I arrive at the notion, that God must be pure Spirit ; for Spirit being the ruling substance, and the fountain of causality, it must exist absolutely, that is without mixture or contingency, and must be the universally Creative Power.. Pure causality is Volition ; and pure Volition, in all its power of causality, can exist only beyond the region of contingency ; and that which is beyond contingency is absolute, unmixed, and above all conditions. And we can have no notion of Being of this sort, but that it is pure Spirit ; and this must be an unbounded Consciousness, with Will unrestricted, self-moved, and moving all beneath it.

7. The law thus exhibited in the case of that which is absolutely pure and above all contingency, must be everywhere traceable throughout the universe. Where volition is, there is causality ; and volition belongs only to mind. All seeming causality, where there is no mind, is the indisputable result of causality in mind. In other words, it is not causality at all, but the merely passive impulsion of inertia, acting like dead mechanism, which has only a mechanical reality without life. But as it has even this it must owe it to some causality not mechanical—to the presence and active energy of Mind.

8. In things purely material there is no intrinsic power of action. The mind that moves them must be the Absolute Mind, for with this only can they be primarily and always in contact. But, where there is mind clothed in matter, that mind may be the immediate mover of the matter—itself dependent on the Absolute. Everywhere, then, does Spirit

appear to be the primary and governing substance of the universe—or, “no mind, no matter,” “no moving power, no result.” Spirit, then, must be the absolute, infinite, everlasting substance, existing itself of necessity, making other existence first possible, next probable, then positive, and giving it a never-ending positivity, beyond all doubt and negation.

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## LECTURE IV.

### REASON, CAUSALITY, RESULTS.

#### 1.



1. Mind is essentially conscious, and consciousness is its vitality. All its properties inhere in it as a conscious nature. These are its faculties, functions, powers, susceptibilities. Of these Reason, or the Power of Thought, is the leading department, co-ordinate with the Power of Volition, and the Susceptibility of Emotion, and comprising in itself various subordinates. We have here to do with Reason only, the first of the three, and that in its physical sense.

2. There is Mind Absolute and Infinite in God, and in Him, consequently, is an absolute and infinite Consciousness. To Him, therefore, belongs Absolute and Infinite Reason.

3. By the terms “Absolute” and “Infinite” in reference to God we do not mean the same thing. Absoluteness leaves no room for the separate consideration of attributes, and so it is utterly beyond our power of conception. Yet thus Absolute is God. Infiniteness presents to us a division or distribution of attributes, each attribute, however, appearing infinite. This is the view of God which we get chiefly in Revelation. Yet must it be said that under this latter view every attribute, as Reason here, has its own absoluteness too.

4. Each living creature has its individual grade, it might be said, quantity, of mind, with its due proportion of characteristics and properties. It has also the grade of its species. But creatures of the rank of man, and upwards, carry with their consciousness the Power of Introversion, which is necessary to perfect reasoning power, and to morality (Psych. Pt. I., Lec. vi., Sec. iii. v.).

5. But Mind exists generally, and as a common essence or nature, and in this sense it possesses a relative absoluteness and a relative infinity, for it is above contingency, and without limit. It is finite only in relation to God who is its source. To this belongs the phase of Reason in the same relatively absolute, and infinite degree.

6. From these physical phases of mind we are led to the abstract, and in this sense also absolute, notion of it, without reference to its existence in any individualities whatever, and are enabled to speak of all its functional properties without the encumbrance of individual actings or developments. This is the purely metaphysical method—mind, generic or specific, belonging to the border-land.

### II. -

1. The *Faculty* of Reason includes the whole individual mind as to its intellectual nature. All those active properties of mind which are wont to be distinctly named, Memory, Imagination, Judgment, and the rest, are only developments of Reason as a department, aiding each other in every intellectual process.

2. Mind, in either of the modes indicated in the last section, is not a chaos of indiscriminate thoughts governed by no laws, but a constitution in which harmony is a chief law. Thought agrees with thought, and their agreement produces another thought related to them, and so on in an infinite series, or an infinite variety of series. The constitution by which this harmony, or this coincident or consecutive agreement is secured, is REASON.

3. *Reason Abstract* is THE CONSTITUTIONAL HARMONY OF IDEAS AND PRINCIPLES, without reference to individual possessors of the Faculty of Reason. In every individual, *Reason is the agreement of the Mind with that constitutional Harmony, and operates under its laws.* The Faculty of Reason is so constituted as to act in accordance with the abstract Harmony, and it is for this cause that it bears the name of "Reason." Outside of such agreement the notion of Reason is lost.

4. In a given case, when we meet with a person who speaks, and appears to think, incoherently, we term him "irrational"; by which we mean that his mind does not retain the power of regulating thought according to the constitutional harmony of things. When, by some injury done to the brain, the organ of thought, this irrationality has reached a certain point, the mind and the brain counteract each other, and cease to produce reasonable results. This is Insanity.

### III.

1. This Faculty of Reason we first discover, and then understand, by Introversion, in ourselves; and thence we proceed to observe and investigate both its existence and its operations wherever we may.

2. When an infant first sees the smile or frown of the mother, and feels therefrom delight or distress, there is harmony between the feeling and its external cause. It is certainly not a merely physical harmony, for Reason is at work in the matter. Even instinct will not fully account for the correspondence. The sentiment of pleasure or pain in the child arises out of appropriation, or personal interest, and wherever this exists it is Reason which creates and sustains it. It is Reason which discovers the exact relation between the smile or frown of the mother, *or in reality, the inward disposition thereby indicated*, and the personal interest in it felt by the child. Reason is at work in tracing the law of

harmony between them, so as to lay up in store an expectation of uniformly similar experience on any similar occasion. Otherwise, a frown would work the same as a smile in the sentiment of happiness. No personal interest, in fact, could be felt without Reason, because there could be no appropriation. In every such case, indeed, there is twofold Reason—that which consists in *the action of the Law of Harmony*, and the *faculty* employed in observing it. The embryonic forms of these principles in an infant are the same in nature as the phases of Reason fully matured.

3. Thus we discover in ourselves, as soon as we can exercise the Power of Introversion, the laws of thought and emotion; and, finding them constant and invariable, we discover their *identity*, and the *harmony* of their actions with their results. In fact, we perceive that *Harmony* is the great law. This being found, we denominate the whole faculty conformed to that law “Reason,” and we soon find it, in ourselves, uniform and universal.

4. We then make extrinsic observations. We cast our eyes upon the intelligent creation around us, and we see that the law we have discovered is passively exhibited in every individual of that creation—that it is one and the same law everywhere. Our notion of the uniformity of mental constitutions is thus confirmed, and, with it, our notion of “the constitutional Harmony of Ideas and Principles” (ii., 2, 3) is extended.

5. We next examine the inanimate, and the merely organic forms around us, and we discover that all things are, *in themselves*, rationally, that is, consistently and harmoniously constituted; and also that they are, *beyond themselves*, consistently and harmoniously united to all other things, so as to form a vast constitution in harmony with itself.

6. We then compare this constitution as a whole, and in all its parts, with the intelligences which inhabit it, and we find that its intrinsic harmony is in harmonious relation to

theirs, and that its adaptations to them are every way complete. We thus see that all nature is intelligently, that is, rationally, or harmoniously, constituted or constructed ; in other words, we first discover the operations, and then infer the existence, of Reason Absolute and Universal.

7. Thus we begin our researches with the psychological notion of Reason, and pursue them into the purely metaphysical, not stopping till we have reached the Absolute.

IV.

1. If we pay attention to *human* Reason, or any other finite form of it, it is impossible not to perceive that it must have, outside and above itself, a source which must also be its standard. And then we can find no place for that source and standard but in the Reason Absolute—there is no resting-place between the finite, however high, and the Absolute. Without conformity to the absolute standard Reason would be no Reason, for Reason must be consistent and self-congruous to be able to bear the name ; and this consistency and self-congruity must be either absolute, or must be *conformed* to the absolute. Finite Reason cannot be absolute, and, therefore, cannot be a *standard*, as it has not actually been a *source*, to itself ; it must, therefore, evidently have an absolute source and standard somewhere outside itself. Hence it is a necessary truth that there *is* a Reason Absolute quite beyond creation. Now Reason Absolute is, by the force of the very name, above all contingency, without infirmity, without conditions, depending on no developments, pure and eternal.

Every individuality of finite Reason is a development, or creation, of the Absolute. There is an infinite variety of such developments, and they are manifestations in perfect harmony, a harmony derived from the Absolute by their entire dependence on it. By virtue of that dependence, too, they form a unity. ONE Reason, abstractly speaking, fills the universe ; the finite is the offspring of the Infinite, and, therefore, of the Absolute, and of one nature therewith.

3. As an absolute principle, Reason is the source of all created excellence throughout the universe—there is no adaptation, no union, no harmony, either partial or total, which does not proceed from Reason Absolute, as streams do from their fountain.

4. But Reason would not be better than blind Fate, a mere, dark, senseless, arbitrary, inscrutability, if it were not, in its nature and original, a living principle; in other words, if it were not identical with that CONSCIOUSNESS which is the *vitality of THE ABSOLUTE AND INFINITE MIND* (*Psych. Intro. Lec. II., Sec. iii.*). It is Mind, whether infinite or finite, which possesses Reason as its first great Power. Apart from Mind, and without presupposing Mind, Reason could not be conceived; it could not exist actually, and the abstract or metaphysical notion of it would be impossible. It must dwell *in* mind, and that as essential to its very nature, and not as a mere property of it, in order that an abstract notion may be formed of it.

5. When, therefore, we hear used the phrase, “The Reason of Things,” as supposed to be expressive of an all-ruling Logic in the world of thought, that phrase must be understood in subordination to this great law (see last par.), or it must mean nothing. The existence of God is the primary fact, out of which come all facts, and without which there could be nothing but universal negation, a negation of Reason, and of “the Reason of Things,” as of everything else.

6. The positivity of God's existence and nature is an Absolute, unbounded, everlasting, never-beginning positivity, admitting no shade of negation. But, as revealed to us, it stands out in infinite attributes. That nature is an Absolute Consciousness which is not distinct from Reason—God's Consciousness embraces all things, laws, and relations, within the sphere of an absolutely transparent and luminous self-knowledge, since all things exist in and by His energy alone. This is the very notion of Omnipotence. It is, accordingly,

the fountain of Harmony, which we have seen to be the manifestation of Reason, the very embodiment of consistency.

7. To speak, then, of "The Reason and Fitness of Things," as if it were independent of God, is to speak of Law without the source of Law, of Being without the source of Being, of Harmony without the source of Harmony. These principles all imply the existence of the Absolute and Infinite nature of God as their primary and all-governing condition. Or, even thus—**GOD IS REASON—GOD IS LAW—GOD IS HARMONY.** It is HE that is all this ABSOLUTELY; that is, exclusively, without conditions, without contingency, eternally, everywhere; and there can be no Reason or Fitness, of which He is not at once the centre, the source, the substance, the all.

## v.

1. Reason in finite beings is developed from the Reason Absolute Metaphysical by the power of the Reason Absolute Ontological.\* To the Reason Absolute Ontological all developments and manifestations are fundamentally conformed, from the nature and intelligence of Seraphim downwards as far as the rational faculty descends. All animals which reason, even in the lowest degrees, have their respective shares of this conformity. This conformity is subjective. But there is an objective conformity to the Reason Absolute both metaphysical and ontological in all organizations whatsoever, from those of Angels, if they have any, down to the animal polypi, or the dubious sponge, or the vegetable puff-ball, which is constructed to scatter its seedlings abroad.

2. Science everywhere reveals the supreme dominion of Reason, the laws of which no temporal or local disturbance can do aught to unsettle. Even the law of penalties, whether

\* Let the reader pardon this use of a discarded word, for it has a proper meaning here, and is far from unintelligible. Let the notions of reality and actuality be attached to it.

physical or moral, is but an application of the same principle. Astronomy shows Reason at work in the expanded universe; Chemistry, Geology, Zoology, Botany, Physiology, and all other sciences co-ordinate and subordinate, reveal its operations on this globe. The constitution of man, with his physical and intellectual adaptations to work out his own destinies, are magnificent evolutions of this great principle.

3. And that Reason which is the peculiar glory of the human mind is an emanation of this great consistency which everywhere prevails, and makes the universe ONE.

#### VI.

1. Reason thus exhibited in the vitality and consistency of its centre and source, as well as in the infinite variety and harmony of its laws and developments, must itself be the reason and efficient cause of those developments. Its causality is essential to its nature as pervaded and directed by the supreme power of Will, and the developments are but the results or forms in which that nature shows itself.

2. The Reason Absolute Ontological is the reason why all things exist as they do, why the universe exists in its unity, in its entireness, in its harmonious workings, and in all its individual parts, with their laws and relations. It contains the conception and representation of them all in itself, and then, so to speak, it *divulges* them all. The question being asked—"Why these things are as they are, or even at all?" —the answer is, "Because there is a Reason Absolute which contains them—a Reason which is vital, and of infinite energy, the very nature of God."

3. And this Absolute Reason being vital, and having vital conceptions of all things, it is necessarily causal—it is the directly moving cause of all things which it conceives, that is, all things which exist. In other words, it conceives them, it contains them, it makes them, and so reveals them. The making is the revelation. The very law of vital energy is to be producing and developing. The Divine Nature, as it can

have no negativity, must be free from passivity and neutrality—it must be active, and everlasting, unchangeably so ; and its nature of unlimited consciousness, without contingency or condition, the Reason Absolute, is, as co-incident with unbounded Will, its very principle of activity. And it is obvious that if Reason, under the impulsion of Will, is causal, Reason Absolute must be the centre and source of all causality.

4. The emanations of Reason Absolute which are found in the forms of individual intelligences, being of the same nature as their source, become, in like manner, reasons and causes of whatever movements proceed in the directions they indicate. Wherever Reason exists it must share the attribute of causality.

5. But this causality, which is the prime prerogative of Reason, is brought into action by another essential faculty of Mind already glanced at—Volition, the Power of Will. In the Divine Nature, WILL is the *action* of Reason; and the Divine REASON is the *essential Power* of Will.

6. In finite and individual intelligences Reason and Volition are distinct powers, on account of the necessary limitation of every faculty—no two mental operations can be simultaneous except where the capacity is unlimited. In these finite forms, then, the *direct* causality is in Volition, the *ultimate* in Reason. But, as Volition is the completion of Reason, it is not improper, for all metaphysical purposes, to speak of them as one cause.

7. In Reason, then, *as thus conditioned*, we find causality, and nowhere else. In Reason Absolute, causality is absolute ; in Reason finite and emanating, causality is finite and dependent. But it is to be held thus—where there is no Volition there is no Reason ; and in the absence of these united there can be nothing but passivity, or at most a merely mechanical causality, depending wholly on an active Reason foreign to it.

## VII.

1. The method by which we have reached the Reason Absolute has been chiefly inductive and synthetical—from obvious manifestations we have traced our way to that Reason as the living principle of the universe. But it is clear that the Reason Absolute, in other words, the Divine Mind, is essentially incapable of analysis, even as to what we call its attributes. Only when we use the term “infinite” instead of “absolute” is the analysis of attributes suggested, and this is the only way, however inadequate, in which we can form any just conception of what God is *to us*.

2. We must conceive that the Divine Mind, as the Reason Absolute, is incapable of development, improvement, growth, or acquisition. It must, therefore, fill eternity and unbounded space—it must fill unbounded space absolutely and eternally.

3. It follows, that no harmony or beauty can be perceived by that Mind at one moment, which is not eternally, and without intermission, perceived by it. Nor can it, vital as it is by absolute and unbounded Consciousness, and active as it is by its Supreme Volition, ever be so shut up in itself as to be unproductive of results. Its vitality and activity must be eternal, for they are, in fact, itself. And all its results must, by its own character of Reason, be marked and pervaded so as to display both the beauty and the grandeur of harmony.

4. Every beautiful thing, then, in the universe must have had its ideal eternally in the mind of God, reserved to be brought into physical existence when the harmony of things required it. The pattern must have been in the thought and conception of the Reason Absolute ; or, rather, the pattern should be deemed the germinating principle, out of which, in due time, the actual beauty sprang, and in which the efficient and supreme causality resided.

5. The preceding remark is true equally in regard to physical existences, and to matters intellectual and moral.

6. It is inconceivable that the physical universe should have been otherwise constituted, or could have been more harmonious than it is, because it is inconceivable that the Reason Absolute could be active in an imperfect manner, or to a deficient degree, or could produce results ultimately inadequate to its own glory. If we could comprehend all parts of the actual creation in a manner at once synthetically and analytically correct, we should find that it could not have been different without being inferior to what it is. We must believe the universe to be as perfect, physically speaking, that is, as rationally and harmoniously arranged, as a creation can be.

7. It is in perfect verification of this synthetical view, that analysis everywhere reveals the perfection of divine workmanship. An ever-growing power of analysis reveals more and more the rationality, that is, the beautiful consistency, harmony, and mutual connection and adaptation of all parts of the physical creation, together with their both separate and combined adaptation to the intellectual and moral. And our past experience in this respect leaves no misgiving that, however far we may proceed in our investigations, we shall find a limit to this perfection.

### VIII.

1. In Reason Absolute, then, which includes Sovereign Volition, we have Supreme Causality, a principle positive and active, without any negation whatever.

2. Supreme Causality is itself absolute, for it is an absolutely vital principle, essentially active, and ever at work.

3. On Absolute Causality all positive and substantial things are dependent; and they are, together with their issues, its proper results.

4. The endowment of Reason, in whatsoever degree, gives the same degree of real causality to its possessor. Every finite intelligence, then, of every rank, positively developed,

possesses a positive, though dependent, causality ; and every such degree of causality must produce corresponding results.

5. The works of men, consequently, in as far as they are not purely accidental and undesigned, whether they be morally good or evil, are the effects which naturally result from the causality that is in Reason acting by Volition ; that is, the causality of Reason itself, and, therefore, of Reason Absolute.

6. The mechanism of things without intelligence, together with its adaptations to effect certain objects, is not a possessor of real and positive causality ; but it is itself, first, the effect of a causality extrinsic to it ; and, second, the instrument through which that causality reaches forth to remoter results.

7. The whole mechanism of the universe holds this relation *directly* to the Great God in whom is Reason Absolute. But human Reason, and its mechanical productions, hold the same relation to each other which subsists between the universe and God.

8. The adaptations of mechanism may be real without being self-sustained, and therefore their reality is that of effect only, and involves no inherent causality. Nothing can be a cause which has not its power in itself.

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## LECTURE V.

### LAWS—PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, ECONOMICAL.

#### I.

1. A LAW is, *morally*, a rule of free action for a rational being ; *physically*, a uniform principle and mode of development ; *metaphysically*, an invariable relation—first, between cause and effect ; second, between reason and consequent. Law, of every sort, is opposed to the notion of fortuity.

2. Reason always acts, whether intrinsically or extrinsically, by laws ; that is, it acts, when pure, wholly without the intervention of fortuity. Reason Absolute admits no notion of fortuity, of chance, or contingent action. Abstractly, also, all Reason is incompatible with accident ; but Reason in its mixtures with other elements of being, and consequently developed in dependent, finite, individual, and organic forms, will be associated with many things fortuitous to itself, although not fortuitous to Reason Absolute.

3. As far, then, as Reason acts under the energy of its own nature, it precludes fortuity, and acts by laws. Were it otherwise, the very notion of Reason as the source of Causality, and that of Harmony as the attribute of its results, would cease.

4. Law is thus essential to Harmony and to Causality.

## II.

1. Causality is itself a law, developed in causation. These two terms are both abstract, and represent abstract notions, but do not express the same thing. The former expresses the law, the latter its operation.

2. Causality is the intrinsic power of giving rise to results corresponding to causes ; and this power is a law of Being Absolute, and of Reason Absolute as the intelligence of that Being.

3. In the phenomena of physical existence, we perceive what suggests the inference of the law of causality, we cannot be correctly said to perceive the law itself. In fact, the immediate law of sequence is not the real law of causality, for this is decidedly more remote. The law of sequence is included in causation, which has already been stated to be, not causality itself, but its operation. Nor do we see even the *law* of sequence, but sequence only. Yet it is the harmonious doctrine of Reason, that a uniformity of sequence must indicate an identity of producing efficacy, for it is on

this that the harmony of the universe depends. We must, therefore, infer the law when we see the facts. But, indeed, in regard to physical phenomena we must infer two laws, that of immediate sequence included in causation, and that of causality which leads us to Reason, and ultimately to Reason Absolute.

4. When we see a stone falling to the ground we do not see the gravity which is the law of its fall, but we infer the existence of that law from the uniformity of gravitation in all like cases. We also infer, that some force must have been applied counteractive of gravitation to raise the stone into the air. The inference here is, that there is a law of force. In both instances our conclusions are purely inferential, and amount to this, that there are causations, the works of causality, in the respective cases. There can be no causation without an ultimate causality ; to infer the one, therefore, is to infer the other. Thus, from phenomena we infer causality.

5. But we cannot reasonably infer that the causality of necessity resides where we see the sequence, however uniform that sequence may be ; for it is inconsistent with Reason to suppose that any thing destitute of vitality can be self-moving. It must be moved, if moved at all, by something which has life ultimately beyond it. That life must, if finite, come from the Fountain of all life, for we cannot stop short of that. Now the Fountain of all life is the Reason Absolute, in which reside Supreme and Absolute Volition as well as Absolute Intelligence. We are inevitably led on to this issue whenever we begin to infer, reasonably, the laws of causation and causality from actual phenomena.

6. When we have traced all causality to Reason Absolute, we have solved the abstract problem of sequences, of causation, and causality, as far as we are capable of solving it ; and we are now prepared for the physical details. Reason has impressed upon all material things modes of existence harmonious with its own absolute perfection, and, as Reason, it could not do otherwise.

7. And every degree of Reason, short of Absolute, performs its operations by the same rule, and thus at once exhibits the nature of the principle in all finite and dependent forms, and makes itself known as the work of that Reason which is above all, and all-creating.

## III.

1. Every department of the universe of Being must, in order to accord with the Reason Absolute which has produced it, and evermore sustains and governs it, be impressed with laws suited to produce harmony of relationship to every other department.

2. There are three departments which, together, constitute the whole range of thought regarding the universe of Being—the PHYSICAL—the INTELLECTUAL—the MORAL. In relation to all these, the ultimate causality is in Reason Absolute. But there is, also, in every grade of Reason, an intrinsic, although it be a limited and dependent causality. Beyond this we recognise, for convenience, a mechanical causality in all finite Being, even in that which is purely material. But this mechanical causality is nothing but a law passively received, and impressed by the causality which is in Reason Absolute.

3. The PHYSICAL department includes both the substances, matter and mind, viewed in all forms, organic and inorganic ; if organic, viewed physiologically ; and even mind is to be thus viewed. Yet this range of view extends not beyond simple existence. The INTELLECTUAL ranges over the whole field of metaphysical, that is, of abstract inquiry, and so includes, without reference to substance and organization, the active exercise and laws of mind. The MORAL includes the whole range of intelligent obligations, resulting from the nature and economy of mind. This last must be regarded as an important branch of Metaphysics, and yet as sufficiently distinct and prominent to be considered by itself.

4. Now, in the production, support, and regulation of

every chief department, with its subordinate branches in all their extent, and in all their variety of developments and manifestations, Reason Absolute was the sole ultimate cause; and in all, that Reason has acted, and still acts, correspondingly with its own nature in diffusing the laws of causality and sequence throughout the whole range of its operations.

## IV.

1. INORGANIC MATTER has already been shown to be, in its ultimate, and in many of its immediate forms, entirely beyond our present reach. To our apprehension it *is* matter only within the limits of our research, which is bounded by the last result to which our actual power of analysis conducts us. Between that result and our first sight lies our whole experimental knowledge of any given specimen. Here we observe sequence, and here we infer causation, and then causality. Abstract analogy leads us to infer the same laws and their operations beyond our power of observing.

2. As a very simple and common example, take a piece of chalk or marble. Here, first, by some process the impurities are separated, and chalk becomes pure carbonate of lime. Next, by calcination, the carbonic acid is separated and lime remains. Then, by another operation oxygen is separated, and the remainder is calcium, a metallic base. Here our experiments stop. But there is some principle in calcium which brings oxygen into combination with it, and then again it is lime; and, again, some principle in it attracts carbonic acid gas, and with this and accidental additions it forms again common chalk. Some further principle operates, and it becomes marble. We are in contact with undeniable matter at every stage, and in every separable element.

3. Upon this substance, then, thus examined, as far as our process can extend, we find a uniform law of sequence impressed. In other words, in every apparent change which it undergoes we find a certainty which never subjects us to misgiving. Such certainty leads us to conclude that the

facts are subject to the laws of causation and causality. It is true that we first find a mechanical causation and causality in such a process ; but, as was said before, the final causality cannot be in any inanimate substance, and thus we are led from what we see to the remote and effectual causality.

4. Mathematical division of matter is possible to infinity, though our mechanical power to divide matter is very limited. Abstract demonstration alone can be resorted to, yet that is sure. Now to what point of junction with the sovereign Will of the Deity, the Reason Absolute, either chemical analysis or mathematical division of matter would conduct us, we know not ; but the very nature of these principles shows that some such point exists, for otherwise matter would be separated from all cause, and from all Reason, and would float in sheer fortuity ; in a word, there would be no law, and the harmony and unity of all things would be contingent or impossible.

5. Precisely what has been shown in the above example must be true of all inorganic matter.

6. And it is by the operation of laws containing a mechanical causality owing its entire existence and efficacy to the Reason Absolute, that the inorganic masses of solid globes are conglomerated, suspended at their proper distances, made to revolve around their proper centres, and all united into one universe of unorganized abodes for beings of higher ranks.

V.

1. ORGANIC MATTER is exhibited in vegetable and animal structures, every minute part of which is so furnished and finished, both intrinsically, and in relation to all others, as to accomplish some fixed design.

2. It is, however, of inorganic matter all organic structures are composed, according to certain fixed principles which are governed by the laws of causality and sequence.

3. In such structures there resides a principle called " life,"

on the nature of which we make no further remark, than that it is the energetic constituent by which all the parts of a given organism are made to co-operate in reference to their end.

4. In a structure occupied by life fluids are found to circulate with regularity, and to convey everywhere with them conditions of nourishment, by which vacuities are filled, and wastes repaired, and development promoted ; and due provision is made for the reception of gases from the atmosphere, and fluid aliments from the more solid constituencies around ; and also for the expulsion of all useless and injurious things from the system.

5. The power of reproduction in all organized bodies, by means of special functions, is a very prominent feature of structural vitality.

6. Now, nothing can be more apparent to intelligence, than that there must be laws by which alone these functional adaptations can be constituted, and their unerring operations secured. On every one of them we see impressed a mechanical causation, which can come only from the causality which exists absolutely in the Reason of the Creator. As far as we can discover these laws there is not the least approach to fortuity ; for the laws never seem, not in a stray instance, to be violated, or to be abandoned, even in the strangest eccentricities of nature.

## VI.

1. MIND has an organism of its own, not of substance, like matter, but of functions only. Yet, its functions, considered as properties, are as distinct as those of material structures.

2. The functions of mind, which make up its physical organism, are all arranged for one purpose, and that purpose always corresponding to the very nature of mind. In this constitution, considered *objectively*, that is, as it is the work of God, we trace the principle of mechanical causality at

work as distinctly as in matter. Mind, like anything else, is the passive recipient of the skill, and the plastic moulding, of the Divine Artist—it has never willed its own existence or form. But, together with this, in this constitution we find a *subjective* causality, and this consists in the active nature of mind wherever existing, of which Reason, the prime power, always acts through Will.

3. The organism of mind is distributed into three Great Powers, the departments of Thought, Volition, and Emotion, with the several subordinations of the first. (See Psych., Pt. I.) There is causation at all times going on *mechanically* among these Powers: Reason, or Thought, awakening Emotion, Emotion stimulating Volition, and Volition reacting on Thought. This is a purely physical arrangement, forming a mental mechanism. Out of this mechanism spring ten thousand results that are invariably true to their special and general causes—and this because there is impressed on the mind by its Creator a law which cannot be effaced.

4. The mechanism of mind, with its intrinsic and necessary law of causality, is *objective*; that is, it is an arrangement passively received from the hand of the Creator. In *this* respect it stands on a level with matter, which has no active principle at all. Causality is not inherent in anything but Reason combined with Will; and everything which possesses not inherent causality is totally objective. But likewise Reason, with the other Powers, existing in finite forms, associates with itself an objective character, since it is the gift and creation, not of itself, but of Reason Absolute. *As a creation*, mind is as really objective as matter.

5. But the law of causality in mind, however finite, is also *subjective*. Mind supreme, Mind Absolute or Infinite, has its causality *wholly* subjective. Reason Absolute can never be objective in regard either to its nature, its laws, or its origination. There is in it no mechanism on which a secondary law can be impressed. It can have no division, or succession of parts, or arrangement of principles. It is

absolutely undistributed. Its causality is, therefore, absolutely, that is, essentially, invariably, eternally subjective. And from this, as a fountain of inherent and perennial supply, Reason, wherever found, exhibits itself as deriving a subjective causality varying in approach to completeness according to its own degree of expansion short of the Absolute.

6. Mind, then, as essentially the possessor of Reason, whether finite or infinite, dependent or absolute, exhibits subjectively the law of causality ; that is, it is itself a cause, and it is a fundamental and primary law of its nature that it should be so. When, by its finiteness, the notion of its dependence on the Absolute Mind is implied, that dependence makes it objective in regard to its source, and the causality which dwells in it is in this respect consequently objective, just as much as the mechanical law which makes a plant or an animal reproductive of its species. But everywhere in the abstract nature of mind is inherent a subjective causality as really when it is finite as when it is infinite, for it is the essence of mind to be active in all its gradations.

7. Subjective causality is more easily understood than objective, because of its freedom from mechanical and passively borne control. In Reason Absolute we see a vitality and activity, altogether original and underived ; and taking Reason, abstractly, we must attribute to it the like notion. Although we may be confounded by the absoluteness of the principle when it is pursued to its ultimate form, yet in every form, from the finite to the absolute, we clearly see that the nature of Reason united with Will is to be causal. As to this nature, there is no difference between the absolute and the dependent. The mechanical and objective character assumed by the latter is not in the *nature* of Reason, but belongs solely to the quality of finiteness and dependence. But objective causality has an arbitrary face, since it has nothing in common with the activity of the first cause. The combination of the objective and the subjective in finite forms

creates confusion and embarrassment. That which is common to the absolute and the finite, and which is subjective, either conceals the structure of mind as the object of creative power, or is concealed by it. In that which is purely objective and mechanical, the *apparent* activity covers a really pure passivity.

8. Yet nothing of all this is really arbitrary, for it follows fixed laws. Were it not subject to laws it would throw back its uncertainty upon the first cause, the Reason Absolute. But the very notion of Reason Absolute requires that it do nothing without reasons and modes as sure as itself. On all its productions accordingly, we find laws of transcendent perfection impressed, with results worked out by the best means, if not by the only means consonant with itself. In the structure of individual mind, this is at once manifest, so that while, as minds, they must necessarily possess a subjectivity of power, as creations they must be objective in a manner at once accordant with their nature as minds, and with the perfection of Reason in their Creator.

9. When we contemplate purely material structures we see no subjectivity whatever. The laws of their existence and action are wholly objective and mechanical. The only agreement between them and the Reason Absolute is the fitness of correspondence between the Creator and His works. And this is, in fact, traceable, so as to shew the entire absence of all arbitrary procedure in the production of those works. The instance from calcium to marble is a fit sample. It is not rational to suppose that the Great Living Cause could ever have acted from reasons beneath its own perfection. The same rule must hold in every instance of physical creation. In other words, there must be a reality in the law of relations by which any substance acts upon another—only a mechanical reality, it is true, and, therefore, purely objective—but still a reality so determinate, that it could not cease to be without making the universe, as the workmanship of Reason, less perfect and harmonious than it is.

10. That the nature of this law of relations in objective causation and causality is concealed from us, and that we are thrust upon abstract reasoning when we seek to prove it, does not in the slightest degree invalidate the conclusion. The perfections of the Reason Absolute, as well as the uniformity of phenomena, make an argument strong enough. In creation, therefore, this established rule comes out, *that all physical arrangements are as they ought to be, and that this is as true of Mind as it is of Matter.*

## VII.

1. The INTELLECTUAL department is that which comprises the whole field of metaphysical inquiry in its purely abstract principles, and so includes, without reference to substance and organization, the active and causal exercise of the laws of Mind (iii., 3). It draws material, however, from the border-land between Physics and Metaphysics (Lec. I., Sec. iii., 3). The department has to do with economy rather than with substance.

2. In Reason Absolute there can be no distinction of powers, for Absoluteness is without division, condition, or contingency. All distinct attributes, as they appear to us, coalesce, in the Absolute, in the one notion of Sovereign Reason. Were it not so, Reason would cease to be Absolute. If, *there*, any separation could take place between knowledge and efficiency, or between these and moral integrity, so that any one quality did not coincide with every other, and occupy the same whole, Reason would, in that instance, be limited by negations, and would, consequently, be finite and contingent.

3. But in Reason finite and dependent, the functions cannot thus coalesce, because distribution is necessary to reach the purposes of the mental constitution. A limited function cannot apply to all necessities at once, and, therefore, must have its several adaptations suitable to them. Hence arise the several powers of the human mind. Thus, their finiteness

prescribes to them a law of relations and operations which do not exist or take place in Reason Absolute. This law is wholly objective, for it belongs to a passive conformation, the work of a higher Power, in which alone we can recognise the causality which produced it.

4. But this objective law is in the highest degree consistent with that essential character of mind which, finite or infinite, involves subjectivity or active causality. The finite here is in nature like its great Original and Source. Hence, the law of causality must subjectively operate in all causation, that is, in producing every proper sequence—throughout the whole finite range of intellectual operations. No sequence can be heterogeneous to its subjective causality, because such a condition would either make causality nothing, or would be altogether outside of the causality of Reason. Even the passive and objective law would be annulled by heterogeneity between cause and sequence—there would be no law in such a case. Sequence, therefore, could never be random, contingent, or arbitrary, without reflecting on its cause, and even throwing back its viciousness upon the highest Cause in the universe. In short, the whole intellectual department must be governed by laws, of which causality is the chief.

5. In the whole range of mental operations familiar to us, from the first impressions received and communicated by the susceptibilities of sensation and suggestion up to the highest exercises and attainments of intellect, the same laws obtain—the laws of relation and causality. By these laws suggestion holds on its course. One idea is added to another *because* of a relation between them. Were there no relation, mental operations would be chaotic; a rational issue could never come out. Now, every relation involves causality.

6. In the human mind the mechanical law of causality operates between the senses and sensation, while both owe their mechanism to the causality which is in Reason Absolute. Hence, the mechanical law is congruous with its

origin, as well as with itself ; in other words, it *is* a law and a constitution, and not an arbitrary or random thing. Similarly, sensation leads to perception by a mechanical law ; but this effect introduces the active and subjective causality of the mind itself as a participant of the process. The objective and subjective forms of causality for the most part accompany and aid each other in all the subsequent operations of the mind. Furnished with the passive instrumentality of the primary elements, Reason, impelled by Volition, actively pursues its way through all its courses of thought. The twofold causality is here apparent—one thought mechanically producing a second, and so on through the series—and the Will always and efficiently at work in the exercise of Reason.

7. The LAW in these cases is seen in this—that the same thing holds in the same mind in every stage of its growth, and in the infinite variety of its phases and movements. It also appears in this—that all minds act and are actuated in the same way, all minds at least subject to the same conditions of corporeity. We have, indeed, stronger ground than analogy for thinking that the law extends throughout the universe of mind. The mechanical causality of brain, peculiar, if it be so, to man, may subserve, but cannot supersede, the essential and predominant causality of Reason which produces and regulates all things ; and thought must be thought whether *with* brain instrumentality, or *without* it, everywhere essentially a process of causal Reason.

8. Now, if there were no causality connecting the different parts of these processes, or no causality amounting to a law, no thought would insure another, and no rational issue could be expected. Every adaptation implies this law of causality.

### VIII.

1. The conceptions and creations of thought, whether within the range of imagination, of judgment, or of scientific research, are all made possible by the laws of mind, and

those laws of physical nature with which the mind spontaneously compares them. Here, too, are found to be operative the great laws of causality and sequence. Every truth is the cause or the consequence of some other truth.

2. The grotesque and monstrous forms which the mind sometimes conjures up, and collects into strange groups, are the legitimate productions of particular mental temperaments, acting under morbid physical conditions. The incongruous ideas of deranged persons are produced under the sure operation of specific disturbance—the disturbance producing its corresponding results in as certain and inevitable a direction as would a law undisturbed. And besides this, those conceptions are all made up of ideas which represent realities, and which are, therefore, rational in themselves, although irrationally grouped in the disordered mind.

3. When the imagination is wholly free from morbid disturbances, the ideas it collects and groups are not only borrowed from the regions of Reason and Truth, but are consistently, that is, under the laws of Reason and Possibility, associated.

4. And in the regions of Reason and Truth, which in reality comprise the whole dominion of Reason Absolute, all positive conceptions and principles are not merely in harmony with one another, but are so arranged by laws that some are fundamental and categorical, and others are their necessary sequences—even possibilities following the same law as actualities.

5. All the incongruities which trouble the sphere of finite Reason are results of a negation of law and relation. There is in them no proper sequence, causation, causality, harmony, or law of connection—they are such as can have no place in either Reason Absolute or its operations. Reason is always positive. So, also, are its operations. Irrationality alone is negative, and this is always so in part or in whole. Hence the whole region of Truth is under the government of absolute laws, necessarily, and for ever.

6. The doctrine now propounded applies to the whole range of both mathematical and moral Truth as branches of the metaphysical. We now turn more especially to the range of the moral.

## IX.

1. The basis of MORAL SCIENCE is the relation of created intelligence to the intelligence that is uncreated ; the latter being the cause of the former, prescribing their course, and determining their reward. Here, then, is the MORAL department of the range of thought.

2. The mental science which the moral implies is Psychology, already explained as setting forth the three Great Powers of Thought, Volition, and Emotion, as one constitution, each Power acting upon the others in turn with all the force of internal and mutual causality, and all uniting at length, and determining in specific acts of Volition.

3. The union of Volition with the other Powers, and its never-ceasing constitutional co-operation with them, gives and completes the moral *basis* of the character internally ; but the *actual* morality of that character consists in the specific acts of volition, and more thoroughly in that stream of such acts, perpetuating the feeling which originates in emotion, which constitutes the real, though perhaps unnoticed, habit of the mind. (Psych. Pt. II., Lec. II., Sec. ii., 5 ; iii. 4, 5.)

4. Wherever Volition is in conjunction with the Power of Thought, especially in the form of Introversion, there is essential morality of constitution. Wherever specific acts of volition are the results of the Power of Thought in its perfect forms of exercise, there is that which constitutes moral character. And as Volition is the immediate antecedent or cause of every action which can be deemed moral, we have in it, combined, as it constitutionally is, with Reason, the whole force of moral causality, amounting to an irresistible law. And this is to be traced through every gradation of finite

Will up to the Will that is one with Reason Absolute, the Will of God.

5. There can, therefore, be neither vice nor virtue without a cause, and that cause must be distinctly moral. Where there is no volition there is neither vice nor virtue. The merit of an action wholly depends, for kind, on the rectitude or integrity, and for degree, on the intensity of the volition which produced it. In every instance, then, and in every degree, actual morality, whether depraved or sound, has a moral cause ; and motive is that moral cause, for where no motive is, there can be no volition.

6. In contemplating Moral Science from the highest point of view, the motives furnished by the Government of God, the hopes and fears which that Government incites, through knowledge, in the mind, reveal themselves to us. Here is the faculty of Reason dealing with the relations of the creature to the Creator, the finite intelligence to the Infinite, and drawing out consonant deductions. These deductions in turn arouse consonant hopes and fears ; and these again induce the observance of the rules prescribed by the Great Governor. Throughout the whole process there is a law of relationship prevailing to keep it rational, and the law of causality is predominant.

7. In the final issues of a course of moral action, the same laws of relation and causality will be found working out their proper results. Punishments are traceable to a twofold causality—they may come immediately from the sovereign Will of God as expressions of His holy anger—they may spring out of a course of conduct as its natural and proper fruits. In the former case the sole causality is in the Will of God, from which causation runs on direct to its sequence. In this instance the finite is in contact with the Infinite. In the latter case the causality lies in the conduct punished, producing its own sequences by the established laws of physical Being, and of intellectual conformation. In either case there is nothing variable or capricious, but every product is trace-

able to a law of causality and sequence which is absolute and inviolable. Rewards are to be considered in the same two-fold way.

8. And in all the processes of Divine Government exhibited under the Economy of Redemption there is nothing at variance with the notion, that God acts with all the regularity and certainty of fixed laws towards His subjects. His threatenings and promises are together the equal product of Wisdom and Truth, that is, of high and all-ruling Reason, a product so absolutely perfect that no other result could follow; while the punishment of those who abuse, and the happiness of those who rightly use, that Economy, is, in every instance, the direct and necessary fruit, *rationally* resulting from conduct.

9. The reality of a law in this case is attested by conscience, which in all instances makes its testimony a prime element, or rather the chief essence, of the misery or joy experienced under a moral government. But there are *physical* results which attest the presence of a mechanical causality also.

## X.

1. The universe thus appears to be one vast economy, with all its parts in due connection, subordination, and administration. All things in it are directly dependent on the one grand Causality, the Reason Absolute. We reach this point, and can proceed no further.

2. And God has constituted human society as an economy after the model of His own Economy of the Universe. As the one has laws, causes, and sequences, so has the other. The fundamental laws made by God for mankind are drawn out of the very nature of man, and are finally impregnable. Every wilful attempt to set them aside brings an inevitable punishment. Even a neglect of them cannot be harmless.

3. Here, then, is law in full and universal reign. Nor is it possible to conceive that in this universe any constitution or organization could exist if law, the law of causality

supreme, and every subordinate one as dependent upon it, were withdrawn. All things would rush to chaos or nothing.

4. In this we have the proclamation of *necessity*; but we shall see, in another lecture, that such necessity as this is in no respect at variance with moral accountability and free agency.

5. It is the universality of the principle which shows it to be a law; and this law of causality *is*, in fact, so universal that nothing exists uncaused except the Nature of Him "who is before all things, and by whom all things consist." In Him nothing is effect, because nothing is successive.

## XI.

1. We have seen that in the universe the law of causality is supreme; then, every other law either centres in this, or is subordinate to it.

2. It is a law of the material world, as far as our knowledge of it extends, that organized beings reproduce and propagate their species. The law is a development, or an application of causality; but the special reason of it is remotely hidden in the Will of the Creator. We do not know whether there are worlds in which this law does not obtain, so that we cannot tell whether it be essential to organized Being. We only see it that it is a law here, itself a sequence of the causality which is in Reason Absolute.

3. The world which we inhabit is clothed in green, so generally that we must infer a law. A co-ordinate law conforms animal vision, especially human, for either pleasure or preservation, to that hue. The conjunction of these two laws suggests that there is an intelligent causality above them both, creating each, and fitting each to the other. Why, without any change in our organs of sight, should not the earth be dressed in scarlet? Or, why should not the eye prefer some other hue to green? Many similar cases and inquiries present themselves. It is clear that the combined and

reciprocal adaptations in such cases are not random results of *un-Reason*, but the sure sequences of Reason Absolute, which is equivalent to infinitely benevolent intention. Yet, we see the facts only, and have to reason out their Great Cause.

4. It is a law both of organized matter and of mind, that repetition of a movement shall produce habit; and that habit confirmed beyond a given point shall be a bond stronger than material fetters, or prisons of iron and granite. In this nature of habit we trace a continuous causation, an incessant train of sequences, which must lead back through every successive mediate or mechanical cause to the original power which established the law. The law of habit must thus depend on some antecedent out of sight; nor can we find the ultimate antecedent until we come to the Reason Absolute, that is, the supreme Intelligence and Will of the Creator. The reason on which He founded this law lies hid among the archives of His inscrutable government.

5. We might multiply instances without end, and the conclusion would always be, both that subordinate laws pervade all departments of principles and existences, and that their subordination is to the one great law of causality.

6. Law and Essence must not be confounded. Essence is the source, Law is the stream. Essence is not causality, but is either its reservoir or its fountain.

7. When law *seems* to be arbitrary or contingent, it is not really so. Its nature is to be certain, and that nature cannot be changed. But the source of it may be changed from the mediate to the immediate, or the contrary; yet not so as to affect its ultimate dependence on the latter, the Reason Absolute. Every law is surely traceable to the dominant Mind of the Creating Power, which has its own intrinsic and eternal laws. Thus no law is destitute of an adequate cause, and therefore none is arbitrary or contingent.

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## LECTURE VI.

### NECESSITY ; LIBERTY ; MORALITY.

#### I.

1. NECESSITY, in true philosophy, is wholly distinguishable from the "fate," however named, of the ancients, which often overruled even the highest of the gods. It is, properly, no other thing than the certainty of law as proceeding from efficiently operating causality. This definition will apply in all cases except that of Eternal and Absolute Being, which alone is uncaused. *Its* Necessity is as absolute as itself.

2. The notion of Necessity is as purely metaphysical as that of Law. It leads us into fields of abstraction, where physical phenomena do not enter.

3. But although the *notion* of Necessity is metaphysical, its application is both physical and metaphysical, the latter including the moral.

#### II.

1. The highest notion of Necessity is connected with the intuitions of Being and Absoluteness. Indeed, all the intuitions, as absolute principles, involve it. The paramount example of it is in the Being of God, which we intuitively perceive to be a thing of eternal and absolute necessity, and which must guarantee, since it contains, all other intuitions.

2. Whenever, in the course of inquiry, we have reached such a first principle as an intuition implies, further research or questioning is impossible. Hence the primary notion of necessity must be intuitive, and because intuitive, determinate. But, in the development of the principle, or, rather, its application downwards, we discover that it is in every case but a particular manifestation or exemplification of that "reason of things" which, originating in the Reason Absolute, is unfolded in all processes of causation.

3. BEING is necessary, for it is the first fundamental

actuality, and, therefore, the first object of intuition. As a principle, it is an intuitive *truth*; as an *actuality*, it is an intuitive *fact*. In the notion of Being, taken metaphysically, there is nothing which admits of dispute or division; and, consequently, there is no contingency. Descending to fact, we find the same certainty. Whatever specimen of the actuality may be taken we find in it undeniable Being. *I*, *Thou*, *He*, contain it. So does every object we see. And combining all objects in one universe, both the principle and the fact of Being remain, *metaphysically*, just the same, capable of neither extension nor contraction. But, as all Being must be centralized, every specimen suggests that centre where we find Being in its absolute form, no longer an emanation. Here, then, it exhibits an absolute necessity, giving rise to an emanative necessity in all the dependent specimens of Being.

4. No power, no contingency, can affect Being. The cessation of the particular thing that *is*, is not an annihilation, or even a diminution of Being as it stands before us in the abstract, Being of intuitive necessity. So long as anything has not ceased to be, *its* Being is a reality, an actuality, a necessity emanative, yet true; and when it *has* ceased to be, the Absolute Being whence it came, and in which it was contained, has suffered no diminution, and remains undisturbed. It is thus impregnable and unalterable reality, or actuality, which constitutes to us the proof of the necessity of Being in the simple, original, and intuitive form.

5. Every actual being endowed with intelligence possesses *personality*, as well as that nature or essence which goes beyond personality, and is, abstractly, infinite. That nature rises above contingency, with a proper absoluteness of its own. It is thus a thing of necessity, for the being could not exist without it. But personality is also a necessary principle, necessary to identity in an intelligent being, and, therefore, to his reality. But, in general, when we speak of personal Being as absolute we do not allude to that abso-

luteness above-mentioned, which is the property of every nature, however finite, yet pervades the entire species to which the person belongs ; but to a property exclusively personal. In the previous sense there is an absoluteness even in human nature ; in the sense exclusive God alone is Absolute, and *His* Absoluteness, while still that of a personal Being—for He is that—is exclusively His own. The metaphysical, generic, or specific absoluteness of a creature, while a personal possession, is yet common to his grade, and is not exclusive. But in all these conditions there is necessity, the necessity of law in creatures, the necessity of supremacy in God. In the latter case it is the necessity of unoriginated and entirely positive Being, the uncaused causality ; in the former it is the emanative necessity of natures in every respect dependent.

6. *Eternity* gives another phase of necessity to Being. If there ever had been a negation of Being—for the moment permit the inconceivable paradox—that negation would have been eternal, since there would have been no causality. Negation would have been an eternal necessity. But since, where *any* thing exists positively there must be an uncaused cause, Being, at least in that uncaused cause, is necessarily eternal. It is of absolute, not personal Being, we here speak ; or, only of *that* personal Being who is the cause of all others. It is only Being which, while personal, is individual, that has not its nature necessarily eternal.

7. Any theory involving non-existence, or universal negation of Being, thus becomes a pure absurdity, a metaphysical self-annulling, a palpable impossibility. Then, the *fact* of Being determines its *necessity*. That which, in Being absolute and eternal, *is*, is the only thing which *could be*.

### III.

1. The FOUNTAIN OF NECESSITY is in Being Absolute and Eternal. Every other form or degree of Necessity is either contained in that, or an emanation from it.

2. But, inasmuch as that Being Absolute and Eternal is no other than the Reason Absolute which is the very essence of the Divine Nature, Necessity is not a blind and unintelligent Fate, but a principle of intelligence and harmony.

3. Being Absolute and Eternal is an unbounded and non-contingent Consciousness, a Wisdom immeasurably and inconceivably profound, an activity perpetual, without fatigue and without restriction. It is that of which the positive side of every physical, intellectual, and moral perfection is the very life. Incongruity, whether of purpose or of workmanship, is utterly incompatible with the whole notion. Being, thus exalted, can do nothing but on the principle of *Harmony*, which is fundamental to government, and to all the relations of beings and things. Now Wisdom, which implies harmony of conception and intention, and, therefore, in God, relies on absolute Consciousness, is so essential to His nature, and, therefore, to His Being, that its conclusions can never be spoken of as if they were contingent or arbitrary. Take away the Infinite and Absolute Intelligence, and, consequently, the never-broken consistency of God, and you take away the whole congruous notion of His Being.

4. It hence appears that Intelligence, Harmony, and Causality, are, in their Fountain, which is Reason Absolute, coincident, or rather identical, with the very nature of God, and, *therefore*, in their issues, things or principles of ETERNAL NECESSITY.

5. In that Necessity, which may be fitly called *primary*, are involved all abstract, that is, metaphysical truths. These truths are, therefore, not only necessary truths, but, as they come from the Fountain of necessary truth, they, too, must be placed in the primary rank. By this, however, we do not mean intuitive or axiomatical. These terms relate only to what is primary *to us*. To the limited mind of a creature there must, in abstract reasoning, be both primary and secondary or deductive truths. The former will be intuitive. But it is far otherwise with the Infinite Intelligence, and in

the nature of the case. The whole of science together is one collected truth, every particular being fundamental, or at least essential, to all the rest. To God, then, all particular truths will be primary, and within the transparency of His unbounded and eternal Consciousness. Their secondaries will be only those practical forms which come out in active causation.

## IV.

1. We have here to do with science as it presents itself to the understanding of a limited intelligence, and, consequently, with the primary mathematical truths as axiomatic, and their issues as deductive.

2. The axioms in Mathematics are necessary truths of the simplest form. It is impossible to dispute them, to analyse them, or to receive them with hesitation. If they were ignored, nothing could be proved at all, and the very universe would appear without consistency. But, these being admitted as primaries, there are deductions from them and combinations of them, as necessary as themselves, no rational deductions contrary to them being possible.

3. So in other cases not mathematical—the combination of the primary notions of Being and Essence is as necessary as those notions themselves, for it is obvious that the former implies the latter—whatever has Being must also have Essence or proper Nature.

4. Thus also Being and Duration, Being and Space, Being and Quantity, and the like, are inevitable combinations, for it is impossible to disengage Being from such associated conditions.

5. We cannot avoid taking Being under one or the other of the alternatives, Absoluteness, or Individuality. We must, therefore, combine with it one or the other of these notions. But here is a choice between two combinations, and we are forced to reason out the right one. Our deduction, therefore, whatever it be, becomes to us a secondary truth, yet as necessary as if it were primary.

6. Thus we must reason either *a posteriori* or *a priori* respecting the law and action of causality ; that is, we must either trace causality from individual developments upwards till its vestiges surely conduct us to the Absolute ; or we must assume it in the Absolute, and trace it downwards through all grades to individual creations, and that with a view to verify our first assumption. Individuals are not eternal ; they have their known commencement; therefore they cannot have been self-originated. The Absolute alone can be eternal, for **ETERNITY IS DURATION ABSOLUTE** (Lec. II., Sec. v., 4). Hence the individual must originate in the Absolute ; and this is a truth which, though secondary, because inferential, is as necessary as if it were an intuition.

7. Nothing can be clearer than that the individual development can never produce the absolute, and also that there must be an Absolute somewhere to produce the individual. Hence the Absolute must be taken as a primary and fundamental fact, beyond which there can be nothing. Hence, too, we are compelled to place in it the ultimate and supreme causality. Then, also, perfection is a necessary character of Absoluteness. Thus it becomes a truth next to primary, that God is a Being of Absolute Perfection. Now such a Being cannot do or meditate wrong. He can do His creatures no wrong, because His Absoluteness renders temptation to malignant action, or to unwise purpose, impossible. Malign tempers and defective knowledge are faults only of finiteness and depravity.

8. From the dependence of the individual upon the Absolute, and from the Absoluteness of Him upon whom the individual depends, results the broad conclusion, that pure Moral Philosophy is made up of necessary truths, and that not one of those truths could be reversed or expunged without destroying the perfection of the system, annulling the grand principle of final causality, and rendering moral confidence vain and baseless.

9. The proper doctrines of Natural Theology thus become

necessary truths. In this department of sacred science, that depravity shall be the parent of misery, is less a threatening than a thing of natural necessity. We are led even to the verge of Revelation. That an absolutely wise, powerful, and benevolent God will devise the best plans, if any are possible, for the restoration of the depraved, as well as provide for the felicity of all who coincide with His will, is another inevitable inference. Thus, even the doctrines of the Evangelical System assume a character of more than *prima facie* probability.

10. For individuals depending on the Absolute, happiness is possible only by the provisions which the Absolute can make. If they are endowed with Reason, they are thereby assimilated in nature to the Absolute. The happiness of the Absolute is rational, and consists in spontaneity, or the unrestricted Power of Will. Of the same kind must be the happiness of all beings endowed with rational spontaneity. In all such beings such spontaneity thus becomes a *necessary* condition. On no other footing could they be like God, or morally subject or united to Him. Their moral constitution, in other words their perfect freedom, is therefore a necessary fact. *Here, then, is the coincidence of LIBERTY AND NECESSITY*, two things so often thought to be in conflict. Liberty, in rationality of nature, is an eternally necessary principle.

11. In beings endowed, like man, with the mental constitution of Thought, Volition, and Emotion, choice is the necessary attribute of that constitution, and on the exercise of choice must depend their well or ill-being. The nature of moral capacities renders this inevitable; Liberty and Necessity, therefore, here manifestly coalesce, the one not being conceivable as possible without the other. Also, by the like necessity, right choice is both duty and felicity, and that without either contingency or dubiety. Here, then, we see the consistency and connection of NECESSITY, LIBERTY, MORALITY.

## V.

1. It is universally allowed, that mathematical truths are necessary truths. Here the primaries are axioms. Every Arithmetical, Algebraic, Geometrical deduction is equally a truth determinate and inevitable. Nor can such truths be altered by any mode of expressing them. They are certain, fixed, and eternal. But they are merely intellectual, without moral quality. Choice, that is, liberty, belongs not to their nature or range.

2. Now, every doctrine of Moral Science is just as necessary as any Mathematical truth. For instance, it is a necessary truth that Reason, in the exercise and faculty of Introversion, involves accountability to Him in whom Reason is Absolute, and whose prescriptions are sovereign, just as much as it is that a circle must have a centre, or that the product of the extremes in a geometrical series is equal to the product of the two terms next the middle, or the square of the middle term. It is as necessary a truth that the Sovereign Will of the universe will call intelligent creatures to judgment, and there treat them by an inviolable law of rectitude, as it is that any straight line may be infinitely and eternally produced.

3. Similarly, it is as necessary a truth, that a law issued by an Absolute Being will be adapted to the nature and wants of the creature to whom it is addressed, and that compliance therewith will make that creature happy, while non-compliance will make him miserable, as it is that mathematical principles are the only correct ones for mechanical structures, whether in the vast fabric of the universe, or in the tiny elaborations of human ingenuity.

4. In a word, *all truths are necessary*. Not one truth can be unimportant. In truth there is no contingency, no dubiety. Doubt implies nothing but ignorance or infirmity on the part of the doubter, it implies no contingency in the thing doubted. It, however, pertains, as a failure or vice, to ignorance and infirmity, either to doubt or to presume ; and

the alternative will be as necessary a consequence of the preponderance of timid irresolution, or of pride and self-will.

## VI.

1. Reason is prior to facts, and is the necessary cause of them; otherwise, facts would be contingent. This metaphysical law is the basis of *physical* necessity, to which all the *facts* of the material world must be referred. Let us begin with things with which we are familiar.

2. In every organic structure, whether vegetable or animal, we see adaptedness to the location and mode of life by which that structure is to be sustained. The principle of adaptation is one of physical necessity, and were it annulled nothing organic could exist.

3. There is a like adaptation in all the inorganic agents of nature to the organic beings they are required to support.

4. The modifications of this reciprocal adaptedness are in every fact, however minute, of Natural Philosophy and Natural History; and in every case we trace necessity.

5. It is on these adaptations that the unity and harmony of the physical universe depends; and it is in the foresight, comprehension, and establishment of such a system of things we trace the workings of a Reason which is absolutely perfect and unerring. Perfect, that is, Absolute Reason, could produce nothing adverse to unity and harmony; on the other hand, these could not be maintained by any power short of a Reason so perfect and absolute. In all this, then, we find NECESSITY.

## VII.

1. Every plant and animal is fitted to climate, local habitation, and mode of life, and to its proper nutriment and opportunities of obtaining it. Elsewhere than in its temperature, if it could live it could not thrive, and in many cases it could not live. Necessity is the law which operates; and

it is shown in this, that if such varieties of adaptedness did not exist, countless regions must be unoccupied.

2. Man's location is the whole globe, and he has a frame adapted to extensive locomotion, and fitted to sustain the force of every climate. But his actual constitution and conformation would be totally unfitted for residence in any other known planet, and, therefore, he is placed *here*. From every quarter of the earth his organization can supply its wants, and derive its means of enjoyment. A slight change in it would alter his destiny, or destroy him. That organization, then, is a necessary physical fact, resulting from the unfailing Wisdom of the Creator.

3. In the structure of the human body we see mechanical laws applied with mathematical precision. Scientific exactness is everywhere apparent, indicating the actions which the functions of the body are intended to perform, and do perform. The erect and steady gait results, among other causes, from the breadth of the pelvis, and the insertion of the thigh-bones at well-adjusted distances. No other animal possesses the like arrangement, because no other animal requires it.

4. The eye is the best possible contrivance for the purposes of sight, the ear for those of hearing, the larynx for melodious sound, fitting man for the practice and enjoyment of intelligent song. In like manner the hand is a perfect instrument for intelligent use, the foot for varied locomotion. Any accidental derangement of these organs reveals at once the delicacy of their fitness and adjustment. To speak of the viscera—the bowels, besides their proper and vital functions, are an elastic cushion which gives flexibility and grace to the movements of the whole frame, rendering it easy without pain or fracture. Now all such facts are necessary, considering the sphere occupied by mankind. The very size and bulk of the human body within given limits is another instance of its fitness for its terrestrial abode. Plainly, in every thing about man, necessity has been consulted.

5. Travel whither we will, we observe necessity thus a ruling law ; and it is a fair presumption, that it rules equally beyond our power of observation. The uniting and repelling forces of chemical agents in the earth's substance are well-known to act by necessity for the preservation of the mass, as well as for their own specific ends. In like manner gravitation acts for the balance of the visible universe. In fine, it is not possible to conceive how, consistently with the perfection of creative wisdom, any portion of the universe could be altered without detriment.

## VIII.

1. As we ascend the ladder of contemplation, we are gradually confounded with the stupendous disclosures of science ; yet our perplexity, amidst the vast conglomeration of physical facts, never makes us feel that we are in a wilderness, or a chaos, of disjointed and fragmentary masses. The same laws are everywhere discoverable, the same necessity reveals itself.

2. We, however, continue to ascend through all the gradations of actual and living, of single and associated phenomena, till we reach the solitary presence and vision of the Great Being from whom all things spring, and who is the embodiment and realization of Reason Absolute. Here, all we can understand is, that, though bathing in His splendour, we conceive Him not, and can never conceive Him, as He is in Himself. Yet we *feel* that "in Him we," with all other creatures, must *necessarily* "live, and move, and have our being." As to His sovereignty, we recognize it at once, yet not so as to separate the Absoluteness of His Will from the Absolute Reason which is one with it. Some persons speak of the sovereignty of God's Will as if it were mere unreasoning caprice, forgetful that an Absolute God can Will only the best, and that, therefore, the actual universe is the necessary result of a wisdom that is absolutely never at fault, or capable of embarrassment.

3. It is impossible to conceive that a vital energy which is Absolute can be in a state of total inactivity. The essential energy of God must, therefore, have been ever at work, and ever in the best way. An eternity of mere purpose without action for such a God cannot be reconciled with His boundless Intellectuality and Volition. Even the supposition of a *past* eternity of mere purpose to be terminated at a given moment shares the same crudity of conception. Purpose, Will, Action, are contemporary in Reason Absolute. What we see of commencement is not commencement of actual work with God. God does not wait as we wait, but every purpose in His mind, as it has been there from eternity, so it must be ever actively proceeding to completion by the employment of a creative and unfolding energy. Succession of works is mere *orderly* performance in the Divine hand. God is a God of order in both time and economy of action.

4. Creation, then, must be an everlasting work, yet so as that each item of that creation has its point of commencement, and so as that matter is shown not to be inherently eternal. While, then, no part of the universe is eternal, the universe, as a fact, has been from eternity proceeding from the hand of God. The existence of the universe is an eternally necessary fact.

5. As also the highest mode of existence is the moral, because this is the very consummation of Reason Absolute, that Reason must of necessity create moral beings, and supremely care for them, as the truest exemplifications of itself.

6. Since, also, it is the nature of Reason Absolute to be always reasoning and choosing, and in rational choice to find absolute pleasure, all beings made after the image of that Reason must share the same characteristics, must reason and choose, and in their choice, if exercised rationally, find the essence of their felicity. The law of necessity is, in their case, the law of liberty.

## IX.

1. It would be as wrong to suppose that, in the case of moral agents, Necessity is destructive of Volition and Accountability, as it would be to suppose that Accountability can exist without the Power of Introversion of Thought. Necessity as much demands liberty and power of choice in moral agents, as it demands, in inferior creatures, the instinct which fabricates the honeycomb, or weaves the spider's web.

2. Liberty is a necessary condition of moral action—a being cannot be moral in any degree in which liberty, that is, unfettered choice, is not supposed to be inherent in him. Therefore, in his case, necessity consists in this very condition of liberty being essential to his mental constitution, to his rank, his dignity, and his destiny.

3. Liberty, in the metaphysical sense, is mental, not bodily. Bodily freedom is an accident, important to outward exercise, but not interfering with the *nature* of a moral agent, however it may with the morality of a particular action.

4. No moral action can be performed without intelligent motive; and on the contrary, the presence of intelligent motive makes an action necessarily moral. Intelligent motives of sufficient intensity, and unchecked by counter influences, render actions certain. The law of causation operates, but not of blind causation. The necessity is moral, not physical, yet is sure in both cases. Yet as motives produce their effect through the Will, the department of freedom, freedom and necessity unite to make a moral agent.

5. Necessarily the results of motives as the actions of moral agents are, there is no intelligent action which is necessary as the result of fate or of controlling decree. Every such action owns its immediate cause in the Reason, Emotion, Volition, of the agent. Some metaphysicians have thrown out of view this grand distinction between the two sorts of Necessity, and have, consequently, denied the fundamental truth of human responsibility; and the Theology of some has been perplexed in finding the answer. The confusion is

as needless as the denial is wrong. The direct cause of action is in the nature of the mental constitution, which constitution is the security, and enters into the very notion, of freedom. We can have no other notion of moral action than this—that rational volition has produced it, volition unconstrained by anything else than the very nature of mind. If the direct cause of action were extrinsic to the mind, there would be necessity indeed, but it would be the necessity of fate.

6. The only connection of an extrinsic cause with moral action is in this—that the original cause of all sustains the mental constitution out of which the action comes—or also in this, that any extrinsic cause may shed over the mind a *persuasive* influence to facilitate rational conclusions. In the latter instance the efficient cause of action is left unimpaired in the mind. In the former, we merely revert to the connection of all constitutions with their Sovereign Creator and Upholder. Where there is persuasive influence it can be effective only through the activity of Thought, Feeling, and Will.

7. Hence it is absurd to talk of the **WILL** as being *free*, or *not free*, in the actions which result from it—language common with opposite classes of Theologians. The **MAN** is *free* or *forced*. It is the whole mind, not a part of it, as constituting the man, which is free. The whole mental constitution works and is free together, and ever follows the motives supplied by the intellect. The Will never acts without a motive which the Understanding deems sufficient. Thus the Will can act only in combination with the other powers which, however, it makes moral.

8. There is no question here of depravity. With regard to freedom, the Will is the very same whether its actual volitions be good or evil. It is a question of constitution, not of moral quality.

## X.

1. The Law of Necessity, and with it the whole substance

of this lecture, may be thus summed up. The Absoluteness, and the consequently boundless Perfection of God are *necessary* characters of His nature ; in that Absoluteness and Perfection are *necessarily* included His eternal and unbounded Energy and Wisdom ;—an eternal and unbounded Energy must, *of necessity*, be ever at work ; and an eternal and unbounded Wisdom must, of *equal necessity*, always work in the best way ;—the best results of such Energy and Wisdom must, *of necessity*, be found in the production of creatures, and their societies, assimilated to the nature of the Producer, and then in fitting them with adequate physical functions, abodes, and relations ;—the whole mental nature, with its properties, was thus the creation of *necessity*, for its non-creation would have been a negation of perfection in the works of God ;—the mental nature so formed, of *necessity*, secures freedom of personal choice and action, that being the very fact in which the principle of assimilation to God is found ;—but, of *necessity*, a finite being is incapable of surveying all things at once, and, therefore, his motives and inducements must always be limited, partial, and successive ;—as his relations are to things without him, he must, *of necessity*, have many of his reasons and inducements supplied from without, and under the influence of these, when not adequately counter-checked by internal motives, he will, *of necessity*, act ; yet so as that, by *necessity*, the consideration he bestows upon these to induce right action shall be at his own disposal, by that very law of his mental constitution which assimilates him to God.

2. It is solely by virtue of this principle of **NECESSITY**, acting through causality, that we are able to calculate on results ; and this is alike true in all the departments of Thought. In *Morals*, the proper subject of this lecture, we estimate character, and anticipate conduct, by our acquaintance with the established laws of motives and volitions.

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## LECTURE VII.

### MATHEMATICS—NUMBER AND QUANTITY.

#### I.

1. Mathematics is a metaphysical Science, for it contains in itself nothing but abstractions. Number and Quantity are abstract notions, however applied.
2. All material structures are made on principles supplied by pure Mathematics—it is impossible that it should be otherwise.
3. Hence the construction of the Material Universe is but the development and application of the principles of Mathematics.
4. Hence, also, many of those principles have been first deduced from observation of the various forms of material actualities, albeit afterwards combined into the form of a science, and confirmed by abstract thought.
5. But it is clear that the principles are in no respect dependent upon this development and application for their truth and nature. The principles are not physical, but metaphysical.

#### II.

1. Mathematical truths are, in themselves, wholly independent of any physical use or application. The *notion* of a triangle is possible without drawing or moulding. If no material universe had ever existed—just to allow such a paradox for argument—if nothing had existed but pure spirit, the properties of a triangle would have been an intellectual conception. Similarly must we conceive of every other geometrical form.
2. Mathematical truths are all thus eternal and necessary, absolute and fixed; they are abstract, prior to matter, and independent of it. Consequently they are never contingent, arbitrary, or subject to volition, but always form part of the

intelligence of the Reason Absolute, and are, therefore, the principles to which that Reason has conformed all physical creations of a material nature.

3. Quantity is an intuitive notion (see Lec. II., sec. vii. 2); as a *division of Mathematics* it is inferential ; but it does not in these cases mean precisely the same thing. The intuitive notion of Quantity includes Number—the mathematical division excludes Number. It is to Quantity in the mathematical sense we refer in this lecture ; and we mention Number as the other branch of the science. But in referring to these our doctrines are to be understood as abstract and metaphysical, even when we take illustrations from material objects.

### III.

1. GEOMETRY is the science of *Quantity*, but the term does not express the notion. The etymology of the word—*γῆ* “earth,” *μέτρον* “measure”—points out its own meaning—“the measure of the earth,” or “land measuring ;” while the science does not metaphysically imply any specific or actual, but only general, abstract, and possible measurement, and is as applicable to the remote places of the universe as to the earth. Still, we accept the term as it is now in use ; only we use it not for actual, but only for possible measurement.

2. Geometry is applicable to space and duration, as well as to actual and material quantities.

3. It comprises the notions of form, size, and density ; and combining these notions with those of space and duration, and adding that of extrinsic impulse dependent on the law of causality, it produces the idea of motion, with that of momentum in general.

4. All notions of form, without sight or feeling, are purely abstract ; and such notions are conceivable. It is impossible to assign any general limit to the power, inherent in mind, of conceiving such things. Before figures were actually

drawn or moulded, the mind must have abstractly conceived them. They are, therefore, notions of pure and eternal Reason.

5. It is at once evident, that the notion of form involves that of limit ; and that if quantity exist, it must either be subject to geometrical figure, or it must fill boundless space. The last supposition is absurd. It is next evident, that what is subject to limit and form must be measurable, and that as to both extent and density.

6. The whole doctrine of proportions is the abstract result of leading principles in Geometry. Hence homogeneity, hence ratio, hence series.

7. The Postulates are assumptions of fundamental *possibilities*. The Axioms are fundamental *data*. The Definitions are explanations of fundamental *forms*, whether abstractly conceived, or practically drawn. Geometrical notions are as applicable to possible as to actual figures.

8. Plainly, then, all possible as well as all actual quantities must be measured by geometrical principles. Not only the material universe which does exist, but all possible additions to it, must rest on principles which Geometry will supply. The Science, therefore, is before the Creation, and independent of it. It must, then, be sought for in the Reason Absolute, to the conceptions of which it owes its forms, and to which, therefore, it must be wholly conformed. For this reason, no change in geometrical truth is possible.

9. Hence, a triangle, a circle, a solid, and the like, are not products of arbitrary volition in God, the Creator, but are essential and eternal truths of His Absolute Reason. They are things which He could not alter without altering His own intelligence.

#### IV.

1. ARITHMETIC is the Science of *Number*. The school-books are mere treatises used as aids to the art and practice of counting. They furnish to the science only what treatises

on practical Mechanics do to Abstract Geometry. It is only of the science we must here speak.

2. Number may be considered abstractly and *per se*, and also in its applications to Geometry.

3. When viewed *per se*, it is not confined to any branch of physical science, and is, therefore, more general than Geometry. It is co-extensive with both Physics and Metaphysics in their widest reach of thought. It is as easy to speak of a thousand spirits, immaterial in nature, as of a thousand animals, or a thousand particles of dust. Even thoughts and notions, and those most abstruse, can be enumerated.

4. The notion of individual as covered by species, and that of species as covered by genus, are always associated with that of number. Also the *intention* to create a thousand worlds, with all their parts and arrangements, must take number as a leading principle, and must involve a thousand primary, with the concomitant vast, but still not countless, assemblage of secondary and subsidiary thoughts.

5. Quantity is necessarily measurable by number, for it is obviously divisible. Nor is there an assignable limit to the possibility of such division. In truth, Geometry cannot be far pursued without calling in the aid of Number. Several definitions are based on a previous recognition of number, and several axioms are decidedly numerical as well as quantitative. A large collection could be made of geometrical propositions demonstrable as well by number as by reasoning in pure quantity. In most demonstrations numerical ideas find a place.

6. It is thus apparent that Number is the prior science of the two—the prior, not in order of time, for both are eternal, but in nature and position. The more general and abstract must precede the less so; and that which depends must follow that on which it is dependent. And numerical truths are not less conformed to the thoughts of the Reason Absolute than Geometrical truths are.

## V.

1. ALGEBRA is *Arithmetic* in its most general and ratiocinative form. It, therefore, contains the fundamental principles, in abstract form, and demonstrably worked out, of the Science of Number. Symbols of a more general and abstract kind are employed, instead of those of definite value, to conduct numerical reasoning.

2. The common rules in books of practical Arithmetic are founded on Algebraic proofs, and are mere formulas, rarely accompanied by the reasons. Those reasons must be sought for in the more general and expanded form of the science. They are purely abstract and metaphysical, and are independent of the special purposes to which they are applied.

3. The modes of reasoning employed in Algebra, from their generality and freedom from encumbrance, are often capable of being applied to the solution of practical questions with far more facility than rules of ordinary arithmetic; just as we retreat upon pure Geometry for solutions of questions in practical Geometry.

4. As Geometry involves Number, and is dependent upon it, the abstract and ratiocinative nature of Algebra makes it a fit instrument to aid in the solution of geometrical questions. Its generalizing power adapts it peculiarly to a science of pure generalities.

## VI.

1. The universe of physical beings, and the universe of thought, are thus, both of them, expositions of Quantity and Number combined.

2. But as Quantity is measurable by Number, so must Space and Duration be; for, otherwise, Quantity, which occupies Space, and exists in Time, must be unlimited in extent, and of eternal duration. No notion of individual or successive beings could be formed without supposing a division of space and a succession of moments. Division and succession are numerical notions.

3. Hence, when we speak of space and duration absolute, we speak of what is utterly beyond our power to conceive ; but when we speak of space and duration, in relation to created or dependent existence, they involve the notion of Number, and furnish matter for mathematical reasoning.

## VII.

1. Connected with causality, Quantity implies motion. That is, an impulse extrinsic to quantity, and traceable through all intermediate agencies up to the Supreme Causality which is in Reason Absolute, removes it from one point or location in space to another, and, it may be, to another and another in perpetual succession. 1

2. Causality being thus understood, the combination of quantity with motion generates Momentum. Momentum is not motion in the abstract, but whenever it is produced it is the *measure* of motion.

3. It is obvious that, if motion requires impulse, a stronger impulse must increase motion, and a weaker impulse diminish it ; that is, according to the extrinsic force applied will be the rapidity or slowness of motion. Thus, not only space, but duration is involved.

4. It is also obvious, that if impulse is required to produce motion, when there is no impulse there will be no motion ; that is, matter without extrinsic impulse would be absolutely still. A variety of statical results comes out of such principles. Resistances and counteractions come from contrary and contemporary impulses. All such things are dependent, as the phenomena of their operations, on laws. The facts are physical, but the abstractions are metaphysical. The universe is pervaded by them.

5. But the causality of the Reason Absolute is the source whence all the developments proceed, and whence comes the energy which they carry with them.

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## LECTURE VIII.

### INFINITES AND PROGRESSIONS—MATHEMATICAL.

#### I.

1. Considering Number as a series, the middle term is unity, or one; and on either side of unity the series is infinite, that is, interminable.

2. Take the two sides as ascending and descending. Then, it is evident that, to the ascending series there can be no other limit than that imposed by the shortcoming of faculty; that is, there can be no metaphysical limit. The act of counting one by one could proceed through eternity were there a capacity to conduct it. The lack of names for the steps of the series could be supplied by invention, but the series itself is wholly independent of invention. The terms employed in actual enumeration are confined to human want and experience, but the train is infinite for which no terms can be found, and which no created faculty can measure.

3. Similarly, *any* train in descending from unity is without end. ONE can be divided for ever. Whatever is less than one is a part or fraction of one. Nor in this respect is there any difference between Vulgar and Decimal Fractions.

4. In the Rule called “Infinite Series” we have an illustration of the doctrine of this section; and Algebraic symbols are made to express, in a practical manner, what would be otherwise, from its infinity, inexpressible.

5. The ascending series from unity, in its simplest form, is a progression whose *additive* ratio is one, or unity; and it is manifest that it can proceed as long as *one* can be added—that is, for ever. The descending series from unity can proceed by the continued subtraction of an increasing fraction as a *subtractive* ratio; and this process, also, can be made infinite. Let  $n$  stand for infinity, or an infinite number, and be used as a denominator. Then we may get the subtractive

fractions  $\frac{1}{n}, \frac{2}{n}, \frac{3}{n}$ , and so on with all successive numbers for numerators, every increased numerator making a larger fraction to be subtracted from unity ; and so the subtraction may go on for ever because  $n$ , the denominator, is infinite. Here, then, the subtractive series becomes infinite ; that is the diminution of one goes on to infinity. This one example is enough to illustrate the doctrine of infinite diminution from unity.

## II.

1. Progressions may proceed by Addition or Subtraction as they ascend or descend ; or they may be made by Multiplication or Division also as they ascend or descend. Illustrations are needless here, as abundant examples are furnished by every book on Arithmetic or Algebra.

2. The powers and roots of numerical quantities are other forms of progression. Of these, too, the books abound in examples. Our only concern here is to mark the *infinity* of all these progressions.

3. There is an infinite variety of ratios, and there are infinite series of the quantities which they measure. Also, in regard to descent from unity, one may be divided into an infinite number of parts for the denominators of fractions (see last Sec., 5) ; and numerators, too, may also be interminable when Vulgar Fractions are reduced to Decimals.

## III.

1. The exact root of every perfect power in Arithmetic and Algebra can be found, but most numbers are not exact powers, and, consequently, cannot furnish exact roots.

2. In all cases in which exact roots cannot be found, the process of evolution can, by decimals, go on to an infinite number of places, and the notion arises of values infinitely little. Also, approximation to the true root goes on for ever, without the possibility of reaching it.

1. The *existence* of Absolute Space is an intuitive notion,

## IV.

though the thing itself is beyond the conception of a finite mind. (Lec. II., Sec. v., 5, 6.) It associates with it *infinity*, but the one thing is not strictly the other. That which is **Absolute** must, of course, be boundless ; but the difference, mathematically, between the **Absolute** and the **Infinite** is, that the latter admits the notions of division and measurement, which the former does not.

2. Infinite space is measurable by any ratio, taken an infinite number of times.

3. All geometrical figures, irrespectively of their size and shape, having position in infinite space, are capable of being repeated, or otherwise numerically treated, an infinite number of times ; for all such figures are, in fact, given ratios by which infinity of space is divided. And all geometrical figures, for the like reason, are capable of being infinitely and eternally extended.

4. It is a Postulate of Geometry, that a given straight line may be produced to any length in a straight line ; which is the same thing as saying, that a straight line may be infinitely and eternally produced.

5. And it is demonstrable, that a straight line, so capable of being produced, can be divided infinitely, for it may be cut by circles with ever-lengthening radii, or ever-receding centres. This is nearly the same thing as saying, that a point is infinitely divisible ; for the extremity of a line is a point, and through this extremity an infinite number of cutting circles may be made to pass.

6. It is plain that Mathematics admit the notion of the infinitely little, as well as that of the infinitely great.

## V.

1. In a triangle, the three angles are together equal to two right angles. (Euclid, B.I., Prop. xxxii.) If one of them be a right angle, say, at the base, the other two will be together equal to one right angle. Then, it is obvious that,

however the perpendicular side be lengthened, and the vertex made more remote, those two must always remain equal to one right angle ; yet the increasing distance of the vertex will diminish progressively the vertical angle, and enlarge the angle at the base. Now, let the perpendicular, forming with the base the right angle, be infinitely extended as per Postulate, the vertical angle will become infinitely little, and the angle at the base, which is less than a right angle, will be ever approximating to a right angle without ever becoming one. The process can go on to eternity and infinity.

2. It can be shown that two lines, the one straight, the other curved, can be what are called "asymptotes" to each other ; that they can be for ever approaching each other without touching, crossing, or coinciding. Here, again, is infinity.

## VI.

1. In both branches of Mathematics the doctrine of infinites is undisputed and indisputable, and is one of the inevitable results of infinite space and duration. In relation to both branches, also, the doctrine holds of the infinitely great and infinitely little, since there can be no limit to either the multiplication or the division of unity.

2. To *powers* in numbers, in like manner, there is no assignable limit. Here, extension and progress have no internal law of termination. Notation—taking for example the decimal—the first and simplest thing in the science, is bounded only by the fatigue of human faculty. Millions, billions, trillions, upwards, and the millionth, billionth, trillionth part downwards, are alike infinitely distant from termination. Now, this infinity of Notation is fundamental and essential to the science. All the Rules of Arithmetic contain this principle ; but all the Rules of Progression and Series are direct examples of it.

3. Every new science, every new discovery and improve-

ment in scientific research, finds the practical power of number unfold before it, so as to be always ready for the utmost exigency ; and the time can never arrive when it will be otherwise, simply because that power is infinite.

### VII.

1. The simplest notion in GEOMETRY is that of a Point ; and if the Point be set in motion in any direction, it produces the next simple notion, that of a straight line, the actually simplest of all figures. As the motion of the Point proceeds, the line is extended, and as the motion may be for ever, the line becomes in that direction infinite.

2. As any line can be considered as a radius, and even thus can be extended infinitely, the area of a circle to which it belongs becomes in such case infinite—the motion of the Point ever going on in the extending radius.

3. This principle applies likewise to every plane, sphere, cube, cone, pyramid, or other solid, regular or irregular.

4. As a polygonal plane can have any number of sides, evermore approaching the circle, but never coinciding with it, so every polygonal solid may have any number of sides, always approaching, but never completing the sphere.

5. In the fact that every point, as the end of a line, can be infinitely divided, we have the doctrine of the infinitely little in Geometry.

6. Our experimental knowledge in every direction indicates the remote truth of the doctrine of mathematical infinites, no research having ever reached the end of a science, but rather having thrown open new fields for exploration. But the actual Infinite our most scientific, elaborate, and finished experiments can never reach—experiment, or otherwise *experience*, therefore, can never demonstrate Infinity. Yet to the *progress* of experiment there is no assignable limit, no limit, indeed, but one of faculty ; and this is a fair ground of assumption, that the physical must take the metaphysical as the rule of its extension—and not the reverse.

## LECTURE IX.

### INFINITES AND GRADATIONS—NATURAL.

#### I.

1. Some Naturalists have derided the systems of classification adopted by others in the investigation of animal life as fanciful and unfounded ; and some Metaphysicians deny the reality of genera and species, maintaining that they are nothing more than convenient mental contrivances for the study of nature. We hold with neither.

2. In our judgment it is a necessary doctrine of Metaphysics, and specially of Natural Philosophy, that the orders of the Universe, whether spiritual or material, are sustained by real gradations and modes of classification and arrangement. No conception of order can ever be formed in the human mind that has not, from eternity, been in the Divine Mind. Then, what God conceives in regard to all the works of His creation must, of necessity, be a reality, not a human fallacy. Nor can human thoughts be more orderly than those of God, whose intelligence is the Reason Absolute. Classifications, therefore, genera and species, and the whole system of natural gradations, are God's laws of order for Him to work and teach His creatures by, and for man to study and adopt both in mental conceptions and in practical applications.

3. In surveying what we observe in this respect, we detect a double law, of which the one part is physical, the other metaphysical, according to which the gradations of rank and comprehension ascend and descend. This law is, in both cases, no other thing than a form of progression.

4. And in this law we discover the distinguishing principle, Infinity, operating so, that the *culmen* or the *infimum* can never be reached, and that wherever we happen to be we are always at the central point of the system ; or could we reach some actual *culmen* or *infimum* of the progression,

we should still see that this is not the limit of its possible development. The progression, both upwards and downwards, is of infinite power, whether that power be applied or not. In a word, to every part of the actual creation, the Reason Absolute, in the Creator, has given a law which is, as it were, an impartation of its own infinity.

## II.

1. The law of infinity belongs to every grade or rank of organization in a manner which will presently appear.

2. The Animal and Vegetable Departments form systems, called "Kingdoms," and these two kingdoms have an indefinite power of adaptation to each other for mutual support. The actual limits of that power of adaptation, if there be any, are not its possible limits. The actual limits are indefinite; the possible may be infinite; or, rather, the power of adaptation may be boundless.

3. Students of Nature give us CLASSES, as a highest division; then ORDERS, subordinate to them. These are again subdivided into successive gradations, till we reach the lowest, that of INDIVIDUALS. For our purpose the artificial systems of Linnæus, or the natural ones of other botanists and zoologists are equally available as illustrations, since they all admit, in one way or another, the principle of generic and specific gradations throughout the whole range of organized nature. No one doubts the gradational ascent from individuals through varieties, species, families, tribes, sub-kingdoms, kingdoms, and so on, until one great whole is reached which comprises all things organized. The names given to the gradations are arbitrary, and are of no consequence to the principle, however they may be adapted or not to the physical facts. The principle is a Law of Nature, and has been established by the Reason Absolute. Our purpose will be served by simple adherence to the common grades of individuals, species, and genera. Although in the individual we have certainly found the lowest step in every gradation,

we can assign no limit, no position for the highest, for the infinite of possibilities is there through which the progression may ascend, and even continue to ascend for ever in increasing approximation to the conceptions of the Reason Absolute, without ever reaching them.

## III.

1. Let us begin our inquiry after the infinite with the *individual*, and for a ready case let us suppose the individual to be a man. Now there are two infinites about an individual man. As an individual fact, indeed, he is finite, for he is a creature, bounded by negations. But, first, there is the abstract principle of individuality in him, and that is unbounded. Second, there is his nature or essence uniting him to his species ; and this nature or essence is a principle which is co-extensive with the possibility of boundless development in the species. Here it is to be seen that the possible number of individuals under species is unlimited, though the actual number is limited. There is a metaphysical possibility and infinity which the actual cannot reach, although the actual number of individuals may be ever increasing. Nothing but the extinction of the species can affect this law.

2. The *individual* is an actually and materially organized being, distinguished by its peculiarities from all the individuals of its own species. It is, therefore, the actual development of the creative thought. But there are properties which belong equally to it and to its fellows. These, taken wholly apart from the individual peculiarities, constitute the notion of *species*. All the individuals that possess the common properties, indicated by instincts and organized life and habits alike, belong to one species. It is, therefore, the species which is developed in the individual. But the actual number of individuals under the species is not the limit of the species ; and there is no possible limit to it—that is, it is infinite. The law by which it develops itself into individual

forms is without termination. An infinite number of individuals under it is metaphysically possible.

4. But although the species is thus infinite in relation to the individuals under it, it is finite in regard to the gradations above it. The species we here speak of may be the *infima* of the Logician ; to us here it is simply species. In like manner we may take a *subaltern genus* as the next grade. This is a genus to our species, as it is a species to the genus next above it. To avoid needless complications and technicalities, let us regard it simply as a subaltern genus. Now, the species in relation to this subaltern genus is finite, just as the individual is in relation to the species ; while, on the contrary, the subaltern genus in relation to the species is infinite, just as the species is to the individual.

5. Thus the actual number of species under a subaltern genus is not the possible number. For, as individuals belonging to a species can be metaphysically augmented to infinity, so can species belonging to a subaltern genus. And in every two grades, however high in ascent, we see the same law of relative infinites and finites.

6. The individual must have impressed upon it all the marks, representing properties, of all the grades under which it is placed, otherwise it would not belong to those grades ; but its individual characters are exclusively its own. The grades as they ascend take in fewer and fewer marks ; thus, species has fewer than individuals ; subaltern genus than species ; genus than subaltern genus ; and so on. The summum genus has the fewest marks of all. And it is this fact which gives rise to the relative infinity of each ascending grade.

7. When we have reached even that grade which we may suppose to be the summum genus, we would think very wrongly if we regarded our position as more than hypothetical. The truth is, we cannot conceive what gradations may lie between our recognised summum genus and the Reason **Absolute**, the ultimate goal of all inquiries. What is the

extent of the chasm between the *summum genus*, supposing it reached, in created developments, and the creative power, it is not possible for the human mind to conceive ; but it is a certain truth in Metaphysics, that this chasm can be progressively filling up for ever, yet so that it will never be filled up.

8. The reason of this apparent paradox is plain—there can be no actual approach of the finite to the infinite. There can, for example, be no approach of the individual to the species so as to coincide. Similarly the species can never coincide with the *subaltern genus*, or the *subaltern genus* with the genus ; and so on. The grades can nowhere approach coincidence, or be commensurate. Now, if this holds between the grades themselves, it certainly must hold between the *summum genus* and the Creator.

9. There is even this still stronger reason, that the Supreme and Absolute Causality of the Universe must be for ever immeasurably distant from any effect it may produce.

10. It is, therefore, certain that the chasm must always be infinite, always immeasurable, although always being measured. The filling up must be an infinite and everlasting process.

#### IV.

1. In all the progressions now explained, we see that even infinity has degrees, and that one infinite can contain more than another ; for the genus can contain in it an infinite number of species, and the species an infinite number of individuals.

2. The infinity, however, in all these cases, is only a *relative infinity*, and this phrase is its proper designation. Every gradation is infinite only in relation to what is below it. The same rule will apply to all the possible gradations which may be eternally filling up between the real *summum genus* and the Creator.

3. Physically, in power, intelligence, causality, the Creator

alone is Absolutely Infinite, for all creatures are infinitely below Him. He is *relatively* infinite to nothing ; but the highest gradations in the universe are only relatively infinite. All the abstractions, however, have a metaphysical infinity drawn from the Reason Absolute to which they belong. And this is emphatically the fact with regard to the Intuitions of our second Lecture.

4. What but Reason Absolute can conceive the notions of Absolute Space, Absolute Duration, or Eternity, Absolute Being, and the like ? Every attempt of a created mind to form these notions produces only bewilderment. We instantly resort to measure to reach the immeasurable.

5. And so, Absolute Space is but the *location* of Absolute Being, and Eternity is but the *Duration*, or life-time, of Absolute Being. Absolute Space and Absolute Duration are but the work-field, and the working-day, of the Absolute, Supreme, and never quiescent Causality.

## v.

1. From this Lecture, and the last, we see how man is thronged and penetrated by infinities. They are to him a labyrinth without egress. They are, as it were, an atmosphere that enwraps him, and in which his rational nature breathes, lives, and moves.

2. There is at once an awfulness, a grandeur, and a satisfaction, in the realization of this stupendous connection of a creature with infinity. Man, finite as he is, and small as he seems, is made to take both work and pastime in a universe of infinities, and to soar there, not as a vagrant, aimless and hopeless, but with grand and exquisite delight, for ever.

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## LECTURE X.

### ACTUALITIES, POSITIVITIES, POSSIBILITIES, PROBABILITIES, AND THEIR CONTRARIES.

#### I.

1. The universe as it *is* comprises all globes, and systems of globes, with all their component materials, with all their furniture, organized and unorganized, with all their physical laws and relations, and all their animated or animal inhabitants. But it also comprises all spiritual beings, all minds of every rank, with their laws, habitations, and appurtenances.

2. These component parts of the universe are its Actualities. This universe of Actualities floats in an immeasurable and unfathomable ocean of metaphysical principles, whose subtlety penetrates and pervades it, and whose consistency sustains it.

#### II.

1. All Actualities are the result of positive principles in Metaphysics ; and these positive principles have their source in the Reason Absolute, and are, therefore, eternal.

2. Negative principles are the denials of these, and are conformed to nothing in the Reason Absolute. They are utterly and for ever incapable of producing a single actuality.

3. Positive principles, therefore, represent possibilities of creation ; negative principles represent impossibilities.

4. All that is *positive* in metaphysical science is possible in physical development ; all that is metaphysically negative is physically impossible.

5. There could have been no universe but for the Causal Reason, the Reason Absolute, which preceded and conceived it, drew its plan, founded and constructed it upon pre-existing principles positively in unison with the eternal and unbounded intelligence of that Reason Absolute, the source of all positivity.

## III.

1. All Actualities are certainties, and so are the positive principles which produce them. But the Actualities are *not* co-extensive with those positive principles, for if they were there could be no further progression.

2. There is an equal certainty in negations and impossibilities, but they *are* co-extensive. It is as certain that three and five are *not* nine, that a circle has *no* angles, that falsehood and truth are *not* compatible or identical, that the infinite and the finite are *not* commensurate, as it is that four and five *are* nine, that the circumference of a circle *is* a single line, that all truths are mutually congruous, and that the finite is dependent on the infinite and comprised within its scope.

3. The direct opposite of actuality is non-existence; and the direct opposites of the positive and possible are the negative and impossible.

4. The positive is, however, infinite; the actual is in progression towards the infinite. In the Creator alone, the Possessor of Reason Absolute, does the actual coincide with the positive, and in Him there is no progression.

5. There is no infinite negation, and therefore non-existence is finite.

## IV.

1. To the Mind of Reason Absolute all positive principles and their actualities must be primary intuitions, by reason of the fact that that mind is an ever unbounded and uninterrupted Consciousness. The boundless sphere of metaphysical truths, with the whole universe of actualities which has sprung out of them, must appear to that mind one absolute category; while to a finite mind, which is compelled to take all matters in detail, only a few principles and facts can be intuitive and primary, and all that is understood besides must be matters of inference and ratiocination.

2. But principles are not the less positive, actualities not the less certain, their issues not the less possible, because the

highest finite mind perceives them, either not at all, or only in slow succession—for the standard of Positivity, of Actuality, and of Possibility, is in Reason Absolute, and nowhere beneath it.

## V.

1. All principles, *in the sight of Reason Absolute*, are either positive or negative, and, consequently, all issues either possible or impossible; there can be no medium, and no doubtful ground. All actualities, likewise, are certain; there can be no uncertainty, no doubt.

2. Hence the notions of probable and improbable are inapplicable to Reason Absolute, and have no relation to the nature of things. They are mere conventionalities, arising out of the ignorance and feebleness of finite minds. We say that a thing is probable or improbable when, being acquainted with some certain principles or facts which might tend to produce it, we are consciously ignorant of much that might tend to aid or hinder it. Could we be sure that our minds have grappled with the whole case, we should not be under the doubt which the terms "probable" and "improbable" imply. Probability and improbability have nothing to do with the reality of things, but only with those imperfect perceptions of truth and fact which enfeeble the strongest created intelligence.

## VI.

1. When finite minds reason, they must take as their data either intuitive conceptions, or other truths equally certain and clear which have been previously reasoned out. If they can take all the truths of this sort which concern the case, and that so as to be sure there is no negative anywhere, they arrive at what may be fitly called certainty. In Mathematics this certainty is demonstrative, and rewards the investigator with assurance. Here the probable and improbable have no place. In other departments the certainty is less absolute, and of another kind.

2. In any case where it is suspected that there are other-truths, relating to the subject, concealed, or partially so, only probability or improbability is reached.


3. The probability or improbability is great or small as the assured data are many or few, strong or weak. If nothing counteractive remain unsurmounted by legitimate argument, and there be only some deficient link of direct proof to act against absolute conviction, the probability or improbability is of the highest degree; but still it is no more, it is not perfect proof, and the word "certainty" will not express it.


4. In the remarkable instance of the discovery of the planet Neptune by more than one astronomer not in concert, the probability, on *demonstrated* mathematical data, was so great as to prompt prediction, which the telescope verified.

5. Mathematical demonstration is the only strict demonstration. In all other cases even the most assured, and serving all the purposes of full conviction, alike in the intercourse, the commerce, and the other interests of the *present* life, and even in the immeasurable concern of a preparation for the life *to come*, strict demonstration, in the mathematical sense, is impossible. Only what is called high probability, from the nature of the argument, is reached. Yet, let it not be imagined that this is an injurious defect. The Bible appeals, indeed, *first* to Reason, and that with satisfying proofs to justify belief; but *then* to faith, a principle nobler because moral, and therefore of higher power and more sanctifying efficacy. And in this there is perfect reason. Faith, not demonstration, is the basis of all human intercourse and dealings even in this world. Faith deals with *evidence*, and honesty, a *moral* principle, is called for. Just so God forces us to deal with the concerns of Eternity.

6. But *contingencies* there are none in reality. Contingencies are nothing but the inevitable misapprehensions of Reason Finite.

SUPPLEMENTARY LECTURE  
ON  
THE CONNEXION  
OF  
THE INTELLECTUAL SCIENCES.





## APPENDIX TO VOL. I.

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### THE CONNECTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SCIENCES AND THEIR ISSUE IN MORALS.\*

EVERYBODY knows that the celebrated Authoress, Mrs. Somerville, a lady of world-wide renown for her scientific attainments, among her various works has one entitled, "The Connection of the Physical Sciences." The high merit and utility of this work are unquestionable. Its purpose is to show how all the branches of Natural Philosophy are interlaced and mutually dependent, so that a perfect knowledge of any one of them cannot be acquired without a considerable acquaintance with the rest, and that, in fact, all material science is ONE, though with manifold ramifications. It does not often fall to the lot of a lady to stand on so high a pinnacle of scientific and literary honour, and that with so true a merit. The connection of the Physical Sciences is a very grand subject, and well has she shown its grandeur.

We object, however, as we have uniformly done, to the limitation of the term "physical" to *material* nature, with its substances and laws. It is not a philosophical limitation, nor does it represent the truth. What are called "Physical Sciences," pertaining only to the range of matter and its laws, are only one-half of the great science of real being, which includes every thing, *whether material or spiritual*, which can be regarded as an entity, together with its essential laws and relations. Every entity, or actually existing thing or being, must have its *φύσις*, or nature; consequently

\* The substance of a Supplementary Lecture, delivered at the Australian College, January 7th, 1851; but re-cast for this Volume.

every *spiritual* being, every Soul or Mind, must have its φύσις or nature. The term “physical” comes from φύσις, and ought, therefore, to belong to spirit as well as to matter. There is a tendency, in the limitation to which we object, to favour the too prevalent disposition to ignore, or to banish from thought, the substantiality and superiority of mind. A restoration of the right habit of thought is indispensable in this class of speculations.

Nor must it be forgotten that the material and the immaterial universe are intimately united, blended, and reciprocally adapted so as to form a whole which has its “connections” of science, as well as that half of it which Mrs. Somerville has so well explained. Much has, indeed, been written on this subject to which we cannot now even allude, and so we pass it by. One premonition, however, is essential to our purpose. We regard all material existence as created, arranged, and governed for mind, for the ends of the very being of mind, and not mind for matter and its ends. All terminates in the well-being of mind, that is, its high morality. Consequently, Physical Science in its widest range must so terminate. This is a fundamental thought which must never be forgotten. Out of this also will grow the truth, before we have done, that the Intellectual Sciences equally determine in high morality, a result which ought to be anticipated here. Morals are the end of the constitution of the human mind, and of the whole Science of Metaphysics. Let us keep this in view as we proceed.

The material part of creation, together with its laws, furnishes the subject of what is called Natural Philosophy. The spiritual part gives that of Mental Philosophy or Psychology, the Science of Mind. The two comprise the whole circle of entities, or of actual Being. Of this second branch we have given a course of Outlines.

But Science reaches beyond the circle of entities and their actual laws, and takes in the whole scope of possibilities, probabilities, and proprieties, of essential principles and

eternal necessities; and in this wide domain of inquiry are placed all purely intellectual, moral, and abstract matters of thought. The same remark holds good with regard to those which we have already made with regard to Physical Science—they have their “connections,” their consistencies, their harmonies, their essential and eternal relations. No truth can really be unconnected with any other truth, or contrary to it. And, moreover, this wide range of Intellectual and Moral Science is every way consistent with Physical Science, and is, in a sense, the vast ocean of possibility in which every branch of Physical Science, every actuality of being, is but an islet, on which the foot of the explorer may sensibly rest.

In this domain, also, of the Intellectual and the Moral, it is necessary to gain a competent acquaintance with every branch in order to be thoroughly conversant with any one of them. He who would think truly in one direction should be able to survey his field all around. Especially the student, who aims at an expanded and harmonious view of things, must include the whole range in his mental ken, and draw his checks and corrections from the provisions he thus makes for a general consistency. We shall be under the necessity of applying this rule in all our studies. Let us now enumerate.

The two great divisions of Physics and Metaphysics in reality comprise all material and intellectual objects of thought. But this division does not define Physics correctly, as we have already seen. Physics ought to include all actual being, whether material or spiritual, in its range. Psychology would thus be a branch of Physics, not of Metaphysics, as is commonly held. To this allotment of the science we see every reason, mere custom apart, to adhere; and accordingly we so treat the matter. We prefer clearness to usage where we think the latter is wanting in perspicuity.

Then, for Intellectual Science, we are compelled to begin with Psychology, though we deem it a proper branch of

Physics, because it is the only footing we can take in contemplating the true Metaphysics which lie next beyond it. For this reason it is, that we consent to call Psychology one of the Intellectual Sciences. In so taking it, however, we find it single, without subordinates. It is one whole by itself. So we have treated it in our previous courses, and so we regard it here.

Thus, then, we have for our present range the two great branches of Intellectual Science—Psychology and Metaphysics—and according to the purpose of the present lecture, we have to show the fundamental “connection” between the two, and their union of bearing on high morality.

But here, again, while Psychology is one Science, and no more, Metaphysics has a range which admits of many subdivisions. In reality, *every science, as such*, is metaphysical; or, to speak with more precision, every study in which abstract principles rule belongs to Metaphysics, whatever its practical applications to physical realities may be.

It is further necessary, then, in order to obtain an unembarrassed footing, to get such a division of Metaphysical Science as will leave the mind in no doubt of its constituents. Thus, then, Metaphysics has two sides, an intellectual and a moral one, and these two in reality cover the whole field.

To the intellectual side of Metaphysics belong—all pure abstractions; Logic, considered in its highest character, as the science of Reason, and then as that of reasoning; Mathematics, as the ruling law of all constructions and movements; the Philosophy of Language as the science of connection between the inner and soul life, and the outer and social life, of man; Political Economy, or the science of the wealth and material prosperity of a nation.

To the moral side belong—Moral Philosophy, as presently to be defined; Theology and Religion, considered as sciences; Law and Law-making; Jurisprudence; Politics, or the science of Government.

On these manifold divisions in full our present purpose

does not require us to expatiate ; we have named them merely to avoid the imputation of oversight or ignorance. Every one of them would require a whole course of lectures. We confine ourselves to the subjects of our four courses. Theology belongs to a collateral course. On Natural Theology some views are given in our Outlines of Moral Philosophy, where also Law, Jurisprudence, and Government get some side glances.

Without further specification here, we shall now proceed with our survey, glancing at the branches as they come in our way.

Mental Philosophy, or Psychology—which name we shall use throughout the remainder of this lecture—we have shown to be, in our judgment, one of the two great divisions of Physical Science. Its proper department is limited to Mind as an entity, as a substance, and as an actual constitution. Mind must, therefore, have its *φύσις*, or nature, developed in its manifold instincts, tendencies, or properties, and must, therefore, be as capable of examination, through its functions, and their operations, as any material substance can be through its known properties.

Yet, in examining Mind, we are led to perceive that it is in very peculiar alliance with the intellectual region of Metaphysics. The knowledge of it, if correct and thorough, conducts us to the apprehension of other principles which, while purely philosophical, are in no respect physical. For there is a vital activity in mind which exists nowhere else ; and this vital activity is one of thought, feeling, and consequent determination, self-originated, self-sustained, and directed solely by laws which have no extrinsic parallel. Happiness and misery can never become conditions of any thing but mind ; and these conditions are the results of a causality at once innate and peculiar, the source of all vice and virtue, of all volition and virtuous or vicious action. To mind alone, contemplation, reasoning, faith, and demonstration are congruous and possible processes ; and the direc-

tion of these processes is often wholly beyond the range of physical science and actual being. And even these processes themselves are ruled, not only by the laws of the mental constitution, but also by others which are purely metaphysical, so as to give them an immediate alliance with the objects they embrace in the realms of possibility and probability, and in many instances to conduct them to the high sources of all conceivable things.

From such a comprehensive relationship, the science of mind, although physical in its direct application, cannot be completely studied without enlarging our sphere, and taking in vast portions of sciences which are not physical. Indeed, Psychology is the science which forms the connecting-link between the physical and the metaphysical. It stands on the highest side of the physical department, and is, so to speak, the very water-edge of that shore, on leaving which we find ourselves on an element at once allied and foreign. Thus connected, Psychology seems to grasp and govern what is in fact beyond its nature, and that so truly as to become the standing-place before which ranges itself the whole science of Being actual and possible, with all its subordinate parts.

To be more explicit—If mind be not assumed as a real being, there is nothing left. The supposed non-existence of mind puts a negation upon everything. It were absurd to speak of any proposition as a necessary truth, if nothing existed which could estimate truth. Truth and mind have an eternal and absolute correlation with each other. Mathematical truth, for example, would be nothing without intellect to weigh and apply it. The application of this rule to the laws of morality must leave an unquestioned result. Morality is nothing without relations, and relations always imply the co-existence of subjects. Moreover, Morality is mental, or it is nothing.

It will hence be fully apparent, that Psychology cannot be excluded from a cyclopedia of intellectual and moral sciences, without destroying the whole circle ; and moreover, that its

proper place in this department of study is at the very commencement. Nothing connected with the laws of thought and the sphere of morals can be understood with consistency without a preparatory comprehension of this. It is the only sure foundation of everything intellectual ; and there is evidence enough, in the contradictions which abound in intellectual and moral speculations, of the pernicious consequences of a neglect or a perversion of it.

Having thus assumed our first principle in the philosophy of thought, we proceed as if such a thing had never been questioned. Psychology is the first thing. All departments of thought must agree with that, for they are made for it.

We now come to the comprehensive Science of Metaphysics. The name indicates its range beyond physical being. We explain it elsewhere. Leaving then the substantial nature of the mind for the present behind to be recurred to as we want it, our first step leads us into the boundless field of abstractions, of essential principles, in all their variety and extent. The science begins with the laws of mind, without its *substance*; the laws in their range extend through the whole of spiritual existence. It abstracts them, and measures all spiritual natures by them, not indeed in individual, but in specific and generic forms ; and from these advancing, it seeks and scans Reason, first in its developments, and then in its absoluteness. It stops not short, indeed, of the region where Reason dwells in eternal stability and repose. It always reverts, however, to mind as its resting place, and as its *datum* for reasoning power. It is not vagrant—it is at once too vast, and too determinate for that ; so that while, for man, its beginning is with the mind that he *knows*, it never leaves him to wander in idle incertitude.

We will not, however, content ourselves with mere generalities in this lofty region—it is not necessary. Metaphysics includes all that can be understood of the actual constitution of things, as they have proceeded from a Supreme and Universal Power of Causation. Laws and relations,

learnt from existing things, are its matters of inquiry. No part of creation is thus beyond its reach as the work-field or the workmanship of the Almighty Creator.

And what is still more interesting to piety—the Being and Attributes of God, regarded not irreverently, and in the spirit of wild speculation and reckless hardihood, but humbly and with sober science, are objects of metaphysical inquiry. And there are no principles or laws, necessarily proceeding from that Being and those Attributes, whatever their range or application, whether physical, mathematical, or moral, which this science does not embrace. Metaphysics thus viewed is not the science of mind as an entity, but it is the science of the sphere in which mind moves, of the laws of that sphere, and of all the conditions and degrees in which mind can have an original or developed existence, together with all the conceptions among which it can range at large.

Such is the broad field of Metaphysical Science. Now, does it not appear, that between it and the constitution of the human mind there is a most interesting correspondence? Is not the mind, with its functions, just such a scholar as such a school befits? And, on the other hand, does not the school demand just such a pupil as man, gifted as he is assumed to be? Or to change the thought, does not the region befit the explorer, and the explorer the region? Vast as the science of Metaphysics is, it is not too vast, and certainly it is not too strange, for man; for it lies at our very doors, and, whether we will or not, it almost forces many of its truths upon our acceptance and entertainment. None but the stupidly and hopelessly animal, or the sordidly gain-loving, can altogether avoid its pressing appeals and demands.

We begin the more special views of Metaphysics with Logic.

But, in introducing Logic we must take somewhat unusual ground. The whole notion of Logic, current and popular as well as scientific, connects itself with Reason in no very

obscure manner of association. We think of Reason when we think of Logic, nor is it possible to dissever the thoughts. There must be some ground for so adhesive a sentiment. Doubtless, that ground is the fact, whether justified by the etymological explanation of the terms or not, that Logic has to do with the consistency and truthfulness of reasoning processes, processes belonging to the domain of Reason, and that as resulting from the Reason Absolute, the Reason of God, the Omniscient, the All-wise.

This consideration forbids us to enter on a course of technical instruction in Logic, without first understanding what the science can do for us in a far higher range of thought ; and thus, though we propose to do justice to the ordinary range and method, we shall place our feet on ground elevated far above common thought.

At once, then, we declare our conviction, that the Science of Reason, as that of Divine Intelligence, is the Science of Logic in its own proper field, and that it is this which gives its lower applications all their value.

It is necessary to observe, with regard to the term "Reason," which we so often use in our Outlines, that it has several meanings. To exhibit these meanings succinctly, we quote the following passage from our own Outlines of Logic in the second Volume. We say there—

"There are several notions attached distinctly and separately to the word 'Reason.' First, there is the individual faculty, the first great Power or Faculty in the mental economy of any intelligent being. Second, there is the operation of this faculty, which is more properly called 'reasoning.' Third, there are all such operations of all minds collectively, considered in an aggregate unity. Fourth, there is the aggregate reasoning faculty, together with the habit engendered thereby, whether quiescent or actively employed, of the finite but intelligent universe. Fifth, there is the abstract notion of the province of reasoning processes, and of the laws which guide and regulate them. Sixth, there is the

Reason Absolute, the Intelligence of the Creator, which is both the source and the sustaining power of all the rest."

Disregarding Reason as a psychological faculty, we take the fifth and sixth of the definitions just given of Reason, where we say, "that it is the abstract notion of the province of Reasoning processes, and of the laws which guide and regulate them"; and that "there is the Reason Absolute, the Intelligence of the Creator, which is the source and sustaining power of all the rest."

Now, first of all, it ought to be perfectly intelligible, that the Reason or Intelligence of the Creator, the Omnipotent God, is the only possible source of all Reason and reasoning power in the universe. *That* Reason must comprise the entire science and practice of mental operations with which creatures occupy their powers.

Now, by *Reason* do we not understand *consistency and truthfulness of thought, considered as thought, or, as a mental operation without regard to its subject matter?* and does not, as truly, this understanding belong to the high range of Infinite Faculty, as to the lower range of the created? In a word, consistency of thought in reasoning is Reason; and the same thing is Logic, whatever field or whatever elevation we take in explaining the matter. It is certainly true that the Infinite Reason will combine truth and consistency of matter with truth and consistency of thought; and that it can do so by reason of its very infinity; whereas we are so limited in faculty as to be compelled to sever the process of thought from the matter about which we reason, and to make our practical Logic a science of thought alone. But, while submitting to this necessity in our ordinary course of instruction, we are surely entitled to treat our department on a principle which can ennoble our minds, and to show *first* its breadth of lofty expansion before descending to the comparatively low ground of our limited science.

We have called the ground we take unusual, and it will be admitted at once that it is so. Time was when Logic was

called merely "The Art of Reasoning," or "The Art of Reasoning for the purpose of finding out Truth." Sometimes it was called "Dialectics," which really means no more than "the art of Discussion by Conversation." It was thought that a book or an instructor might give the power of finding the material truth in any matter of dispute. Such views are now pretty much discarded. Still there is a good deal of confusion as to whether Logic is a science or an art, and what, in either case, are its purposes. The highest views of it do not raise it much above the rank of *a science of forms*; or, perhaps more correctly, above that of *a science of Consistency of Forms in processes of thought*. Now we do not deny, we on the contrary maintain, that it is this in reality, as a reference to the commencement of our own course of Outlines will show. But we see no reason for the limitation of the science to this ground. There must be a science of high Reason somewhere, and where shall we find it but in the elevation we take for Logic? To clear our way we quote our own definition of Logic in regard to the common ground. We say:—

"In reality, Logic is both a Science and an Art. Then as a Science it is that of Consistency of Thought under laws purely intellectual, the laws of Reason not taken as a Faculty, not psychologically, but metaphysically, that is, abstractly; not subjectively, but objectively. As an Art, it is the grammar or analysis of reasoning processes."

Now we are prepared to say that, though it is our own, the above does not give the *whole* case of Logic as a science, but only the lower part of it; and in saying this we claim the right to say, also, that Logic has two scientific aspects, a higher and a lower, of which the above definition gives only the *lower*, leaving the higher to its proper study as the most important part of Metaphysical Science, while we fully admit that *Logic is the Science of Consistency, according to well-determined laws of Thought*, or however otherwise expressed, and that it is limited to *forms* of thought, exclusive of subject

matter ; we say, also, that it could not be even thus much if it were not also the Science of Consistency according to the laws emanating from the Reason Absolute and Eternal, and that all the consistency in the universe is measured by it.

For the purpose of this lecture we must take the whole Science of Logic, including its higher as well as its lower range ; or, rather, including the lower, not merely because we have specially to teach it in our course, but because it necessarily leads us to the higher, and goes to complete our acquaintance with the laws of Reason Universal. We maintain that the object of the lower range, beyond its art relation, is to raise our appreciation of the grand science of which it is only a part, though a very important one. Holding such views, our chief business for the instant is with the higher range. And here we say that Logic, as the Science of Consistency, of universal fitness, of the harmony of all truths and their legitimate and rational applications, comes from the Reason which arranged the universe rationally and harmoniously, and brings with it the traces of its parentage. It is, in fact, the Science of Reason itself. Its *formal* character as applied hereafter, derives all its truth and use, and as an Art it derives all its value, from the higher relation in which it stands to Universal Reason.

There is no inconsistency between the higher science of Logic, as we have held it, and the lower as we accept it. That lower science simply maintains that the laws of Thought require *consistency and agreement between premises and their conclusions*, leaving out of view the truth or falsehood of the matters of argument. Still, *consistency* is the thing demanded, and consistency is Reason. The higher science is still more completely a science of consistency, for it applies to the whole fitness and reason of things. It is hard to see how the lower science can be maintained if the higher be ignored. Logic must originate in the very Reason of God, or it can exist nowhere in any sense whatever. There is, therefore, a true agreement between our views and those to

which we allude, and ours are the completer. Logic, in every sense, and Reason, are really the same thing, but with conventional diversity of application.

As truly as all things exist, so truly are they the products of the Wisdom and Power that dwell in the Reason Absolute and Eternal, the only final Causality, the Reason of God, or, preferably, God Himself. Then, that Reason is the only possible source of Reason in all the developments of creation. Hence, what is called "the reason and fitness of things" is the *product* of the Divine Reason, and has no separate and independent existence. Yet as far as our own limited Power of Thought, our Reason, can reach and penetrate, we actually trace this "reason and fitness" in all departments of creation. In other words, there is a logical consistency everywhere, as truly as there is in the Laws of Thought. God has made His whole creation logically, and every principle of science has been logically developed in it. In other words, there is a universal Logic high as heaven, deep as Hades, broad as space, and to it all the works of God and all the principles of His Government are strictly conformed.

Hence it appears that Logic, in its true scope and character, is no trifling artifice of petty ingenuity, no plaything of schoolmen. Even when reduced to the Art of Analysing Reasoning Processes, its very technicalities must be rational and consistent, or they will not represent Logic at all.

This, then, is one of the Intellectual Sciences to be studied by us; and it is that one which must, from its very nature, be so "connected" with every other as to give them all whatever "connection" and consistency they have. Especially is it a fit field for the human powers explained by Psychology to explore and work in. A manifest connection there is between the universal "Reason of Things," and the Human Mind.

Descending from Reason Universal and Supreme, the high domain of an all-pervading Logic, there are two co-ordinate

branches of metaphysical science, most important because they have subordinate divisions alike under them. These are Mathematics and Moral Philosophy, the latter often called Ethical Science. Mathematics are, in rudiment, taught generally in schools; Ethics rarely, if ever.

Mathematics is the whole Science of Number and Quantity. Its matter of thought is whatever can be enumerated or measured. It, therefore, obviously comprises within its range of application every material structure and organization. All constructions have numbers and parts, and these are mathematical. The material universe, in all its divisions, is mathematically framed and adjusted. There are mathematical laws, not only in such great sciences as Astronomy, whose mechanism reveals them clearly, but in every subsidiary science. There are mathematics in every tree, shrub, and herb, in every animal frame. There are mathematics in all physical arts, and in every handicraft. There are mathematics in music, in painting, in sculpture. In short, wherever there is either number or quantity, there the ruling science is Mathematics. But Mathematics, however, practically applied, are still abstract in their nature—that is, they belong to Metaphysics. With Psychology, therefore, they stand in alliance as objects of thought, and the connection is inseparable.

But how does the science of Number and Quantity tend to Moral Science, or help to promote it? Evidently not in a direct manner, because it is in no respect subject to the Will. Yet is there a connection between the two in Natural Theology, and that in no respect equivocal. A right appreciation of God's works promotes the reverential confidence in Him which He claims—and here is a matter of high appreciation. Who can look through the well-adjusted universe without finding both matter and motive for the due adoration of its wondrous Creator? Thus the Mathematics of material structures are part of the matter of Natural Theology, and, through that, of high Morality.

To Morals, then, to Moral Philosophy or Ethical Science, we are brought even where we seemed least likely to find it. Nor is this in any respect fanciful. All the conceptions of mathematical science were in the Divine Mind, awaiting application, before they were actually applied to the construction of a domicile and a sphere of action, for rational and moral beings who were to serve and enjoy Him for ever.

But we come to Morals now directly, and here we have the second great division of Metaphysics ; for morality, too, is an abstraction, made up of eternal principles independent of the beings to whom they are to be applied.

Moral Philosophy comprehends the whole range of duties, mental and outwards, arising out of the dependence of intelligent beings on a Supreme Power, and out of their mutual relations, together with all the felicities to which a strict adherence to obligation, and all the infelicities to which a neglect of obligation, gives birth. We can conceive of no obligation, no duties, no merit or demerit, on any other ground than this.

The constitution of every individual mind is such, that its relation to the Infinite and Eternal Mind is at once apparent. Every mind partakes, in a limited measure, of all the properties of that Infinite Mind. A remark here is necessary to show what we mean by the terms "Absolute" and "Infinite," respectively. When we speak of God as Absolute, we place Him beyond all possible conception and comparison, with one whole unsearchable nature undistinguished by any attributes. Such in reality is God in Himself, and without revelation, for thus He cannot be revealed to a creature. But when we call Him Infinite, we view Him as He has revealed Himself to men, with appreciable, though boundless, attributes both physical and moral, a small semblance of which he has given, severally, to every rational being. Thus, then, we have in us the likeness of the Infinite Mind. That mind *thinks, desires, purposes, perseveres in intention, executes.* In a word, all mental operations and affections are represented to

us as properties of the Mind of God ; and to every mind of man the like properties are given by His implanting hand. Thus appears the essential alliance between our finite minds, and the Mind of the Infinite God. Out of this alliance, and from no other source, arises the whole Science of Ethics, for man specifically, but generically for the whole intelligent universe.

Giving supremacy, as we must necessarily do, to the Infinite, and dependence to the finite, we cannot but see that the correspondence which subsists between any individual intelligence and the Mind of God, inevitably involves the principle of subjection to His Sovereign Wisdom and Will, and of reliance, as befits dependence on His goodness and power. Here, then, is the very fountain of Moral Philosophy. It is impossible to avoid, or even to qualify this conclusion, without rendering Moral Science a nullity, and more, subverting the whole relation of God to man, and that of man to God.

The metaphysical principle of consistency demands for Absoluteness and Infinity, perfection and universality. Hence, God, who possesses Reason at once Absolute and Infinite, must have an ever unshaded and unbroken Consciousness wide in its perception as the universe, lasting as eternity. To such a Being what is not subject ? In conformity to such a Mind, what being can be otherwise than good and happy ? In repugnance to such a Mind, what being can avoid misery unspeakable ?

It cannot be supposed that a Mind of absolute perfection could reveal itself in a self-contradictory manner, if it should reveal itself at all under the representation of infinite attributes. Nor, again, can it be supposed that such a Mind could devise, or issue, laws mutually antagonistic and destructive. It could not be in the department of either physics or metaphysics, material or intellectual. If possible, still less could it be in moral government. All the laws of such a Being must, by metaphysical, that is, both intellectual

and moral necessity, be free from all variance with the harmonies of Reason and Truth universal. It might, indeed, choose its own method of revelation, to which no creature could have any right to object; but both intellectual and moral consistency in the *matters* of revelation there must be; and here is, in reality, the sovereignty of Wisdom and Truth.

In Reason Absolute, that is, the Absolute God, there is absolute simplicity and unity of nature, character, intelligence, and will, unlike our divided conceptions of God as revealed to us. In God, therefore, one Absolute Consciousness supersedes divided conceptions. In Him our notion of the distinctions of Reason and Volition, the Intellectual and the Moral ineffably blend into one thought. The same Reason which constructs the universe mathematically, governs it morally. The distinctions are ours, not God's. To us they are inevitable, to Him they are nought. The departments, therefore, are not as different and distinct to Him as they appear to us. We might almost say the Mathematical Reason morally governs; the Moral Reason constructs the universe—we might say it if we could so understand it. What a *unity* of sciences then is here! The One God is the God of Psychology, of Logic or high Reason, of Mathematics, and of Moral Philosophy. As they all unite in the Mind of God, their union *must* be essential; and thus they *can* appear to us *connected*, though we cannot see their absolute union. Thus, then, we arrive at the "Connection of the Intellectual Sciences," and even we can see how they must co-operate and blend.

But our end is not yet reached—we must show the determination of all Intellectual Science in Morals.

There is an innate grandeur in every one of the departments we have cursorily surveyed. In this world the most splendid production of the Creator is the human mind. Its array of powers adapted to every end, even to climbing the stupendous heights of the visible heavens, and approaching

the very throne of God, is beyond all comparison among merely material creations and arrangements. And worthy of these powers is the metaphysical field of their exercise. If Logic, in its primary character, is, as we think it, the Science of Reason, we see its grandeur in this, that it furnished even to the Mind of the All-wise the reasons necessary to guide the creating hand, while Mathematics furnished the rules of scientific truth necessary to the consistency, stability, and harmony of the vast creation. There is a magnificent field of thought in each of these departments worthy of our high appreciation. Of all this there can be no question.

But Moral Philosophy, even as a single department of thought, has a surpassing glory. In God's moral government, and in its arrangements and issues, must always be the consummation of his purposes. It is here that accountable beings must find their blessedness if they find it at all. It is here righteousness, and truth, and benevolence, find their proper scope and exercise. Intelligence is not happiness, nor does it secure it. Intellect may rove for ever in unresting vagrancy, hopeless of satisfaction or quietness. Not so the mind at one with the will of the Almighty. The soul which agrees with infinite righteousness, truth, and love, cannot but find ineffable repose. As, then, the whole nature of God prompts Him to give happiness, moral government is His supreme delight ; and for the establishment of this all His measures, all His departments of intelligence, are maintained and employed.

Had God created a world of merely intelligent beings without a moral nature, the case would have been far otherwise. Such beings might have been the creatures of a day, and might have ceased for ever to be. But such a creation from such a God could not have sprung. The very notion is an absurdity. Reason, without accountability and its issues, is a contradiction of all consistency. Thus, then, the moral government of God, and the happiness which it

alone can give, is the very end of His infinite intelligence, and of all His works. Must not, then, the science of that government be the prime science to His intelligent creatures?

It is moreover to be noted, that the Intellectual Sciences all unite in this grand issue. What is Psychology but the Natural History of the being who is to be made morally happy, by being made morally like God? What is the whole science of Metaphysics, but the field of exercise and growth in moral life for man with his vast powers? What is Logic to him but a domain of high rationality where he may train his intelligence for moral expansion? What are Mathematics but the law by which he has been furnished with an abode while growing into the moral likeness of God? What is Moral Philosophy itself but his school of virtue, where he may exercise himself in the very gymnastics of celestial spheres?

These are but feeble and imperfect illustrations of a great principle, yet we hope the effort will not have been altogether in vain. Before we close, an application or two of Moral Science requires to be pointed out.

There has been prevalent in many quarters a strange and ignorant prejudice against the study of Intellectual Science, and especially against the very term "Metaphysics." If we have succeeded in our aim, we have shown that this prejudice is most irrational, and that education, in future, ought not to be deemed complete without a competent acquaintance with subjects of this nature. We might, with truth, say, that this ought to be the prime department of education.

It is very true that the mass of mankind hardly seem to think they have souls to which such a science as Psychology can apply. Yet they *have* souls nevertheless, of the nature and high destinies of which it is a moral disgrace, and a lasting damage, to be ignorant or unmindful. Again, the masses scarcely know the name of Logic, either as a science or as an art; and if they ever use the word it is in a tone of contempt. The cause is, that they do not know that Logic

is but another name for the Reason of which they claim possession. Little do they perceive that there is Logic in every money contract, every dinner-table conversation, every transaction in which they engage. If men did not reason they could not deal with each other in the commonest things. And once more, they do not study Mathematics, but they practice them, they meet with them in every building they see, in the very clothes they wear, and in every purchase they make. If then they care not to explore these things, they should be glad that others explore them, and reduce them to forms fit for intelligent instruction.

But how important is it that morality, the very end for which man was created, and for which the whole domain of intellect subsists, should be far better understood and applied than it is ! It is a truth undeniably, that God has interwoven morality, as an emanation from Himself, with every thing that man is, or does, or devises. All institutions recognise its presence and dominion. Law is a moral institute ; so is legislation ; so is jurisprudence ; so is government ; so is commerce ; so is society in every form and degree of intimacy. It is utterly in vain to deny all this, it is worse than foolish to ignore it, for it cannot be disproved. The wise thing, therefore, is to acknowledge it, to use it, and to rejoice in it.

Again, we speak not here of Theology, of Religion, of Ecclesiastical Institutions, since they belong to a course beyond the purposes of these four series ; yet it must be asserted, and it shall, that the whole notion of such things is a recognition of a morality which comes from God, and which man must receive, or pay a terrible penalty for its rejection.

END OF VOL. I.



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